George Mason University

School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (S-CAR)

CONF 746: Peace Building

Semester: Fall 2011
Class Time: Thursdays, 4:30-7:10 pm
Location: Arlington Campus, ICAR (Truland) Building
               (Rm. 648)
Instructor: *Dennis J.D. Sandole, Ph.D.*
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COURSE DESCRIPTION

The objective of this course is to distill from appropriate
theory and practice the essential elements of *Peacebuilding* and
in the process, explore the analytical differences but also
substantive overlap and possible linkages between: (a) violent
conflict *prevention*; (b) conflict *management*; (c) conflict
settlement; (d) conflict *resolution* and (e) conflict
transformation.

The discussion will include types of Peacebuilding such as
reactive Peacebuilding, which is what 3ʳᵈ party interveners
attempt *after the fact* of an actual violent conflict involving
significant human rights violations -- after "the house has
caught on fire" (e.g., as in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the early
1990s). In "inductive," *reactive* Peacebuilding (IRP), members
of the "concerned international community" focus initially on
one particular type of intervention (in Bosnia, conflict
management through *UNPROFOR*) but if that fails, then move on to
other types (in Bosnia, conflict *settlement* through NATO bombing
of Serbian forces and then, following the Dayton Peace Accords,
peace enforcement with *SFOR, IFOR*, and currently *EUFOR*).
"Inductive," *reactive* Peacemaking (IRP) may develop into a basis
for one possible trajectory toward conflict *transformation* (in
Bosnia, through the conflict parties taking the steps necessary
to achieve eventual membership in the European Union).

By contrast, *proactive* Peacebuilding is what 3ʳᵈ party
interveners attempt *before the* fact of violent conflict. In
this case, interveners design and implement an intervention into
a *potential* violent conflict to achieve violent conflict

prevention -- to prevent "the   house from catching on fire." If that fails, they may then decide on a strategy of partial "inductive," *reactive* Peacebuilding (IRP), moving first to conflict *management* (preventing the fire from spreading) and if that fails*,* to conflict *settlement* (coercively suppressing the fire). If, however, their initial effort at *proactive prevention* succeeds (e.g., as with *UNPREDEP* in Macedonia), they may then decide to go forward with a strategy of "deductive," *proactive* Peacebuilding (DPP): employing the full array of multi-sectoral, multi-actor interventions normally reserved for full "inductive" *reactive* Peacebuilding (IRP), but in which all categories of intervention are designed and implemented from the outset *within* a conflict *transformation* framework.

The course features "deductive," *proactive* Peacebuilding (DPP) as one source of effective Regional and Global Governance, especially (but not only) for Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and former Soviet Union: what conflict resolution pioneer John W. Burton refers to as conflict *provention* and Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall as *Cosmopolitan conflict resolution*. Arguably, it is "deductive," proactive Peacebuilding (DPR) that constitutes the ultimate antidote to the deep-rooted causes and conditions of global terrorism.

The major premise underlying the course is that "national interest" is *global interest* and vice versa, especially within the current parameters of Globalization. Moreover, to achieve any objective along the violent conflict *prevention – transformation* gradient at the local, state, interstate or regional levels, policymakers must pay attention to the global level as well: "what goes around comes around!" As Ramsbotham, et al., put it:

> Conflict formations run through our political communities *at all levels*, from the global to the national to the local. Moreover, these conflict formations are *intertwined* … [Accordingly,] there is no possibility of addressing local and regional conflicts without also taking the global and international setting into account (emphasis added).[1]

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[1] See Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall (2011). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*. 3rd Edition. Cambridge (UK) and Malden (Massachusetts): Polity Press, p. 129.

Finally, the course emphasizes   that Peacebuilding -- whether reactive *("minimalist")* or proactive, inductive or deductive *("maximalist")* -- is a *multilateral* and not a *unilateral* process, even for the world's sole surviving superpower.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

1.   Prerequisites: CONF 501 or 801, *or* permission of the instructor.

2.   Assessment: Students will complete *one* (final) paper:

[a] A *FINAL PAPER* (25-30 double-spaced pages; **due: no later than Thursday, 15 December 2011**), in which, using **ALL** of the course readings, students will:

[i] *design a peacebuilding plan* for any conflict, at any level -- current, developing, potential, historical -- inclusive of

[ii] *modalities [i.e., details] of implementation* (e.g., how to achieve **coordination** among multiple actors performing different tasks at the same time and/or at different points over time (**60% of final grade**).

[b] Students will present on the projects culminating in their final papers for feedback (**20% of final grade**).

[c] Students will also present on the readings assigned for the course and, in any case, are expected to participate in class discussions on readings and in *scenario development exercises* (see below) (**20% of final grade**).

3.   Office Hours: Thursdays, 7:15-8:00 pm and by appointment.

4.   Withdrawal: The last day to drop the course without dean's permission is 14 September 2011.

REQUIRED READINGS

(1) Abu-Nimer, Mohammed (2001). *Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence: Theory and Practice*. Lanham (Maryland) and London: Lexington Books.

(2) Bellamy, Alex J. (2009). *Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities.* Cambridge (UK) and Malden (MA): Polity Press.

(3) Beswick, Danielle and Paul Jackson (2011). *Conflict, Security and Development: An Introduction.* London and New York: Routledge.

(4) Chetail, Vincent (2009).*Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon.* Oxford (UK) and New York: Oxford University Press

(5) Cousens, Elizabeth M. and Chetan Kumar (eds.), with Karin Wermester (2001). *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

(6) Diehl, Paul F. (2008). *Peace Operations.* Cambridge (UK) and Malden (MA): Polity Press.

(7) Junne, Gerd and Willemijn Verkoren (eds.) (2004). *Postconflict Development: Meeting New Challenges*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

(8) Lederach, John Paul (1997). *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) Press.

(9) Paffenholz, Thania (2010). *Civil Society & Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment.* Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

(10) Ramsbotham, Oliver, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall (2011). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts* (3rd Edition). Cambridge (UK) and Malden (MA): Polity Press.

(11) Reychler, Luc and Thania Paffenholz (eds.) (2001). *Peacebuilding: A Field Guide*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

(12) Rifkin, Jeremy (2004). *The European Dream: How Europe's Vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream.* New York: Jeremy P. Tarcher/Penguin (Penguin Group [USA]).

(13) Sandole, Dennis J.D. (2010). *Peacebuilding: Preventing Violent Conflict in a Complex World.* Cambridge (UK) and Malden (MA): Polity Press.

(14) Sokalski, Henryk J. (2003). *An Ounce of Prevention: Macedonia and the UN Experience in Preventive Diplomacy.* Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) Press.

(15) Wenger, Andreas and Daniel Möckli (2003). *Conflict Prevention: The Untapped Potential of the Business Sector.* Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

NOTE: Clearly, the course calls for a great deal of reading, but it is the instructor's view that the course demands nothing less than an attempt to be comprehensive in dealing with peacebuilding in the postmodern (post-Cold War and post-9/11) world.

Course Structure

I.   Introduction.

For the first few class meetings, we will introduce ourselves, overview the course and then start to briefly discuss actual or potential conflicts worldwide, inclusive of failing/failed and collapsing/collapsed states that could involve or are involving significant human rights violations. We will also discuss the interdependent dynamics between domestic and foreign conflicts, plus the *proactive* need to anticipate and deal with likely conflicts over time, as well as the *reactive* need to respond to actual conflicts worldwide in the short term. Implicit here is the need for significant reform of existing global and regional intergovernmental and NGO institutions (e.g., civil society), and the need for new mechanisms, to enhance prospects for "concerned members of the international community" to develop a *proactive* ("maximalist") Peacebuilding capability, complementing *reactive* ("minimalist") Peacebuilding proclivities and practices

already in place.

1 Sep:

> -- Introductions.
>
> -- Course Expectations.
>
> -- Course Overview.

8 Sep:

> -- State of Deadly Conflict in the World.
>
> -- The Domestic-Foreign Conflict Nexus
>
> -- Need to be Proactive ('Liberal') as well as Reactive ('Conservative').

> **Read:** Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall.

II. Peacebuilding: Theory, Analytical Frameworks, and Broad Surveys.

In this section, we will examine broad surveys of the Peacebuilding literature, noting, among other features, the distinction between *negative* and *positive peace*, as well as the overlap between various 3rd party interventions. We will also discuss two frameworks for facilitating the analysis and design/implementation of interventions into potential or actual, complex conflicts.

15/22 Sep:

> -- Peace.
>
> a. Negative.
> b. Positive.
>
> -- 3rd Party Interventions.
>
> a. [Violent] Conflict *Prevention* (**Preventive Diplomacy**).
>
> b. Conflict *Management* (**Peacekeeping**).

        c. Conflict *Settlement* (**Coercive Peacemaking**).

        d. Conflict *Resolutio*n (**Noncoercive Peacemaking**).

        e. Conflict *Transformation* (**Peacebuilding**).

     -- Relevant Frameworks.

        a. 3 Levels of Conflict Reality.

           -- Conflict-as-*Symptoms*.

           -- Conflict-as-*Fractured Relationships*.

           -- Conflict-as-*Deep Rooted Causes and Conditions*.

        b. 3 Pillar Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution.

           -- Conflict *Elements* (P1).

           -- Conflict *Causes and Conditions* (P2).

           -- Conflict *Intervention* (P3).

   Read: Chetail; Lederach; and Sandole, Chs. 1-2.

29 Sep: **Part II, cont'd.**

   Read: Reychler and Paffenholz.

III. Peacebuilding: Specific Components.

The objective here is to examine a number of components of the Peacebuiding enterprise in greater detail.

 6 Oct: *State Fragility/Failure.*

   Read: Cousens and Kumar.

13 Oct: **Semester Break.**

20 Oct: *Responsibility to Protect* and *Peace Operations.*

    Read: Bellamy; and Diehl.

27 Oct: UN *Intervention in Macedonia.*

    Read: Sokalski.

 3 Nov: *Security and Development.*

    Read: Junne and Verkoren; and Beswick and Jackson.

10 Nov: *Role of Civil Society.*

    Read: Paffenholz.

17 Nov: *Role of the Business Community.*

    Read: Wenger and Möckli.

IV. Peacebuilding Successes and Failures: Lessons Learned.

The objective here is to examine a number of cases where various elements or interpretations of Peacebuilding have been attempted, noting failures as well as successes and "lessons learned."

    Read: Sandole, Ch. 3.

V. The European Union as the World's Pre-eminent Peacebuilding Project.

The objective here is to discuss the EU as the ultimate Peacebuilding project in Europe, if not the world; the sources of its relative success and the prospects for it to be employed as a *model* for other areas and regions worldwide. Included here is the role of the EU in absorbing former Cold War "enemies" as well as Yugoslav successor states (e.g., Bosnia, Kosovo, and Serbia) which engaged in genocidal conflict during the 1990s.

Of special importance against the background of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) is the potential for the EU to embrace Muslim Turkey as well, and in the process nip in the bud the self-fulfilling "clash of civilizations" dynamic that has been unleashed by the GWOT.

> -- Immanuel Kant's "Perpetual Peace" (*Ewige Frieden*).

> -- Democratic Peace Theory.

> -- Superordinate Goals.

> -- Basic Human Needs (BHNs) for *Identity, Recognition*, and *Security*.

> -- Conflict *Provention*/"Cosmopolitan Conflict Resolution."

Read: Rifkin.

VI. Trauma, Historical Memory, Justice, and Reconciliation: "The Devil Lies in the Details."

Here we examine the necessity of dealing with the psycho-emotional "baggage" that severely traumatized victims carry around with them that must be dealt with *before* reconciliation of any significance can take place. As one example, Armenia's historical conflict with Turkey regarding the issue of the 1915 Genocide must be addressed as a "necessary condition" for Armenia and "Turkic" Azerbaijan to deal effectively with their current "frozen" conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. The discussion will also explore approaches to trauma-healing and reconciliation.

> **Read:** Abu-Nimer; Chetail (pp. 256-267, 368-379); Ramsbotham, et al. (Ch. 10); Reychler & Paffenholz (Chs. 12.1-12.8).

24 Nov:
> -- The Role of Trauma and Historical Memory ("Chosen Trauma") in the Etiology of Violent Conflict.

  --   Justice *and/or* Reconciliation.

  --   Trauma Healing.

VII. Conclusion: Further Institutionalizing Peacebuilding as Both the Right and Sensible Thing to Do: Domestically, Nationally, Regionally, and Globally.

Here, we will briefly explore the implications of insights generated by the course thus far for applications of *reactive* ("minimalist") and *proactive* ("maximalist") models of Peacebuilding to other areas and regions, including Afghanistan, Armenia/Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Georgia, Iraq, Palestine, and Sudan. We will also discuss the potential role of the U.S. – the world's sole surviving superpower – as a source of Peacebuilding expertise, resources, *and* leadership. Part of the objective here will be for the U.S. to work with its partners in Europe (the EU, NATO and OSCE) and others worldwide, including the UN, to develop effective Regional and Global Governance. The *new European peace and security syste*m (NEPSS), a framework designed by the instructor for developing a system of "Cosmopolitan conflict resolution" in Europe, will be discussed as a model for Regional Governance in Europe and elsewhere, ultimately enhancing prospects for the development of Global Governance.

As was made abundantly clear by former President George W. Bush and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair in their prosecution of the war in Iraq, a "neo-conservative-only" approach to dealing with complex identity-based conflicts tends to lead to self-defeating, counter-productive outcomes. Accordingly, this discussion – and the course -- will close with the necessity of resolving the "clash of cultures" between conservatives and liberals in the U.S. and elsewhere in order to complement existing *reactive* ("minimalist") models with new *proactive* ("maximalist") models of Peacebuilding and to definitively "win" the GWOT.

 1 Dec:

    --   Implications of Insights for Other Areas (e.g., Afghanistan, Armenia/Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Georgia, Iraq, Palestine, Sudan).

--   The Role of the U.S. in Global Peacebuilding.

--   The Role of Peacebuilding in Regional and Global
         Governance.

--   "Winning" the GWOT.

--   The Ultimate Challenge: Closing the
         Simple/Visceral ['Conservative'] –
         Complex/Intellectual ['Liberal'] Gap.

   Read: Sandole, Chs. 4-5.

**VIII.   Putting it All Together "in Practice" -- Scenarios
             Development Exercise.**

8 Dec:

         A.   Identity a *Conflict* (Current, Developing or
              Potential) that Could Worsen or Improve during

the

              Next 5-10 Years (**Pillar 1**).

         B.   Explore *Conflict Trajectories*:

              1.   Identify the Factors -- *"Drivers"* --
                   That Could Make the Conflict Worse
                   or Better (**Pillar 2**).

              2.   Construct a *Scenario* Indicating How
                   These Factors Could Combine to Make the
                   Conflict Worse (**Worst-Case Scenario**=*Negative
                   Trajectory*) or Better (**Best-Case Scenario**=
                   Positive Trajectory) (**Pillar 2**).

         C.   Design a *Strategy* for Responding to these Factors
              ("Drivers") to Either *Undermine* their Potential
              Negative Impact or *Enhance* their Positive Impact
              on the Conflict over Time (**Pillar 3**).

15 Dec: Papers Due.