By Christopher Mitchell
One of the rules of thumb emerging from the growing research literature on conflict resolution is that it is better to try to make peace with a relatively unified adversary than with one that is factionalized and internally divided, both ideologically and organizationally. “Better” in this case means that, while bargaining may be tougher and negotiations more difficult, once an agreement is achieved there is a greater chance that it will prove durable, as there is a greater likelihood that it will be implemented and that the adversary will be able to sustain it.
This situation is different from that described in Fred Ikle’s classic Every War Must End, which deals with the divisions that inevitably arise over the question of whether the time has come to abandon the struggle and seek a compromise. It is related to but also different from Stephen Stedman’s “spoiler” problem. There are always those who are willing to fight to the bitter end – recall the recent fate of the LTTE in Sri Lanka. However, in many cases these “bitter enders” are few and can be satisfied, sidelined, or contained, like the members of the “Real” or “Continuity” IRA in Northern Ireland.
It is quite a different matter to try to create a durable peace with an opponent that is fundamentally split into several large sub-organizations or movements, not infrequently at odds with one another. In such circumstances, the temptation is often to take advantage of the adversary’s divisions, to divide, rule, and “win” – at least in the short term. The temptation for any “status quo” party to a conflict is either to try to defeat the adversary piecemeal or to take advantage of the other’s internal divisions and conclude a compromise settlement with the more “reasonable” sub-groups, without having to deal with the fundamental causes of the conflict.
Southern Sudan - By Michelle Glasser
This rule of thumb is well illustrated by the historical experience of the Sudan since independence from colonial rule. The only time a relatively durable agreement was reached to bring an end to the first civil war between north and south was in 1972. At that time, most of the various southern factions had achieved a perilous unity under Joseph Lagu and the South Sudan Liberation Movement, mainly brought about through the temporary dominance of its military wing, the Anya, over the previously disunited southern resistance. The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement lasted ten years until it was broken by Sudanese President Nimieri’s efforts to stay in power by placating his own internal opposition. A second civil war between north and south resulted, the southern resistance splintered again, and it took a further twenty years before another agreement could be hammered out, this one appearing likely to result in the final secession of the south from Sudan.
The present situation in Darfur in the west of the Sudan mirrors the historical disunity within the south, and again illustrates the difficulties of making peace with a factionalized adversary – always assuming that the regime in Khartoum wants a negotiated peace, which often appears open to question. Since 2003, the divisions within the armed Darfurian resistance, mirroring the ideological and ethnic divisions within the region between Fur, Masalit, Zaghawa, Berti, and the various misnamed “Arab” communities, have plagued efforts to arrive at a resolution. These divisions have become one of the crucial obstacles to serious negotiations aiming at a settlement that addresses the basic, underlying causes of conflict – ecological change, underdevelopment, political marginalization of the region, competition between ethnic groups for land and water, chronic insecurity, and an absence of effective mechanisms for managing local conflicts.
As with almost any resistance movement, there are inevitable differences between the military leaders in the country, who lead the actual fighting, and the political figures in exile in surrounding capitals, who conduct the political, diplomatic, and fundraising campaigns. In the case of Darfur, further deep divisions exist between the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A). For the SLM/A, there are subsequent splits into SLA/Abdulwahid, SLA/Minnawi, SLA/Abdulshafi, and SLA/Khamis; further splits into SLA/Juba and SLA/Unity; and organizations like the United Revolutionary Front and the URFF.
These have all contributed to the ability of the central government in Khartoum to pick those with whom it will negotiate, to change its negotiating partner when this appears a productive strategy, to stall negotiations when necessary, and to make the not entirely specious argument that there is no representative Darfurian body with which to hold serious negotiations that have some hope of ending the violence.
Restated, the rule seems to be:
“If you want to defeat an adversary, keep it divided and take every advantage of those divisions to achieve piecemeal victory; but if you want to negotiate realistically and with some hope of reaching a durable solution, ensure before you start that the other side is (relatively) unified.”
In the case of Darfur, the question becomes “Who can help this second process – represented by the frustratingly fractured negotiations in Doha – by acting as a unifier?” Efforts carried out by the UN/AU mediator can hardly be counted a success. The Chadian and Libyan governments (when they were closely engaged in the Darfurian problem) seemed content to back their own client organizations as, inevitably, the lead representatives. The US President’s Special Representative managed to create at least one coalition of organizations – the Liberty and Justice Movement (LJM), which replaced JEM as the government’s chosen negotiating partner in Doha. But overall, unity among the armed resistance remains elusive and the Darfur example suggests another rule of thumb:
“You cannot simultaneously carry out both roles as ‘mediator’ and ‘unifier’ with any great hope of success.”
If outsiders have little hope of bringing together Darfurian combatant movements into a single, representative body, what about insiders? Many years ago, John Paul Lederach and Paul Wehr introduced a potential intermediary in the figure of the “insider partial”, meaning somebody with links to all sides, with stature, local knowledge, and credibility, and with the respect of the adversaries, who thus felt sufficient confianza in this figure to trust his or her goodwill and support his or her activities. There does not seem to be a Nelson Mandela available for the peoples of Darfur, but perhaps a group of insider partials could build upon their individual confianza, and act as a unifier for the Darfurian movements, armed and unarmed. Then serious negotiations could at least begin.
———-
Christopher Mitchell received degrees in Economics and International Relations from University College in London. He is currently Professor Emeritus at the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, formerly known as the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR)) at George Mason University, where he was the Drucie French Cumbie Professor of Conflict Analysis from 1992-2005 and the director of ICAR from 1991-1994. He has held positions at seven universities in the U.K. and the U.S.
Dr. Mitchell was involved in Track Two negotiations for a wide number of protracted conflicts, including Cyprus, Israel and Palestine, Somalia, and Northern Ireland. He headed ICAR’s “Zones of Peace” project, analyzing local communities’ efforts to establish secure zones of peace in conflict areas including Colombia and El Salvador.
Dr. Mitchell continues to work on practical and theoretical aspects of peace processes and has recently published articles on the theory of entrapment, ending asymmetric conflicts, and a multi-role model of mediation. He has published extensively, and some of his key works include The Structure of International Conflict, New Approaches to International Mediation, and A Handbook of Conflict Resolution.