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# LIBERIA ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PROCESSES PROGRAM EVALUATION

## FINAL REPORT

NOVEMBER 2008

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### **DISCLAIMER**

The authors' views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.



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## ABBREVIATIONS

BRIDGE	Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections
CEPPS	Consortium for Electoral and Political Processes
CDC	Congress for Democratic Change
COPPWIL	Coalition of Political Parties Women in Liberia
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Accords
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DG	Democracy and Governance
DFID	Department for International Development
DI	Democracy International, Inc.
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
EPP	Electoral and Political Processes
EPPSP	Elections and Political Processes Strengthening Program
FLY	Federation of Liberian Youth
GOL	Government of Liberia
IFES	International Foundation for Election Systems
IPCC	Interparty Consultative Committee
IR	Intermediate Results
IRI	International Republican Institute
JLMC	Joint Legislative Modernization Committee
LAP	Liberia Action Party
LEAP	Liberian Election Administration Program (IFES)
LP	Liberty Party
LPC	Liberian Peace Committee
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NACEM	National Coalition for Election Monitoring
NAYMOTE	National Youth Movement for Transparent Elections
NDI	National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NEC	National Elections Commission
NPFL	National Patriotic Front for Liberia
NPP	National Patriotic Party of Liberia
NGTL	National Transition Government of Liberia
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
SJSCC	Special Joint Stakeholders Collaborative Committee
SO	Strategic Objective
TA	Technical Assistance
UNDP	United Nations Development Fund
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNV	UN Volunteer
UP	Unity Party
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
WANEP	West African Network for Peacebuilding
WIPNET	Women in Peacebuilding Network
WLC	Women's Legislative Caucus





## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Liberia started a process of democratic transformation with the implementation of the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Accords (CPA) and the holding of credible national elections in 2005. Since then the peace has held and the difficult process of rebuilding a nation devastated by despotic leaders and civil war has begun. USAID provided significant levels of support to this process, including through its Electoral and Political Processes Strengthening Program (EPPSP). While other donors and the UN peacekeeping mission scaled back their elections and political processes (EPP) support after the successful 2005 elections, USAID continued its assistance, filling a critical need and playing a substantive role in helping to ensure the process continued its forward momentum.


At the start of the EPPSP program, Liberia was a failed state.<sup>1</sup> It has come a long way from this rock bottom baseline but its political and electoral systems are still in transition and fragile. Difficult and divisive decisions about the future shape and nature of its political systems and structures remain to be made that will test Liberia's political will, institutional capacity and ability to deliver democratic governance. Continued international engagement and support to the EPP processes through this transitional period is critical to its eventual success. The next phase of EPP assistance should clearly focus on the processes leading up to the holding of credible elections in 2011 and the peaceful transfer of power from this democratically elected government to the next. Liberia's recent gains could be lost if the 2011 elections are not perceived as credible and if losing parties do not accept the results.

## BACKGROUND

USAID's Electoral and Political Processes Strengthening Program in Liberia has been implemented since November 2004 through a Cooperative Agreement with the Consortium for Electoral and Political Processes Strengthening (CEPPS). The EPPSP originally focused on supporting successful national elections in 2005 and the transition from conflict to an elected government based on democratic principles of participation, representation and accountability. The program was extended and expanded in mid 2006 to include strengthening of the newly elected legislature. EPPSP is currently scheduled to end October 31, 2008 with a cost and time extension currently under discussion to take the program to January 31, 2009.

The CEPPS implementers in Liberia have been the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI). Although each implementer worked toward the common EPPSP goals, each one had its own program, budget allocations and reporting. IFES focused primarily on strengthening election administration, IRI on building a multi-party system and NDI on civic education and, after 2006, legislative strengthening.

USAID/Liberia commissioned Democracy International, Inc. (DI) to undertake this external evaluation of its Elections and Political Processes Strengthening Program in order to assess



<sup>1</sup> USAID/Liberia, *Annual Report, FY 2005* p 3

its impact and management and to make recommendations for future programming. The evaluation was conducted by an independent team of experts in September - October 2008 and included site visits and interviews in Liberia with USAID and the CEPPS partners, the National Elections Commission (NEC), the National Legislature, political parties, civil society and others in Monrovia and in the counties of Bomi, Grand Bassa and Margibi. A short questionnaire was developed and distributed to civil society organizations (CSOs) involved in EPP activities to extend the evaluation's reach and gather additional information. Evaluation findings are discussed according to USAID's main EPP objective areas, specifically: strengthening the electoral process; building a multi-party political system; legislative strengthening; and increasing citizen participation.

## **FINDINGS**

The evaluation found that the EPPSP targeted critical EEP needs in Liberia's post-conflict transition and met most of its objectives as defined in the Cooperative Agreement with CEPPS. Assistance in its first phase (November 2004 - July 2006) was well focused, targeted and within the larger donor assistance framework that helped Liberia achieve elections widely regarded as free and fair, and resulted in the peaceful transfer of power from the National Transition Government



of Liberia (NTGL) to the newly elected government. Six months of bridge funding led to a second phase of assistance (December 2006 – present) that provided some of the critical “how-to’s” and models for democratic agents of change within the National Legislature and, to a more limited extent, within political parties. Continued assistance to the NEC helped consolidate and build its professional and institutional capacity. These are important accomplishments in a difficult post-conflict environment.

However, the strategic focus for the EPPSP program has become blurred since 2006, in part from not having a clearly articulated strategic vision for its post-elections programming and in part by becoming driven by the nature of its CEPPS implementation mechanism. This directly affected its potential for impact and complicated its implementation and management.

### ***Strengthening the Electoral Process***

IFES provided support to the 2005 national elections and the six subsequent by-elections. This included significant levels of commodities support, and the provision of technical assistance (TA) and capacity building for the NEC. Areas of focus included campaign finance reporting, electoral dispute resolution, electoral districting and planning for local elections. IRI and NDI helped develop links between the NEC with political parties and civil society and through the fielding of international observation missions in 2005. IRI continues to facilitate regular NEC – party consultations through an Interparty Consultative Committee (IPCC) process while since 2007 NDI has supported legislative committees dealing with electoral reform. Most recently IFES facilitated the creation and work of a Special Joint Stakeholders Collaborative Committee (SJSCC) that developed boundary harmonization guidelines and draft legislation that is now with the National Legislature.

The evaluation found that the electoral process was strengthened as a result of the EPPSP assistance. The legal and administrative framework to hold competitive multiparty elections was es-

established enabling credible national elections in 2005 and six successful by-elections. The NEC has become a permanent institution and is widely perceived as independent and professional. It holds regular consultations with political parties and is pushing electoral reform needed to update voter registration and hold long-over-due local elections. In particular, the EPPSP:

- **increased the credibility of the NEC and the elections it administered** by helping to build a permanent and professional institution that is capable of administering an election and that is widely perceived as independent and impartial;
- **improved the transparency and fairness of the electoral process** by increasing access for the disabled; supporting uniform guidelines for electoral representation and by facilitating channels of communications between the NEC, political parties and stakeholders; and
- **increased the accountability of the process** by improving election dispute adjudication and regulations for campaign finance reporting; training party agents and domestic observers to monitor the process; fielding a high-level international observation mission in 2005 and by the continued presence and activities of EPPSP implementers in the post-electoral period.

At the same time, the NEC is a nascent institution working in a difficult environment. Meeting the EPPSP objectives for Phase 2 will require the continued support and engagement of the international community through the constitutional referendum process, local elections and the 2011 national elections cycle to ensure that the process does not become diverted or revert.

### ***Building a Representative and Competitive Multi-Party Political System***

IRI provided capacity building and training for registered parties competing in 2005 and in the by-elections. More intensive party building activities started in 2007 for the six major parties with seats in the Legislature and national party officials. Election-related assistance included promoting a peaceful election (with development of a code-of-conduct and sparking the IPCC), public debates and party agent training. Recent assistance included development of action plans for parties at the national and county levels. IRI also houses a resource center for parties with computers and internet connection. In collaboration with IRI, IFES conducted training on political finance regulations, and IFES included parties in its technical BRIDGE training.

The evaluation found that considerable progress has been made towards developing a multiparty system in Liberia compared to its baseline and political history. Six major parties remain visible and vocal three years after the elections and were working through the system rather than having gone dormant or resorting to violence. This is a significant accomplishment. In particular, EPPSP:

- **contributed to the acceptance of election results by losing parties** through its party building activities and training of political party monitors;
- **started a process of fundamental change** in the party system from top-down, personality-based and patronage-driven to more institutionalized structures and system at both the center and county levels by empowering national and county party officials;

- **raised demand among voters for parties to take positions on issues and to deliver** on their campaign promises through party debates, town hall meetings and radio shows.

At the same time, personality-based political parties are rooted in Liberia's history and political culture and transforming them into institutions with formal structures and close links with constituents is difficult and takes time. Nevertheless, strong political parties are a key component of a post-conflict transition as they can keep key constituencies and leaders engaged in the political process and increase the chances that a losing party will accept the election results. The challenges are considerable as there are many potential spoilers or those seeking personal power that will resist such change and continued engagement and support for this transformation is critical.

### ***Increasing Civic Participation***

NDI focused on civic education and participation from 2004-2006 providing sub-grants to local NGOs to undertake voter education and domestic observation. IFES complemented this effort by funding a number of Disabled People's Organizations (DPOs) for training and observation for special need voting. In the post-2005 period, with the exception of IFES' civic education activities, most EPPSP civic participation activities that focused on women and youth or were linked to specific activities, such as the NDI's town hall meetings for legislators and IRI's party debates.

The evaluation found that EPPSP activities contributed directly to strengthen the understanding and knowledge of the CSOs that participated in the program but that not enough baseline information or subsequent data was collected to determine the level of impact among the broader population, especially given the large-scale nature of other civic education done within the CEPPS timeframe. Nevertheless, the evaluation team believes EPPSP support resulted in:

- **increased credibility of the 2005 electoral process** through domestic observation, and of the by-elections where CSOs used EPPSP training to mount their own observation efforts; and
- **increased awareness among women of their ability to participate and to run for office** which is expected to result in a significant increase in the number of female candidates in the local and 2011 national elections.

### ***Legislative Strengthening***

NDI started a process of legislative strengthening in mid-2006 that focused on building the capacity of key committees and linking legislators to their constituencies. It provided trainings and individual coaching, and facilitated a series of legislator retreats to work on legislation and public hearings, including the budget. It organized town hall meetings for each legislator with his or her constituents in their districts and with UNDP supported the Joint Legislative Modernization Committee (JLMC) to develop a strategic plan for the institutional development and reform of the National Legislature.

The evaluation found the individual capacity of legislators, key committees and some caucuses were strengthened as a result of EPPSP assistance. In addition, relations between constituents and legislators improved. Both the House and Senate have held public hearings on critical issues including the first televised public hearings on the 2008/2009 draft budget. Every lawmaker has returned at least once to meet with his or her constituents, and the Women's Legislative Caucus is actively reaching out to women voters and changing the way men look at women in politics.

However, this program should have been complemented by a large-scale institutional capacity building program which was absent. This directly affected the working environment within the Legislature and of the EPPSP program, limiting its effectiveness and potential impact. Nevertheless, EPPSP assistance:

- **increased the effectiveness of the legislature** by providing material support, training and mentoring in the almost total absence of any other assistance to support the democratic transition and functioning of this institution;
- **increased the ability of the legislature to act as an independent body** by providing technical and logistical expertise on such things as public hearings, budget analysis and standing rules and procedures;
- **increased the visibility and effectiveness of women legislators** through professional training and support to the development and outreach of a women’s legislative caucus; and
- **increased the awareness among legislators of accountability issues** regarding their constituencies and increased demand for accountability among voters.

The current legislature is in transition and is making critical decisions, establishing precedents of procedure and developing an institutional culture that will directly affect the future shape and direction of the electoral and political processes. The international community needs to continue to mentor and support this process.

### ***Program Design and Implementation Issues***

The evaluation found the EPPSP results were directly affected by the nature of the program design and the mechanism chosen for its implementation. USAID/Liberia provided a very clear strategic vision and direction in the initial program description that resulted in a relatively integrated and cohesive program that was focused directly on the critical constraints facing the 2005 elections. This strategic direction was not provided in subsequent phases where program descriptions identified activity areas rather than objectives under the general rubric of “*political process strengthened.*” As a result, program activities started to diverge into the respective areas allocated to each implementer by the CEPPS mechanism which became formalized over time in the USAID program descriptions. For some Phase 2 activities, such as polling and civic participation, the lack of an overarching strategic purpose to guide their targeting, timing and use resulted in a negligible impact at a strategic level even though the activity itself may have met the “objective” of the Agreement.

The EPPSP program was also constrained by management issues. IRI in particular had a difficult time finding and keeping a suitable chief of party, and suffered from an alleged accounting impropriety that resulted in USAID conducting an audit of all three CEPPS partners’ financial management systems. USAID/Liberia was also understaffed for much of the time, leaving program management and monitoring to its overburdened program office or a series of temporary or short-term managers. In addition, except for IFES, the evaluation team found little institutional memory among the implementers for Phase 1 of the program and no cumulative reporting of their program’s or EPPSP’s outputs. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) plans were also insufficient to be able to capture all of the results and accurately document program impact.

## **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

The EPPSP program implemented by IFES, IRI and NDI through CEPPS addressed a critical need in post-war Liberia that helped it to navigate successfully through its peacekeeping elections which kept the democratization process moving forward in the difficult early years of its democratic transition. The evaluation finds that this transformation is still underway and that continued support to EPP remains a critical need through the 2011 national elections.

As a result, the evaluation team recommends:

- a continuation of EPP support that directly targets the processes leading up to and through the elections in 2011, including needed constitutional reforms and the holding of local elections. This includes continued assistance to the NEC and political party building, more strategic use of CSOs for monitoring and advocacy, and for EPP programming that is more synergistic and mutually reinforcing;
- a more robust program of legislative support that includes institutional strengthening; and
- an updated DG assessment to prioritize the critical areas for EPP support and enable strategic planning and targeting of its activities.

## **PART I: BACKGROUND**

### **I. POLITICAL AND ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN LIBERIA**

Liberia suffered from an extended and far-reaching period of violent state collapse between 1990 and 2005. Settled in 1821 by freed slaves from the U.S., Liberia became Africa's first independent republic in 1847. Descendants of these freed slaves, known as Americo-Liberians, dominated the political landscape until a 1980 coup led by Sgt. Samuel Doe. His regime concentrated power among the Krahn ethnic group. The 1989 invasion by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL) led to the fall of Doe's brutal military regime and resulted in a protracted and multisided conflict between the NPFL, Nigerian-led ECOMOG peacekeepers, and a plethora of smaller armed factions (notably ULIMO-K, ULIMO-J, and the Liberian Peace Council). An estimated 200,000 Liberians died in the ensuing war. Battle lines were fluid, factions engaged in predatory behavior to seize valuable resources, street battles raged in Monrovia, and the use of child soldiers was widespread.

<b>PEACEKEEPING ELECTIONS IN LIBERIA</b>		
<b>Election</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Turnout %</b>
Presidential	7/19/97	89
Legislative	7/19/97	89
Presidential	10/11/05	74.9
Legislative	10/11/05	74.9
Presidential 2 <sup>nd</sup> R	11/08/05	61

In 1997 the Abuja II peace agreement called for quick elections and Nigeria pressed for a rapid wrap up of the peace process. In a context of pervasive fear and insecurity, and where Taylor controlled vast resources, Taylor won in a landslide and was inaugurated as president. Peace, however, did not last. Taylor never transformed his NPFL insurgency with its links to contraband, criminal networks, and war in Sierra Leone into a political movement able to govern peacefully. International sanctions were placed on Taylor and key allies. By 1999, the LURD (drawing on some of the same constituents as ULIMO-K) and later in 2003 MODEL (drawing on ULIMO-J and LPC) reached the outskirts of Monrovia. Under tremendous international pressure, Taylor resigned in 2003, going first into exile in Nigeria and then to The Hague to face charges arising from the Sierra Leone war crimes tribunal.

<b>POLITICAL PARTIES IN LIBERIA NUMBER OF ELECTED SEATS</b>				
<b>PARTY</b>	<b>1997</b>		<b>2005</b>	
	<b>S</b>	<b>H</b>	<b>S</b>	<b>H</b>
All Liberia Coalition Party	2	3	1	2
Alliance for Peace & Democracy [LPP, UPP]			3	5
Alliance of Political Parties [LAP, LUP]	-	2		
Coalition for the Transformation of Liberia [LAP, LUP, PPDPL, TWP]			7	8
Congress for Democratic Change			3	15
Liberian People's Party		1		
Liberty Party			3	9
National Democratic Party of Liberia			2	1
National Patriotic Party	26	64	4	4
National Reformation Party			1	1
New Deal Movement			3	
United Democratic Alliance [LNU, LEDP, RAP]		-		1
United People's Party		2		
Unity Party	3	7	3	8
Independents			3	7
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>30</b>	<b>64</b>

The 2003 Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) called for a National Transition Government of Liberia (NTGL) with large representation by the major armed factions. The resulting authority was pre-occupied with competing for positions from which they could extract resources and patronage. The 2005 elections (for President, Vice President, and all 30 Senate and 64 House seats) represented a critical opportunity for Liberia to move from a failed state into the early first stages of recovery, peacebuilding

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and democratization. The elections took place in a context of considerable uncertainty with a new and untested National Elections Commission, an array of weak and personalized political parties and widespread fears about security.

Despite the difficulties, successful elections were held and the newly elected government took office in January 2006. This included Africa's first elected woman president, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. As members of the NGTL were excluded from running in these elections, the playing field was considered relatively level and no one party gained a majority in the National Legislature. The new Legislature is a mosaic of different actors, including some from previous governments, and others with limited formal education or with ties to former warring factions. The new government has been working since its inauguration, but many issues remain to be addressed. A recent UNMIL/GOL assessment characterized Liberia as "fragile" and identified some of the serious threats to its stability as insecurity, lack of rule of law, unemployment among youth (including groups of ex-combatants), pervasive ethnic tensions, land disputes and the need for better governance and economic development.<sup>2</sup>

## 2. DONOR ASSISTANCE

The electoral and political processes in Liberia received large scale assistance from the international community, particularly for the national elections in 2005 which were almost completely funded by donors. The largest actor was the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) which provided more than 30 long-term electoral experts and 180 UN Volunteers (UNVs). In addition,

INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE ELECTORAL AND POLITICAL PROCESSES <sup>3</sup>		
DONOR	2005 Elections	2006-2008
UNMIL	33 LT TA; 180 UNVs Operational, logistical, IT & budget support	Logistical support for by-elections
UNDP	Voter education through CSOs	Legislative and electoral support; civic education
UNIFEM	Training for women including public speaking.	Secretariat services & office for Women's Legislative Caucus
EU	TA: Legal & Voter Education. Support to political parties. Support to domestic observers. Civic and voter education. International Observation Mission.	Some legislative training (workshops/study tours)
U.S.	NED: CSO assistance. OTI: NEC office furniture & rehabilitation community radios USAID: EPPSP	OTI: Legislative score card & radio shows. USAID: EPPSP; renovation of Capital Building
World Bank		Some training to Legislature re budget issues
Other Donors	Ireland: Carter Center LT international observers	DFID: Civic education

UNMIL provided the critical logistical support required for these elections, including transport for the distribution of sensitive electoral materials. The European Union (EU) was another large donor. It had a significant focus on civic education but also provided technical assistance, political party and domestic observation support and some training for the newly elected legislature.

The U.S. was the largest bilateral donor, providing funding to UNMIL as well as directly to the process through its Office of Transitions Initiatives (OTI) and its democracy and governance (DG) programs. Since November 2004 EPP support has been primarily provided through USAID's EPPSP program implemented by CEPPS. The U.S. continues

<sup>2</sup> United Nations, Security Council, *Seventeenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*.

<sup>3</sup> List is illustrative to show the comparative levels of international assistance to Liberia for EPP and is not comprehensive.



to be the largest and most active EPP donor in the post-elections period (2006-2008) through the EPPSP. It also appears to be the only donor currently providing support to political party development. Most of the other donors, including UNMIL, either scaled back or ended their assistance after the 2005 elections. The UNMIL political section still provides advice to political actors, including parties and legislators, but has little actual funding for programs. UNDP continues to support the process, including some legislative strengthening and NEC support.

### 3. USAID'S ELECTORAL AND POLITICAL PROCESSES STRENGTHENING PROGRAM

EPPSP was a follow-on to USAID-funded programs implemented by IFES and IRI, and NED-funded activities by NDI. By awarding a Cooperative Agreement (669-A-00-05-00013) with CEPPS, USAID intended to have a strong elections support program of *intensively-applied, technical assistance and training* for the 2005 elections along with some material assistance, with a few activities continuing through the seating of the new government in January 2006. The initial Agreement for \$6,800,000 was issued on December 14, 2004, with an effective date of November 1, 2004. Its purpose was to *support key institutions and processes in order to a) realize successful Liberian national general elections in October 2005; and b) help to ensure a successful transition from conflict to a newly elected government based on democratic principles of participation, representation and accountability.*

Specific EPPSP objectives were to:

- *help carry out an effective and credible electoral process that results in the election of legitimate political leaders for Liberia's new, post-war government;*
- *build a more representative and competitive multiparty system in Liberia; and*
- *enhance public participation and political party and government accountability at the national and local levels during the elections as well as immediately after the elections and during the transition period.*

These areas were allocated respectively to IFES, IRI and NDI. Most of the funding (\$4.8 million) was allocated to IFES for direct elections assistance. The Agreement was modified in 2005 to add funding for international and domestic observation. After the elections, USAID added bridge funding and extended the Agreement's end date to December 22, 2006 while a two-year extension to the program was negotiated. This extension raised the total budget of the Agreement to its current level of \$17,816,097, and extended its end date to October 31, 2008. The Agreement has gone through 11 Modifications in total which are detailed in Annex 2.



The two year extension in 2006 added a fourth main objective to EPPSP:

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- *strengthen the new legislature to represent the interests of constituents, engage in law-making, conduct oversight, and model transparency and accountability in its own activities.*

A fifth objective of *conducting anti-corruption research and coalition building* was also added but dropped a year into the extension, reportedly because it was perceived as potentially destabilizing.

CEPPS results were to contribute directly to USAID/Liberia's *Intermediate Result 9.4: Political processes strengthened*. USAID's EPPSP indicators are:

- *Legislative capacity to represent constituencies and provide oversight of executive branch operations;*
- *NEC actions to promote voter education, political party liaison and election law reforms;*
- *Political parties with permanent offices in at least eight counties;*
- *Number of election officials utilizing new skills and knowledge (added 8/08); and*
- *Number of USG assisted political parties with functioning formal operations (added 8/08).*

The complete list of USAID's EPPSP objectives and indicators are in Annex 1.

### 4. EPPSP EVALUATION

USAID/Liberia commissioned Democracy International, Inc. (DI) to undertake this external evaluation of its Elections and Political Processes Strengthening Program in order to assess its impact and management and to make recommendations for future programming. The EPPSP program was implemented through a Cooperative Agreement with CEPPS. The CEPPS implementers were IFES, IRI and NDI each of which implemented their own programs. As a result, each of these programs was evaluated according to the EPPSP results anticipated in the Cooperative Agreement as well as in their respective M&E Plans. USAID/Liberia asked for an *impact* evaluation, however as detailed more fully in the Methodology section (Attachment B), not enough baseline data or subsequent M&E work has been done by the implementers to enable this type of analysis. The Evaluators, however, used the available data and information gathered during the field work to assess impact where possible. The evaluation Scope of Work is provided in Attachment A.

The Evaluation was conducted in September – October 2008 by an independent team of experts commissioned by Democracy International. It was comprised of experts in program evaluation, EPP programming and Liberian politics. It included a review of relevant documents (Attachment D) and field work in Liberia. Interviews were held with key stakeholders, participants and beneficiaries in Monrovia and in site visits to the counties of Bomi, Grand Bassa and Margibi (Attachment C). Additional interviews were held with the CEPPS implementers in Washington. The evaluation team observed an IRI-facilitated debate and town hall meeting with political parties in Kakata and visited the capitol building and legislative offices in Monrovia and the NEC facilities in Monrovia, Tubmanburg and Kakata.


## PART 2: EVALUATION

### I. PROGRAM ACTIVITIES AND RESULTS

The evaluation period covers the EPPSP activities implemented by IFES, IRI and NDI through the CEPPS Cooperative Agreement No. 669-A-00-05-00013 from November 1, 2004 to October 2008.

The program focused its activities in four major areas:

- Strengthening the electoral processes;
- Strengthening the multi-party system;
- Legislative strengthening; and,
- Increasing civic participation and accountability.




Each implementer developed its own M&E plans to measure its program progress. The complete list for each implementer and the end-of-project status for all of their indicators are provided in Annex 3. The programmatic budget figures used throughout the evaluation report are illustrative and based on best-estimates done by the evaluators.<sup>4</sup>

#### I.1. Strengthening the Electoral Process

USAID's objectives for this component were to *support the electoral process by helping to carry out an effective, credible electoral process that resulted in the election of legitimate political leaders for Liberia's new, post war government (2004-2006) and to support electoral systems and preparations for elections, including local and municipal elections (2006-2008)*. USAID's definition of effective and credible was *efficiently administered, transparent and in compliance with international standards for sound electoral administration*.

The evaluation found that the Phase 1 objective was met. The objective for Phase 2 is in the process of being met but will require continued engagement and support through



<sup>4</sup> CEPPS implementers track expenditures by the line items in the Cooperative Agreement (such as personnel, equipment). The evaluation team estimated use of the budget by programmatic area for illustrative purposes based on proposal budgets to USAID and the apparent level of effort expended in the different programmatic areas as reflected in the partners' quarterly reports and other information reported to the evaluation team.

the 2011 national elections cycle to ensure it is fully met and that the processes do not revert.

### **1.1.1. Electoral Framework**

**Activities:** IFES, and to a lesser extent NDI and IRI respectively, implemented activities towards *developing a solid foundation for the credible conduct of the electoral process by strengthening the legal framework* (Phase 1) and *through legal reform and capacity building*<sup>5</sup> (Phase 2). For Phase 1, IFES complemented the legal assistance provided by the UN and European Commission (EC) for electoral law reform by focusing on, among other issues, election finance regulation and election dispute adjudication. IFES provided TA and training to the NEC, political parties, judges and others to clarify and improve these regulations and their handling. IRI supported political parties to develop a code of conduct. For Phase 2, IFES supported the creation and workings of the SJSCC<sup>6</sup> on the delimitation and demarcation of chiefdoms and municipalities and its drafting of legislation to harmonize and rationalize electoral boundaries. NDI supported this process at the legislature through its work with the House election committee and IRI, through its facilitation of regular NEC/party consultations through the IPCC.

**Findings:** The evaluation found the objective for Phase 1 was met. IFES technical assistance improved the legal framework in areas that were not directly addressed by other donor assistance and which allowed for the holding of credible general elections in 2005 and subsequent by-elections. Targeting electoral dispute resolution was an appropriate choice in a volatile post-conflict environment and was an important factor in developing an ability in 2005 for election officials and judges to address and defuse potentially destabilizing challenges. Although election observers found the process slow and cumbersome, it gave the parties a functional and transparent mechanism to channel complaints, reducing the pretexts to by-pass the system or reject the results. The work with campaign finance regulation is laying the foundations for greater transparency and accountability and is solidifying the role of the NEC as a professional and credible arbiter in this regard.

Significant work has been done towards the Phase 2 objective, but the Legislature has yet to take up the draft legislation proposed by the SJSCC and the NEC. After decades of patronage, the number of administrative units has proliferated making boundary harmonization and redistricting a critical prerequisite to holding local elections. The consultative process leading up to the drafting of legislation to correct these imbalances set good precedents for outreach and the building of constituencies for reform. For example, the consultations in Grand Cru country facilitated by IFES resulted in local leaders recommending a reduction in the number of their “cities” from 46 to 1. Implementing the NEC and SJSCC recommendations to repeal overlapping jurisdictions and other reforms to improve the conduct of local and national elections will require constitutional reform and have the potential to fundamentally reshape the nature of democratic representation in Liberia.

### **1.1.2. Electoral Administration**

**Activities:** IFES provided substantial support to *increase the professional skills of the NEC staff and enhance the capacity of the NEC to organize elections* (2004 - 2006) and *to strengthen the electoral process through electoral reform and capacity building* (2006 - 2008). Assistance in-

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<sup>5</sup> IFES Objectives as stated in its M&E plans.

<sup>6</sup> The SJSCC included representatives from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy, the National Legislature, political parties, CSOs, and the Governance Reform Commission

cluded technical assistance, training, study tours, commodity support and NEC infrastructure rehabilitation. In Phase 1 targeted areas included voter registration, voter education, electoral finance reporting, increasing access for the disabled and the development of electoral procedures. Capacity building and technical assistance continued in Phase 2 for the NEC and its county offices which included BRIDGE (Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections) training, lessons learned sessions and strategic planning for the next five years. IFES also assisted the NEC with six by-elections and with its recommendations for the harmonization of electoral boundaries and redistricting.

**Findings:** The evaluation found that the objectives were met. IFES assistance was instrumental in supporting the NEC's development into a competent, independent and professional electoral commission. Its assistance has built intellectual capacity and links with other elections commissions which provided inspiration and models for independence and electoral reforms. In particular, the 2004 study tour to Ghana made a lasting impression and directly resulted in a desire among the commissioners and other attendees for a professional, permanent and independent elections commission. The BRIDGE training also made a significant impact, not just on the NEC but on the political parties that attended. The level of basic knowledge and understanding of EPP systems and structures among most Liberians, especially those outside of Monrovia, is so low that the sharing of basic EPP information can make a visible impact if the right actors are targeted. Including parties, media representatives, civil society leaders and others in the BRIDGE training was a best practice that contributed to a common understanding and positive relationships that will strengthen the electoral process in the long run.

In addition to the USAID assistance provided primarily through IFES, the NEC was heavily dependent on the UN for financial, technical, logistical, information technology and other support for the 2005 elections. The NEC is still dependent on UNMIL for logistical support for elections. IFES has had a positive relationship with the NEC, cemented early on when the NEC felt the large UN elections assistance apparatus was taking over and credited IFES for its support that enabled them to "chair" the process. They credited IFES for giving them a place to work by rehabilitating and furnishing their offices and providing office equipment. They said the UN took its equipment when it left and credited USAID for "everything you see here." The level and type of commodities provided by IFES at the county offices visited by the evaluation team seemed appropriate and practical and included a computer, printer, safe, file cabinet, bulletin board and waste paper basket (complete with USAID logo). The motorcycle provided to each county office is their only means of transport, but most seemed to be at the end of their usable life after hard use on bad roads.

*The NEC expects political parties to work as professionals, taking some to court who are not consistent to regulations. This is checks and balances and is very healthy.*

-Opposition Party

*NEC is supposed to police and manage the electoral process. They should be making reforms. Not reinforcing the old ways.*

-Party without an elected seat

*We wanted to do voter registration in 2009 or 2010 but there are a lot of obstacles- the legal framework, thresholds, constitutional amendment- we keep losing time. People don't understand, it makes us jittery.*

-NEC

*We need the international community's continuing commitment or we won't have free and fair elections in 2011.*

-House Leadership

The 2005 election date was set in the CPA and meeting that deadline was tight leaving little time for capacity building of a national institution. Election observers worried about sustainability of international assistance and the capacity of the NEC to conduct credible elections without the

UN's technical, operational and logistical support.<sup>7</sup> The EPPSP program directly addressed this issue by continuing its assistance into the post-electoral period which allowed the time to focus on institutional and professional capacity building. This post-election assistance enabled the NEC to assess its lessons learned, improve its procedures and systems, and hold six-successful by-elections. Important steps have also been taken by the NEC to strengthen the electoral process, both in boundary harmonization and rationalizing local structures as well as in enforcing political party compliance to registration requirements (discussed in Section 1.2.1). These actions are starting the process of fundamental democratic change within Liberia and have the potential to transform the political landscape, making it more representative, competitive and accountable. As an example, the NEC has taken 10 political parties to court to deregister them for noncompliance to party registration requirements. This has parties scrambling to open offices, forcing them to build county-level structures and operate between elections which most parties had never done before.

Given the baseline within which EPPSP assistance started, the changes within the NEC and the impact that it is starting to make is quite remarkable. The NEC has a good sense of its roles and responsibilities and the electoral timeline leading up to the local and next national elections. It has stepped in to fill a political vacuum and is driving the electoral reform process. Outside of the opposition parties that protested the 2005 elections results and who still question commissioner neutrality, the NEC is perceived as impartial and professional. Maintaining this credibility and perception of impartiality will be a critical factor in sustaining the democratic transition and ensuring acceptance of the local and national elections results by the various factions and parties. Despite its progress, the NEC is still a nascent institution working in a difficult context and continued support through the 2011 elections is critical.

### **1.1.3. International Observation**

**Activities:** The Agreement was amended in July 2005 to add international observation for the 2005 elections in order to *provide an independent assessment, demonstrate international commitment and interest in Liberia's democratic and post-conflict transition processes, and provide independent recommendations on how to make future elections more credible, transparent and democratic.* Both NDI and IRI fielded international observers along with the Carter Center which received an NDI subgrant. NDI/IRI/Carter Center observed the process through their in-country staff, through several joint pre-election observation missions and through separate large scale observation efforts held during the first and second rounds. NDI and the Carter Center deployed a joint team of international observers for both rounds with a 40-member multinational delegation co-led by President Carter and former President Soglo of Benin for the first round. A small team continued to monitor through the complaints process until the NEC announced that Ellen Johnson Sirleaf had won the second round with 59.6 percent of the vote. IRI also observed both rounds with a 43-member multinational delegation in 8 counties.

**Findings:** The evaluation team found that this objective was met. The international observation missions<sup>8</sup> contributed to the transparency and acceptance of the election. They had good geographic coverage and were able to issue substantive and timely reports. These reports provided a generally positive assessment, despite what they characterized as minor instances of polling officials who did not follow procedures and other irregularities. Following the run-off, however, the losing candidate George Weah filed a complaint with the NEC with generalized accusations of fraud. The reports of the international observers that said they had found no evidence of system-

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<sup>7</sup> NDI/Carter Center, *Observing Presidential and Legislative Elections in Liberia, Final Report* p 29


<sup>8</sup> The European Union also fielded an international observer delegation for both rounds of voting.

atic fraud or problems that materially affected the results reinforced the NEC’s decision and contributed to the eventual acceptance of the results by the losing parties. In addition, both the IRI and NDI/Carter Center delegations made a series of recommendations to strengthen the electoral process and deepen democratization.

## 1.2. Building a Representative and Competitive Multiparty System

USAID’s objectives for this component were to *build a more representative multiparty system in Liberia by improving a) political party capacity for internal organization; b) policy and platform development; and c) political party contacts with citizens leading to greater participation and accountability in the political process (2004-2006) and to improve political party capacity building to contribute to transparency and accountability, and local level elections, especially encouraging the participation of youth and women (2006-2008)*. It also included support during the electoral periods for political party participation.

The evaluation found these to be ambitious goals given the Liberian context but critical if Liberia is to sustain its nascent democratic transition. When compared to the state of the sector at the start of EPPSP



assistance, the evaluation finds that significant progress has been made. But much more remains to be done as discussed below. Continued engagement and support towards these objectives is critical to the sustainability and stability of Liberia’s democratic transition.

### 1.2.1. Strengthening the Party System and Political Parties

**Activities:** IRI served as the primary implementer for this objective focusing on *strengthened capacity of political parties*. Its programmatic interventions originally targeted all of the registered parties that were competing in the 2005 elections, but in the post-election phases limited the majority of its assistance to the six major parties with seats in the National Legislature that meet IRI’s criteria (which includes having conventions, internally democratic party constitutions and county structures). The other registered parties are still included in larger workshops and remain eligible to use the political party resource center at the IRI’s office. Most of IRI’s program focused on the nuts and bolts of training, with mentoring and regular follow up. Its support to these parties included holding national and county level leadership workshops; facilitating public debates and town hall meetings which included a capacity building element for party officials; and work with the women’s and youth of the parties (discussed in Section 1.3.2).

**Findings:** The DG Assessment done in June 2004 characterized parties in Liberia as *little more than ineffective, poorly disguised vehicles for advancing the extremely narrow interests of their leaders* and found that “*most of the parties lack many essential features such as a formal organizational structure, paid staff, issue platforms, plans to boost membership, and communication strategies.*”<sup>9</sup> Just a few years later, the political parties are still clearly weak and continue to be dominated by strong personalities and patronage, but the evaluation team found consistent and widespread evidence that the larger parties are engaged in the early steps of institution building. This included developing national structures of decision making; planning the establishment of

<sup>9</sup> MSI, *Democracy and Governance Assessment of Liberia*, p 25

## LIBERIA ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PROCESSES PROGRAM EVALUATION

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permanent county-level offices and local secretariats; thinking about ways to increase local fund raising; and, in other ways working to remain functioning as parties between elections and increase their autonomy from the patronage of standard bearers. Nearly every party official interviewed attributed this development to IRI workshops, training and follow-up.

IRI succeeded in promoting the idea that major political parties must develop plans to guide party activities between elections and to formalize party structures. Party leaders consistently told the evaluation team that they developed a work plan as part of IRI's capacity building assistance and that IRI provided regular follow-up, continually pressing them about their progress and to meet their plan benchmarks.

The institutionalization of party structures in terms of constitutions, conventions, and clearly identified offices and officers is evident in Monrovia. Although the NEC enforcement of party registration requirements is a clear driver for some of this change, IRI programs contributed to this development. This is also in the process of being extended to the county level, pushed in part by the action plans developed with IRI assistance. Many of the parties interviewed claimed to have plans to increase the number of their offices outside of Monrovia; with the ruling party (Unity Party) claiming to have offices operating in every county. The fact that those without offices claimed to have offices "under renovation" suggests a growing expectation that parties should be present in at least the major county seats. Some parties (NPP, for example) stated that they had to open county offices because it was in their work plan and IRI would be following up to see if they had done it. The importance of local party offices to civil society leaders was apparent at the IRI-sponsored party debate in Margibi observed by the evaluation team where each party was questioned about the location of its county office.

*IRI forced parties to think about organization at the country level.*

-UP official, Grand Bassa

*Before IRI and NDI, parties regarded each with distrust and as enemies.*

-NPP official, Monrovia

*We don't want a one party system in Liberia. People with bags of money coming in and using parties as a vehicle to power. Parties need to be able to stand on their own.*

-CDC official, Monrovia

Party officials emphasized concerns regarding party fund raising and again linked this awareness to IRI training. All of the major parties now have at least a work plan to develop funding sources. In addition to eventually making them less dependent on the standard bearer, it will change the way supporters see and relate to the parties. Instead of seeing the party and its standard bearer as a source of patronage, party supporters are now being asked to pay dues to support the party. Many party officials thought this would transform the relationship between the party and their constituents.

Another important benefit of IRI's programs to formalize party structures is that party officials from all of the major political parties at both the national and county levels have interacted at a number of training workshops, town hall meetings, debates, and other events. They came to know one another better and some party officials said they are now more inclined to see each other as competitors rather than enemies. This not only helped to ease post-conflict divisions but may also provide the basis for party coalition building and perhaps consolidation. The study tours to Ghana and Nigeria also contributed positively to this building of a sense of a party system and reinforced the need for parties to remain active and politically engaged between elections.

IRI's decision to expand its support from the national level to include training at the county level was strategic. At the county-level trainings, parties developed their own county-level action plan,



urged on by IRI not to be dependent on their national headquarters for activity development or funding. The recipients of this training told the evaluation team that this was the first time they had received training and the sense of empowerment from learning a few of the “how-to’s” was evident when compared to other party officials who had not attended. In Kakata, one party official had used his training to start local fund raising and a membership drive, while his untrained counterpart at another party complained to the team about the same problems (lack of funding and attention from national headquarters) but who had no recognition that there was something he could or should do about it.

In Buchanan, the growing presence and self-confidence of party officials at the county level led the local Liberty Party official to state that *the party is not the standard bearer, the party is us*. Some party officials in the counties (such as the Unity Party in Grand Bassa and Margibi counties) expressed their displeasure with the way that party executives and standard bearers in Monrovia imposed candidates upon them. Candidate selection for future elections has the potential to be contentious. The growing strength of county-level structures may apply pressure on the national secretariats to select candidates with more popular support within the constituency rather than those with ties to external patrons. It is also requiring parties to look more closely at their county party officials. In the case of the Liberty Party, the national secretariat officials raised concerns that IRI was empowering county-level party officials before the national secretariat had thought through who it wanted to represent it in the different regions. This is a real problem, but also indicates the success IRI is having with its bottom up approach to energizing and empowering party officials at the county level.

IRI programs emphasized issues, debates and polling to move parties towards more issue-based campaigns in the future, a development that will further move Liberia away from parties based on personalities and patronage. These programs, however, only focused on a few counties and were not integrated with party caucuses and their policy-making activities in the legislature. If the emphasis on developing platforms and issues-based debates in the counties had been connected to the challenges of policy development in the legislature or the quality of policy debates between the legislature and the executive, it could have significantly increased EPPSP impact.

### 1.2.2. Election-Specific Support

**Activities:** IRI’s objectives for this component were to *improve political party capacity to implement voter-oriented, effective campaigns* and to *promote party participation to ensure credible and peaceful electoral and political processes*. To accomplish this it provided assistance to parties competing in the elections (2005 and for four by-elections) which included: organizing public debates; *campaign schools* to assist parties to plan and design their campaigns more effectively; help craft messaging; assistance with multiplying materials (such as poster); training of trainers (TOT) for party poll watchers; and, a mobile resource center for by-election party support. In 2005 it helped develop a code-of-conduct signed by all 18 parties competing in the elections and sponsored a study tour for party representatives to observe best practices from the elections in Ghana. IRI also assisted the IPCC with its regular dialogues with the NEC. IFES also contributed through training on political finance regulations and including parties in its technical BRIDGE training.

**Findings:** The evaluation found this objective met in general. Multiple parties competed in the 2005 elections and 11 parties successfully won office. Multi-party competition has continued in the six by-elections held since and the process has remained peaceful. Party agents monitored the polls in 2005, which was a contributing factor to the acceptance of its results by most parties. Parties recognize the importance of poll watching and of independently documenting the results.

Party agents were present at the polls in the six by-elections, even though funding limited IRI training to four. Political party officials in Buchanan felt that party poll agents were critical to the outcome of the election (where the ruling Unity Party candidate lost and accepted the results).


The initial choice by USAID and IRI to include all registered parties in IRI's assistance was strategic, as it encouraged all of the parties, including those with "stigma" from past association with violence, to work through the system and remain positively engaged during and after the elections. All of the major parties accepted the elections results in 2005 even though some of them remain convinced their candidate had actually won. This is an important accomplishment in a post-conflict context. IFES helped to consolidate this subsequently by including party representatives in its second BRIDGE training, giving them a better understanding of how the electoral process works and the roles and responsibilities of each of the players in that process.

In Phase 2, IRI used polls done in Margibi, Grand Bassa, and Nimba to work with political parties on how to develop political communication skills and strategies to link their parties to voters' concerns. IRI also took advantage of by-elections in a number of counties to conduct "campaign schools" and to work with the parties to craft their messages, relate them to constituent issues, and engage them in debates. In four of the by-elections, IRI provided a mobile resource center at the district level that allowed parties to develop, print, and copy fliers and posters, helping less well-funded candidates compete more effectively.

### **I.3. Strengthening Public Participation and Demand for Accountability**

USAID's objectives for this component was to *enhance public participation and political party/government accountability at the national and local levels during the elections as well as immediately after the elections and during the transition period (2004 – 2006) and provide civic education and encourage civic participation in the political process, including constitutional and legal reform (2004-2006)*. Other Phase 2 objectives included; *assess public attitudes about political processes, political parties, government effectiveness and corruption and conduct anti-corruption research and coalition building (2006-2008)*.

The evaluation found that EPPSP activities did enhance public participation in the process but that the lack of a strategic purpose and targeting for some of the activities reduced its potential impact. The anti-corruption activities were suspended early on by USAID and thus were not a focus area for this evaluation.



#### **I.3.1. Civic and Voter Education**

**Activities:** In the lead up to the 2005 elections, NDI assisted CSOs to *educate citizens and strive to hold government officials and political parties accountable*. Financial and technical assistance was provided to CSOs to conduct voter education programs in five counties on the how and why of voting, to promote accountability and encourage peaceful participation through town meetings and radio shows. Immediately after the elections, messages focused on the formation of the government and the roles and responsibilities of the different branches of government through work with the newly-elected legislators and CSOs. IFES funded 14 Disabled People's Organizations (DPOs) for training related to access to voting for disabled persons. In the post-election period,

IRI and NDI efforts focused around increasing the participation of women and youth (discussed in Section 1.3.2) although to some extent their party and legislative strengthening programs included elements of civic education within them. IFES developed a post-election voter and civic education program on roles and responsibilities of elected officials and good governance using the objective *increased citizen awareness of rights and responsibilities in a democratic society*.

**Findings:** The evaluation found it difficult to evaluate the impact of these programs in the absence of baseline and other data on citizen knowledge and attitudes and given the other large scale civic education programs that were undertaken during the period. However, EPPSP activities did directly contribute to strengthen the understanding and knowledge of the CSOs that provided the civic education. For example, one of NDI’s current CSO partners for its legislative town hall meetings told the evaluators that they didn’t understand the roles and responsibilities of the legislature themselves until they started working with NDI. The baseline level within Liberia for knowledge on democratic systems is so low that the program’s accomplishments need to be put within that perspective.

NDI’s selection of CSO partners in 2005 appeared appropriate and included the Human Development Foundation, Radio Bomi, Concerned Muslims for National Development, and the Foundation for Human Rights and Democracy. Working in the counties of Montserrado, Bomi, Grand Cape Mount, Gbarpolu, and Grand Bassa they provided information on how to choose a candidate, the qualities of a good leader and how to mark a valid ballot.

2005 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION				
Area	INVALID VOTES		VOTER TURNOUT	
	2005 1 <sup>st</sup> round	2 <sup>nd</sup> Round	2005 1 <sup>st</sup> round	2 <sup>nd</sup> Round
NDI Assisted Area Average	3%	2%	78%	68%
Non-Assisted Area Average	5%	3%	72%	54%
National Average	4%	2%	75%	61%

In a comparison of counties that received NDI civic education to non-EPPSP assisted counties, summarized in the table and detailed in Annex 8, the average number of invalid votes was lower in NDI-assisted areas for both rounds of the 2005 presidential elections. Similarly, the average turnout was greater in assisted counties than non-assisted counties. However, this does not necessarily reflect a cause-effect from NDI’s assistance as other factors, such as education levels or proximity to Monrovia could have contributed to the differences in turnout and invalid votes.

Positive impact was also visible at the personal and organizational level for recipients of IFES DPO assistance. This was the first time the disabled community said it had felt involved in the civil society effort for elections and were included in discussions on the right to vote. A blind voter in Margibi County told the evaluation team this was the first time he had been able to cast a secret ballot enabled by the information from the DPO voter education program and the accessibility measures developed by the NEC with IFES support.

In Phase 2, IFES developed its own program of civic education on: the roles and responsibilities of elected officials towards citizens; good governance; reconciliation and peace building; and, accountability and transparency by political leaders. It selected and trained 151 educators who conducted a month-long house-to-house civic education campaigns in remote villages of Bomi, Bong, Grand Bassa, Grand Gedeh and Nimba Counties, and then deployed educators to conduct civic education programs in Lofa, Gbarpolu, Grand Cape Mount, Margibi, Montserrado and Rivercess counties. According to IFES this was done in coordination with the NEC. However, al-

though the evaluation found NEC magistrates aware of the program, and in some cases providing storage for the educators' materials, they seemed otherwise not to be involved with the program.

This program illustrates some of the issues identified by the evaluation in the implementing of EPPSP's post-election phase. As discussed in more depth in Section 2, these include prioritizing areas of assistance so that they address the most critical constraints to continued EPP development, and strategically targeting within these areas to ensure maximum impact of scarce resources. Ensuring sustainability of program activities and results is another issue. Existing CSOs and networks were used in Phase 1 and these CSOs are still active and working in the EPP sector using the skills and training provided through EPPSP. For Phase 2, IFES chose to recruit and develop its own trainers instead of subcontracting an existing organization. The resultant effort is completely dependent upon IFES.

Use of tools such as community radio and talk shows were found to be extremely effective for EPPSP in the implementation of its activities. For example, the public hearings facilitated by NDI were broadcast live, enabling thousands of Liberians to listen and learn about the workings of government. According to journalists, Liberians were extremely interested in the hearings which raised their awareness not only on the role of the legislature, but also on the need to elect someone who would represent their interests. The evaluation recommends that radio be leveraged more in future EPP programs to extend activity reach and impact.

### **1.3.2. Promoting the Participation of Women and Youth**

**Activities:** NDI and IRI focused on *expanded participation of women and youth in the political process* although only IRI had this as a stated objective of its program. Both organizations worked with the Women's Legislative Caucus in its outreach efforts to increase the participation of women. IRI also helped to rejuvenate the Coalition of Political Parties Women in Liberia (COPPWIL) that had been dormant before 2004, helping it to develop its constitution and structure in 11 counties. NDI provided a subgrant to the WIPNET/WANEP (Women in Peacebuilding Network/West Africa Network for Peacebuilding) to conduct a community based women's political mobilization and democracy project. Currently IRI is assisting the Women's Legislative Caucus to develop a legal framework that would encourage the increased political participation of women.

#### **WOMEN IN POLITICS**

*It's a struggle. We decided to challenge the status quo.*  
-COPPWIL

*Give me one vote and I will make a difference.*  
-Women's Legislative Caucus

IRI facilitated a national youth retreat and training in 10 counties in capacity building and provided follow-on strategy sessions to promote the participation of youth in electoral and political processes. NDI trained the youth group NAYMOTE (National Youth Movement for Transparent Elections) to observe by-elections in 2006, and some of NDI's CSO partners targeted their civic and voter education campaigns towards women and youth. The NDI/Carter Center election observation methodology was also to include a focus on the political participation of women and youth in the 2005 elections.

**Findings:** The evaluation found a very active political women's movement in Liberia led by the Women's Legislative Caucus and COPPWIL. Together, and with NGOs such as WIPNET, they are reaching thousands of Liberian women with the unified message "*women all the way*" in order to increase the participation of women- not only to vote but to run as candidates. They are promoting a 30% quota for representation of women in the Legislature and are urging women to vote for women regardless of the party affiliation in order to create the critical mass of women in

office necessary to effect meaningful change. Women in politics have had a difficult time, with women legislators telling the evaluation team that some male legislators tell them to “*sit down and shut up.*” These attitudes are changing slowly based on some of the very dynamic women now in office but cultural habits and perceptions will take time to overcome.

Activities have reached a sizeable number of women. COPWILL alone reports that with IRI help it reached 38,000 women in 2006 in 6 counties with their civic education program. NDI’s program through WIPNET trained 90 women in five counties to go out and sensitize women to get involved. They used community radio stations for outreach as well and are finding that many women want to run for office, particularly for local offices such as paramount chief, but face obstacles such as a lack of education, lack of funding and an inability to do public speaking. They say some women are going to literacy school so that they feel more prepared to run.

The evaluation team met some of the COPPWIL and WIPNET women outside of Monrovia as well as some of the recipients of their programs. They are committed, energetic and active with a clear and articulate message. The impact from this outreach is clear. Women are interested in running for office and the gender distribution of candidates in the next national and local elections is likely to look very different from previous ones.

These results can not all be attributed directly to NDI and IRI as these organizations also receive support from others, such as UNIFEM and previously by OTI, and the women themselves are extremely dynamic. But EPPSP provided continued support and mentoring and can take a significant share of the credit. The evaluation team did note however, that this movement so far is basically women talking to women. At an IRI sponsored political party debate in Margibi, women from COPPWIL were not invited to participate by their parties or by IRI. Linking the COPWILL assistance more directly into party building activities would help the parties to become more open and eventually more representative by strengthening the position of women within their parties (which is currently quite dismal). This is something that should be done in future programming.

**POLITICAL PARTY YOUTH**

*We’re trying to make social change in Liberia, but we need a meal.*

*They want me to do their dirty work but they won’t let me into decision making.*

*Violence is the only way they listen to us.*

The evaluation found the efforts with youth less successful, in part because they received less attention. IRI did help the Federation of Liberian Youth (FLY) update the yet-to-be adopted National Youth Policy and FLY was used by NDI for civic education in 2005. IRI also held two youth<sup>10</sup> leadership retreats and created a Coalition of Political Party Youth. This coalition brought political party youth together and built bridges between them during IRI trainings, but is not otherwise active. The main

issue for party youth is that most are unemployed and their party positions are voluntary. There is a palpable sense of frustration and anger at waiting for the *elderly* party leaders to include them in decision making and give them paying party jobs. They say they are forced to become militant to get their leadership to listen to them which reinforces past patterns of going outside of the system (i.e. violence) to get results. As with the women, facilitating channels for youth to effect change within their parties and integrating them more into the mainstream party building activities is essential for future programs.

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<sup>10</sup> Youth was defined by party youth as up to 30.

### **I.3.3. Domestic Observation**

**Activities:** NDI funded a coalition of NGOs in 2005 called NACEM (National Coalition for Election Monitoring) made up of the Inter-Religious Council of Liberia, the Coalition for Democracy in Liberia and the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding. NACEM fielded 50 observers nationwide to cover voter registration and the campaign period and more than 700 during the general elections. NDI provided technical expertise for the creation of NACEM as well as for the content of observation. IFES subgrants to the 14 DPOs included 150 civic educators who served as election day observers. NDI also provided training to the youth observation group NAYMOTE in the post-elections period.

**Findings:** The evaluation finds that NDI set a very ambitious objective for this activity: *Partner civic groups support the electoral process through the implementation of a monitoring program that promotes the transparency, integrity and peaceful conduct of all election-related activities during the pre-election period and on election day*, but that the spirit of the objective was met. NACEM fielded a sizeable domestic observation effort that started with voter registration, covered the campaign period and went through both rounds of the 2005 general elections.

NDI was instrumental in the creation of the coalition that joined these three large and credible NGOs. It facilitated the development of an MOU between them that clearly specified the roles and responsibilities of the coalition, divided up the areas of the country to observe between them and agreed to issue joint statements. This is an important accomplishment that helped avoid duplication, used existing organizations instead of creating new ones for observation, and unified the message of civil society observation - - which is an important factor in a volatile post-conflict electoral climate. The benefit of using existing NGOs with strong networks for election observation is still evident. Members of these organizations are still observing the political process, political financing and elections today, albeit to a much more limited extent for funding reasons.

IFES support of the DPOs was also an important accomplishment and the first time disabled persons had been able to observe an election. However, this activity was not continued into the post-election phase. The cost for this component was minimal compared to the rewards it reaped within the disabled community (even for just the perception of being included) and the evaluation team recommends it be reconsidered for future programming.

### **I.4. Legislative Strengthening**

Legislative strengthening was added to EPPSP in September 2006 and continued to be a major focus of program activities through Phase 2. USAID's objective for this component was to *strengthen the new legislature to represent the interests of constituents engage in lawmaking, conduct oversight and model transparency and accountability in its own activities*.

The evaluation found that progress has been made towards meeting this objective as detailed below.



#### 1.4.1. Capacity Building

**Activities:** NDI was the primary implementer for this component. Activities included: semi-structured interviews/training with legislators on their roles and responsibilities; targeted support to committees; training of lawmakers and legislative staff; and engagement with the leadership and reformers in both houses. The initial objective in the Bridge Phase was to *provide Liberian legislators and constituents with basic tools to enhance the fulfillment of their roles and responsibilities*. NDI conducted a baseline assessment of the attitudes of legislators and constituents towards each other and the roles and responsibilities of the legislature, which it used as a basis for coaching sessions with legislators and to design its Phase 2 program.

The capacity building objectives during Phase 2 were to *strengthen the capacity of legislative committees to perform lawmaking roles and exercise oversight of the executive branch*, and to *strengthen the ability of Liberian legislators to represent the interests of their constituents*. During Phase 2, NDI's capacity building activities consisted largely of support to targeted legislative committees, especially the Joint Legislative Modernization Committee and Joint Legislative Budget Committees, through technical assistance on a regular basis on legislative activities and facilitation of public and oversight hearings; assistance in the mark up of key legislation and the production of clean copies of such bills prior to their passage; training of legislators on their roles and responsibilities for lawmaking, oversight, and representation; training of permanent and politically appointed legislative staff; facilitation of legislative retreats for the entire membership of the Senate and House; and continued engagement with key reformers and the leadership of both houses of the Legislature. In addition, NDI and IRI both supported the creation of the Women's Legislative Caucus (WLC), and provided technical assistance and training on the development of their constitution and strategic plan to meet their legislative goal of increased representation of women in the National Legislature.

**Findings:** The evaluation found that progress was made towards meeting these objectives. NDI used its legislative-constituent attitudes assessment to develop its program and to inform its coaching sessions with lawmakers. These sessions provided legislators with some basic skills for engagement with their constituents and within the Legislature. NDI also worked closely with targeted legislative committees to build their capacities for oversight and lawmaking. This directly increased the legislature's ability to function more effectively and to start testing its role as a check on the executive. Among other things, NDI's assistance to committees directly resulted in a series of public budget hearings in 2008 during which government ministers and other officials were called before House and Senate committees to testify on the contents of the government's budget and its implications for the people of Liberia. These were the first public budget hearings to be broadcast live on national and community radio stations.

In collaboration with UNDP, NDI also supported the work of the Joint Legislative Modernization Committee (JLMC), which was tasked with creating a strategic plan for bringing the legislature into compliance with international standards. The strategic plan is expected to be formally approved as soon as the current legislative recess is over in January. According to the JLMC Chairman, NDI's technical assistance and constant engagement was instrumental in developing and finalizing this plan which, if adopted and followed, will start the process of institutional reform required if the legislature is to fulfill its democratic role.

Both NDI and IRI worked with the Women's Legislative Caucus. Through a series of retreats, the WLC was assisted in developing its constitution and by-laws and to formulate a legislative strategy plan for passing a bill requiring 30% representation of women in the legislature. Members of the WLC demonstrated in evaluation interviews that they had a clear plan for attaining the

goals of their legislative agenda, and for increasing the number of women elected in the next legislative elections.

EPPSP assistance to the National Legislature though needs to be put into the larger perspective. The newly elected legislators inherited a rubber stamp institution that had never fulfilled its democratic role and whose infrastructure was in ruins. As described by the 2004 DG Assessment, the previous Assembly (NGTL) had *exercised little authority, shown no initiative, and was handcuffed by internal divisions... many of the representatives who serve in the body have an extremely limited vision as far as exercising legislative authority. Most are consumed with using their positions to advance personal interests and exhibit little inclination for governing. Securing access to official cars and other perquisites of office is a major preoccupation... the Assembly has almost no institutional capacity in terms of professional staff, legislative drafting knowledge and functioning committees.*<sup>11</sup> The 2005 elections resulted in a different composition of leaders, some with limited formal education, others with ties to former warring factions, and many with only tentative links to their notational parties. Three years into their legislative term the capital building has been rehabilitated thanks to other USAID-funding, but its support staff still had no resources and little to no training. Those who had received training (such as the U.S. House Democracy Assistance Commission training facilitated by NDI), were frustrated by their inability to put their training to use. Without means, they are unable to provide services for the few legislators who ask for their support which marginalizes them and their departments even further. The institution still lacks the ability to track bills and votes, a codified manual of standing rules and procedures of each house, or a method of documenting debates in committees and during plenary sessions.

The EPPSP activities as designed would have been a good complement to a large scale institutional strengthening program. But there was no other program. As a result, NDI scrambled to fill the void, focusing on committee chairs (in the absence of committee staff) and legislators who demonstrated some ability to lead and who were trying push the legislative agenda forward. This assistance is highly valued by the legislators and staff and the national legislature would not be where it was today without this support. In addition, NDI-facilitated retreats for lawmakers enabled them to work out contentious issues that they were unable to come to terms with in the more public sessions. One senator said the retreats provided the environment and the expertise where political point scoring could take a back seat and they could work together and build a consensus on key pieces of legislation and help reduce the backlog of bills (reportedly to be about 30). Although the capacity being built is primarily within individuals, they are setting important precedents that will improve conditions for the next legislature. For example, the model has been set for having public hearings that question the executive on issues such as the budget. Others have started taking copies of the budget back with them during agricultural break to discuss within the district. According to long-time observers, this was a first.

The Legislature's strategic plan facilitated by NDI and UNDP is comprehensive and once adopted and implemented, will contribute towards the institutional strengthening of the institution. It is unfortunate that other donor support to the legislature was made dependent on its development. As it involves

*We are driving a change process and we need to be inclusive. If we are not strong, it's business as usual.*  
-Opposition Senator

*We don't want a rubber stamp legislature.*  
-Opposition party

*Being a legislator was looked down on before. In 2011, people will realize it's the best job in the country.*  
-Opposition Representative

*We are here. We have these beautiful plans but no one listens.*  
-Secretariat

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<sup>11</sup> MSI, *DG Assessment Liberia*, p 26



the fundamental reform of the Legislature, including the professionalization of staff and the reduction of personal staff (and thus reducing opportunities for patronage), it required three years of consultations and consensus building to develop, leaving the Legislature without the critical assistance it needed in the interim.

The Legislature is in transition and has started the process of making the fundamental reforms and setting the precedents that will guide the next legislature. This process has only just begun and its forward momentum is not yet assured. Several committee chairs expressed their concern that their ability to hold effective hearings among other things would be diminished without the support of international partners such as NDI. There is also likely to be considerable turn-over among the legislators following the 2011 elections. Continued support is critical to Liberia's continued stability and democratic development and to consolidate the preliminary gains made to date.

#### **1.4.2. Building Constituency Relations**

**Activities:** Constituency relations comprised a large proportion of NDI's legislative strengthening activities. Its objective was to *strengthen the ability of Liberian legislators to represent the interests of their constituents*. NDI conducted a baseline assessment of legislator and constituent attitudes, the results of which were integrated into coaching sessions with legislators on how to effectively represent the interests of their constituents. NDI also facilitated constituency outreach town hall meetings between legislators and their constituents on a rolling basis during the Legislature's annual agricultural recesses. This was done through subgrants to five local CSOs who organized the meetings and logistics. The subgrantees also held meetings with constituents to develop a community agenda prior to meeting with their legislators in the town halls.

**Findings:** The evaluation found progress was made towards the program objectives. NDI's coaching sessions with lawmakers focused on conducting constituency outreach activities in a constructive way with an issue-focused agenda. Several lawmakers commented to the evaluation team that prior to receiving training, they had been unaware of the potential political benefits from effective constituency outreach. Because Liberian politicians have a history of using their positions to provide personal patronage to their constituents, some lawmakers said they had been afraid of visiting their constituencies because they knew they would be unable to respond to the number of requests for food, school fees or medical care. NDI's approach lessened these concerns. The coaching sessions provided the knowledge and tools that allowed them to engage with their constituents on issues of public policy as the town hall meetings focused around the community agenda which kept the discussions issue-based.

NDI's program also facilitated the return of lawmakers to their districts. Several lawmakers, from Bong and Montserrado counties in particular, credited NDI with providing the opportunity to consult with their constituents that they would otherwise not have had due to the general lack of resources for constituency travel and outreach provided by the Legislature and their parties. In interviews, it was clear that some legislators had internalized the potential benefits they could realize from being accessible to their constituents and from being seen as doing the people's work. For example, some Senators told the team that the budget was not *constituency sensitive* and how this fiscal year they will *make a lot of noise* so that the budget allocations are disaggregated by constituencies.

The evaluation found a wide-spread perception that legislators do not do enough consultation and a growing sense that voters want to hold legislators accountable in the next election if they do not deliver on their expectations. Most legislators were cognizant of this public attitude - - much of it

from the NDI facilitated meetings. While NDI's activities in this arena have improved some legislators' willingness and ability to consult with their constituents and represent their interests in the National Legislature, there are large structural impediments for genuine representation. Disincentives include the limited resources allocated for outreach, the extreme difficulty many legislators face in visiting their constituencies due to local road conditions, the six to nine year terms of lawmakers that remove the immediate incentive to remain in frequent contact with their constituencies, and a lack of public information on lawmakers' legislative activities that would enable the public to hold them accountable for their actions.

Targeting some of these structural constraints could have been a cost effective means to increase impact and ensure sustainability. For example, work could have been done: with the Joint Budget Committees to increase the appropriations for consultations and public hearings; with the central administration of both houses to provide a public record of members' voting and attendance of legislative debates; and with watchdog CSOs to publicize and distribute information of legislators' performance as was done under OTI funding in 2007.

## **2. PROGRAM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION**

### **2.1. Program Strategy and Design**

USAID's Elections and Political Processes Strengthening Program was the continuation of activities started separately by IFES, IRI and NDI which were then packaged through the CEPPS mechanism from November 2004 on. USAID/Liberia had a clear vision for its initial EPPSP through CEPPS as demonstrated in the Agreement's original program description. It was to be an integrated program of mutually supporting and synergistic activities that assisted the electoral processes up through the 2005 elections and the subsequent transfer of power to the newly elected government. The design focused directly on the critical areas required to achieve this goal within the Liberian context of a failed state in a post-conflict environment, specifically: strengthening the electoral process, building a more representative and competitive multiparty system and increasing citizen participation and government/party accountability. It also identified security as the single most important cross-cutting theme, requiring conflict mitigation and deterrence to be integrated into every CEPPS programmatic activity. USAID made it very clear in the Agreement that these essential elements were to guide the program, and that *the revised technical proposals submitted by the individual CEPPS Consortium members provide the context for the program described above to the extent that these technical proposals are consistent with the program description.*<sup>12</sup>

The evaluation found this design and approach was strategic and appropriate and resulted in: 1) a coherent and relatively integrated program of assistance by the different CEPPS partners in the lead up to the elections; and 2) enabled the strategic targeting of program activities that were critical to the success of those electoral processes.

This strategic vision however did not carry through into subsequent phases of the program. Once the common goal to achieve the 2005 elections was reached, the programs of the different CEPPS partners started to diverge into their respective "areas" (NEC, parties, and legislature). This divergence was reflected in USAID's subsequent program descriptions and in the individual partner proposals, some of which became the program descriptions for certain extensions. This left the CEPPS Agreement without an overarching strategic vision or an integrated program with com-

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<sup>12</sup> USAID Agreement No. 669-A-00-05-00013, p B-19

mon objectives other than *political processes strengthened (legislature, elections, political parties, legal reform)*. The *objectives* listed in the July 6, 2006 program description for an \$8 million two-year CEPPS extension were, for the most part, an activity list. One, for example, was *assess public attitudes about political processes, political parties, government effectiveness and corruption*. Without a strategic purpose to guide its targeting, timing and use, the impact for polling at the strategic level was negligible even though it might have met the terms of the “*objective*” in the Agreement.

## 2.2. Program Implementation

### 2.2.1. Choice of Mechanism

The choice of CEPPS as a mechanism to implement the EPPSP program in its initial phase resulted in a mechanism-driven program in subsequent phases. Although USAID sees CEPPS as providing a unified program, it is primarily a mechanism to allocate USAID funding for EPP activities between IFES, IRI and NDI. Without USAID specifically prioritizing funding and activities in its program description, the CEPPS partners divided the resources among themselves through internal criteria and negotiations. In 2004, the USAID program description provided a clear road map for the division of funding and responsibilities and this was reflected in the partners’ proposals. This strategic direction was not provided in post-election program descriptions, resulting in a CEPPS program that reflected the three-way division of the funding among the three implementers and their respective activity areas. This had a direct impact on what the program has targeted since 2006, the way it has been implemented and its effectiveness.

The evaluation found everyone in Liberia frustrated with the CEPPS mechanism. USAID found it non-responsive and arbitrary in its division of funding and programmatic choices and felt it was managing three programs instead of one. The CEPPS partners felt constrained by the internal agreements reached by “CEPPS,” which limited their organizational ability to do cross-sector programming and activities that they saw as essential to achieving their own programmatic results. Beneficiaries of the program did not understand the CEPPS arrangement or why it limited the activities of their partners. Several asked why NDI did not help them out with their political party activities while others asked why IRI was not helping the party caucuses in the legislature. The nature of the partnership and division of labor were especially unclear to CSOs.

In one sense, given the lack of an overall strategic framework within which to work, the CEPPS framework (i.e. a common program description provided by USAID) kept the three implementers from diverging too far afield. But the CEPPS mechanism did artificially divide activity areas between implementers limiting the ability for the program as a whole to generate results. A key example is “women and youth” which should have been a cross-cutting issue. Instead it is now seen as an “IRI” issue with assistance to the Women’s Legislative Caucus given to IRI by CEPPS for funding reasons. If a division had been done for programmatic reasons, the logical provider of support for this would have come from the legislative strengthening program that is being implemented by NDI.

### 2.2.2. Program Integration and Other Issues

The evaluation team identified a number of other implementation issues. These included:

- **Integration of programs and synergies.** Most Phase 1 efforts were closely linked and resulted in joint activities and mutually synergistic programs. This was less evident after the elections. For example, IRI and NDI programs did not link policy development and


- issue-based platforms by parties to elected officials in the Legislature. Party building work did not integrate COPPWIL, which is an organization of party women. Survey research among the partners was not linked nor was the collection of common EPP baseline data that could have been used across the program. The activities that were synergistic demonstrated the usefulness of such integration, such as IFES' inclusion of party members in its BRIDGE training, which helped to moderate some of the attitudes within the parties towards the NEC and build professional capacity.
- **Targeting.** Even though most programs used some kind of a tool to target some of their program activities, such as NDI's survey in 2006 that it used to target its messages in its coaching sessions or IRI's party assessments that helped it to develop its county level programming, targeting was an issue in some cases. This directly relates back to the lack of an overarching strategic vision for the post-electoral program and the limited integration between programs as well as the Liberian context, which forced some activities to be reactive or overly broad because of overwhelming need.
  - **Timing.** The timing of some activities was an issue. As an example, the IFES civic education program is a longer-term grassroots program that required a lengthy process of curriculum development, material design, testing, and then the hiring and training of educators. This required a longer-term program window than was available in the Phase 2 timeframe. The actual activity only recently started and was already being closed out as the CEPPS agreement funding was ending.
  - **Capitalizing on expertise built.** A considerable level of effort was made in Phase 1 to train CSOs used in voter education and domestic observation. This included their inclusion in the study tour to Ghana. But many of these CSOs from 2005 were not kept as partners in subsequent phases, resulting in some complaining to the evaluation team that civil society assistance had gone into a "coma" after the elections. As the nature of the program evolved, especially for NDI, it is understandable that it would use different CSOs in the different areas. However, there is a substantial pool of Phase 1 CSOs and former NDI civic education personnel, some of which have created their own CSOs that can serve as a trained and capable resource pool for future programming activities, especially during the upcoming electoral process.
  - **Sustainability.** The implementation approach used directly affected the chances that the activity would be able to continue after the end of the USAID funding or that it would have a sustainable impact. For example, in Phase 1, implementers used existing CSOs working in the field of democracy and human rights which provided sustainable outcomes. NDI repeated this in Phase 2 through the use of WIPNET among others. These networks and CSOs are still in place and for the most part working on EPP issues. However, while direct implementation efforts, such as done by IFES in Phase 2, might be easier to manage and ensure quality control, but they are not sustainable once the partner's funding ends.
  - **Coordination.** Coordination among donors in Phase 1 appeared to have been good, but is less visible in subsequent phases. Although the evaluation team was told there were coordination mechanisms for various aspects of the program, there was little evidence of any recent systematic coordination. For example, the last meeting of the legislative strengthening donor coordination group seemed to have been more than a year ago.

There did not appear to be a coordination mechanism for assistance to parties and the assistance for the NEC seemed to consist of informal contacts.

## 2.3. Program Management and Monitoring

### 2.3.1. Program Management

**CEPPS Partners:** The programs were implemented and managed separately in Liberia with each partner reporting back to its own headquarters. By the time of the evaluation, there was no regular coordination mechanism between them for the implementation of a joint program such as EPPSP or a common memory that kept the program records or accomplishments. Each organization kept its own records and institutional identity. In the original program description, USAID/Liberia expected administrative costs to be shared across program activities and implementers where possible, including shared office spaces. While this was done in the initial phases, each partner eventually opened their own offices requiring equipment, generators and IT connections. They also duplicated some facilities within their offices, such as their own resource centers (NDI for legislators and IRI for parties).



For much of the post-election program period, IRI and NDI had trouble securing long-term, qualified country directors, and in early 2006 over \$200,000 of project funds were allegedly misappropriated by an IRI local employee. That case is reportedly now in court. USAID subsequently did an audit of all three partners' financial management systems and made recommendations that the partners say they have implemented.

The evaluation found it difficult to obtain records of program activities that predated the current chiefs of party and staff in both Liberia and in Washington, indicating either a lack of record keeping or lack of systems for archiving and retrieval. Each partner has done quarterly reports on their programs and does field reports for various activities. These documents were available, but others, such as earlier M&E plans or survey data were not for the most part.

**USAID:** As part of the EPPSP program, USAID/Liberia was to place a senior U.S. personal services contractor in its offices to manage the program and ensure coordination with other donors. This may have happened in Phase 1 when the program appeared to have been well managed and monitored, but within the recent memory for most of the CEPPS partners, the program was managed by USAID's overburdened program office and a series of short term managers and TDY-

ers. The presence of a full time senior DG person to oversee the program and handle the many Agreement modifications would have made the program more responsive to strategic needs and facilitated administration of the process. Another complicating factor was that for almost the entire duration of this program, USAID contracting was done from the regional office in Ghana. Whether this resulted in delays in contracting is unknown to the evaluation team, but it did find little institutional memory for the CEPPS Agreement in Liberia as the current persons managing the program had a difficult time locating the documents needed for the evaluation.

### **2.3.2. Monitoring and Evaluation**

There was no one set of indicators used for the “CEPPS” program, and the three implementers used different sets of indicators for the different phases. Only recently do they appear to be providing cumulative reporting of outputs against targets. Some of their quarterly reporting was done by objectives but it was not consistent nor, for the most part, did it report by indicators. Only IFES was able to provide the evaluation team with copies of all of the M&E plans required by the Agreement and its modifications before the end of the evaluation.

The Agreement expected each program to undertake baseline surveys and collect data so that progress towards results could be measured and documented. Although some baseline data was collected, most of it was not available to the team nor was it available in a format that would have enabled its use to compare end of project status against the initial baseline at the start of the program. In some cases, data was available but the indicator was of questionable use (such as “*number of offices open*” for a political party). Some of this is due to USAID’s recent use of common indicators that are primarily activity outputs, some is due to a common lack of attention to a performance monitoring plan (PMP), the collection of essential data and monitoring of those plans. This is regrettable as the evaluation team believes that the impact of the EPPSP program is probably greater than what is immediately visible, but the M&E system was unable to adequately capture it.

PMPs also help ensure that a program stays on track. This is especially important in a transitional period in a post-conflict country. The lack of an adequate PMP and tracking of appropriate indicators meant it was easier for the programs to diverge and lose strategic focus over time. A key lesson-learned is the need for both USAID and implementers to devote sufficient management time and resources to develop a good PMP, systematically collect baseline data and indicator information so they are able to effectively track the program’s performance and have the timely and accurate information needed to be able to make key strategic decisions about program direction and implementation within a fluid political environment.

## **3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **3.1. Conclusions**

In its FY 2005 Annual Report, USAID/Liberia reported *it is too early to tell what the effect that this USAID-sponsored [EPPSP] technical assistance will have on Liberia’s political process, on the parties, on the capacity of civil society to education voters, or on the ability of the National Elections Commission to conduct “free and fair” elections. It appears, however, that USAID assistance to this democracy-building effort is certain to be critical in the year leading up to the October 2005 elections in which Liberia’s citizens will choose its President, Vice President, the*

*entire Senate and the entire House of Representatives. Nothing is more important in FY 2005 than successful elections that results in a legitimate new government for Liberia.*<sup>13</sup>

USAID's work through the CEPPS partnership played critical roles that helped make the 2005 elections transparent, credible, and accepted by the major stakeholders, thereby resulting in a legitimate new government and advancing peace building and democratization in war-torn Liberia. From 2004 into 2006, USAID's programs were well integrated and strategically targeted in ways that helped Liberians make the first steps of this important transition. In the period 2006 - 2008, USAID's programs and the work of the CEPPS partners seemed less focused, less integrated, and not designed in the context of the overarching strategic needs facing Liberia following the election. This is surprising, given the level of support given to ensure success of the elections. Pre-election planning for immediate post-election work might have better harnessed the momentum coming out of the election and allowed USAID to move quickly to consolidate some of the electoral and political gains in a stronger legislature and stronger political parties. Given the extremely high levels of support and capacity building across the executive branch following the election of President Johnson Sirleaf, well-designed and funded programs to strengthen the legislature was needed to build basic checks and balances.

Following the 2005 elections, the important work with the NEC continued and IFES took steps to make sure that the capacity and professionalism of that commission did not disappear after the election. The six successful by-elections held since 2005 are evidence of this increasing ability to manage complex electoral processes. IFES' major investment in basic civic education, however, may not have been targeted at the most fundamental constraints of continuing to advance democratization. NDI work played a major role in strengthening the legislature and the capacity of key committees to increase public accountability. Key lawmakers pointed to work done with NDI and in NDI-sponsored workshops as the basis for reforming the legislature. These efforts, however, lacked support from other programs to strengthen the basic functioning of the legislature and were not well integrated with programs to strengthen political parties. IRI contributed to the growing understanding among the major political parties that they need to develop the structures, outreach to the various counties, and means to raise funds so that they can continue to function between elections. Again, political party training seemed to be insufficiently linked to the work of political parties in the legislature. Parties remain fragile and it remains unclear that these early plans will overcome the tendency of parties to serve as vehicles for personalities and patronage.

The 2005 election was a transitional election that helped to implement the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The 2011 election will also be a transitional election and as such its success is critical to sustaining peaceful development and democratization in Liberia. The period leading up to 2011 will require several very contentious and highly political decisions relating to constitution reform, constituency redistricting, voter registration, and long overdue local elections. The legislature, NEC, and political parties all need continued support to create the context in which these steps

*Democratic forces are shy and apologetic. Un-democratic forces are aggressive and very articulate. They will steal the show and we will be back to square 1-- a violent electoral process.*  
Opposition Senator

*It's too early to disengage. There was no democratic competition before this- look what the USAID-sponsored program has engendered.*  
Political Party

*Stop behaving as if everything was ok. You are building on sinking sand.*  
NGO Director

*We are still learning and the environment makes us. If we don't keep getting help, a tyrant will emerge and take over.*  
Political Party

*All is not right here. We still sit on a time bomb. There are dark clouds over elections.*  
Civil Society Leader

<sup>13</sup> USAID/Liberia, *Annual Report, FY 2005*. P 6

can be taken and the outcomes regarded as legitimate.

The legislature elected in 2005 represented a snap shot of Liberian opinions and fears at a time where memories of war remained fresh. In 2011 at least some of these public attitudes will have shifted. Candidates and parties that have the ability to make persuasive arguments relating to development and other issues foremost in the voters’ minds are likely to do well. In 2005 there was no incumbent party and so the fundamental issue of transition from one party to another was not raised. It is important for USAID and other donors to recognize the importance of continuing EPP support over the next several years because:

- the strength and perceived non-partisan nature of the NEC will be tested during this period and will remain crucial to the success of elections in 2011;
- political parties and the potential for party coalitions will shape the competition and the future shape of government and party poll watchers are likely to be an important requisite to losing parties accepting the results; and,
- a working legislature will establish the purpose of the election and the characteristics of successful legislators for the voters’ consideration.

### **3.2. Lessons Learned**

Activity Area	Lessons Learned <sup>14</sup>
Strengthening the electoral process	Continued support in the post-electoral period allowed for the NEC to consolidate its lessons learned and start the process of sustainable institution and professional capacity building that was not possible in the rush up to elections.
	Continued support to strengthen electoral processes in a post-peacekeeping context is essential as systemic distortions from past administrations are tackled and eliminated and new democratic systems and rules of accountability are developed.
Building a representative and competitive party system	Strengthening elections administration to enforce party registration regulations directly builds party capacity as parties either have to raise their standards to meet the NEC requirements or they are de-registered.
	County-level party officials can start a process of change within their parties when they have the basic information on party roles and responsibilities and the corresponding “how to...” With this they start questioning national party leadership and demanding increased participation and inclusion in decision making. Women at the county level also need to be brought into this process.
	A functioning political party system that can aggregate constituent interests and articulate public policy is an essential component of EPP. Providing support only during an election reinforces the status quo and has little to no impact on building a sustainable party system which requires a continued program of targeted assistance and mentoring.
Strengthening public participation and demand for accountability	Sustainability needs to be factored into work with civic organizations. Existing CSOs that were enabled to do voter education and observation in 2005 were still active and working in the DG sector in 2008 and some, such as the Inter-Religious Council are doing elections observation for by-elections on their own.
	Use of good tools developed by other programs, such as the Legislative Scorecard and community radios by OTI, could have provided visible impact for the EPPSP had they been continued and/or leveraged in its programming.

<sup>14</sup> Lessons include those from the broader context of providing EPP assistance to Liberia. Some are stand-alone recommendations as they related to directly to peacekeeping elections and not to future elections that a country might hold.



Activity Area	Lessons Learned
Legislative strengthening	In a post-conflict situation, assistance to a newly elected legislature should be developed before the elections are held so that the new program can start before the legislators take office – this way there is a functional secretariat ready when they take office and a schedule of routine training and assistance is already in place to avoid assistance from becoming politicized and/or marginalized (through delays or capture) by vested interests and/or political considerations.
	A constituency outreach program should complement a larger institutional strengthening program as the needs for a newly democratic, post-conflict legislature require a full-scale institution capacity building program.
Program design, implementation and management	EPP strategies need to be part of a larger strategic planning process that looks beyond the holding of peacekeeping elections and anticipates the critical needs in the first few years of democratic governance, such as constitutional reforms needed for local elections and marginalizing potential spoilers.
	A well informed strategic vision needs to drive the program and be updated after critical milestones in the process are met- such as elections and the seating of a new government. The strategic vision should determine the implementation mechanism and priority areas for EPP assistance.
	Impact from some of the post-elections assistance will only be felt in and after the next election.

### **3.3. Programmatic Recommendations**

A transition from civil war and state collapse to a functioning, stable, and democratizing state is a process that will take many years and more than one electoral cycle. The current EPPSP program started early in this process, when the country was in flux and the outcome uncertain. The country has changed considerably since this program started-- the democratically elected legislature is in place and working, the NEC has become a permanent institution and the parties have started the process of institutionalization. These new institutions have daunting tasks ahead of them, including constitutional reform and the holding of free, fair and accepted local and national elections by 2011. The current CEPPS agreement is coming to its end. It is a good time for USAID to take an in depth look at the elections and political processes in Liberia so that it can develop its strategic framework and approach for its next phase of assistance.

The evaluation team recommends this process start with:

- an updated democracy and governance assessment to identify the primary threats to continued democratic development and prioritize areas for DG assistance;<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> The DG Assessment was done in June 2004 and provided a snap shot in time of the National Transition Government of Liberia and the political arena and actors during the implementation of the Peace Accords. It advised caution dealing with key transitional institutions and emphasized the potential for warring factions like NPP, LURD, and MODEL to act as spoilers and return the country to civil war. Its recommendations focused on electoral and political processes strengthening in order to support the key November 2005 elections. It also emphasized the need to build a "New Liberia from the Grassroots Up," reflecting its view that the transitional legislature and other transitional institutions lacked the legitimacy required for institutional support. In 2008, we now know that the 2005 elections provided the credibility needed for programs in support of the legislature, transformed the landscape with regard to political parties (the 2005 report did

## LIBERIA ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PROCESSES PROGRAM EVALUATION

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- a political party assessment that documents the current state of parties in Liberia, both to serve as a reference document for the DG assessment as well as a baseline for future impact evaluation; and
- an attitudinal survey of political actors including legislators, local officials and party officials (to inform the DG assessment as well as to target future interventions and serve as a baseline for future impact evaluation).

The evaluation team expects these assessments will confirm that the critical priority in the EPP sector is to support the processes leading up to and through the national elections in 2011. This includes support to the process of constitutional reform and the holding of local elections. Support to this process will require the combined efforts of elections administrators, legislators, political parties, CSOs and the media. The evaluation recommends USAID provide an integrated and synergistic program that is focused directly on this process and achievement of the elections as was the strategy in 2004. USAID should decide on its program and then determine its mechanism to avoid a mechanism-driven targeting of activities for the next phase.

Specifically, the evaluation team recommends:

**Immediate term (2008-2009):** Until the end of the current program in January, the evaluation recommends USAID should focus assistance on:

- building support for the set of reforms waiting to be addressed in the Legislature. This includes: the boundary harmonization and electoral reform bills that will require a constitutional referendum; and the strategic plan for the National Legislature. Implementers should work with their respective partners to help push this process forward and assist with the planning for the next steps. This should include the Women's Legislative Caucus which should get actively engaged in these larger political issues;
- continuing follow-through with the political parties on the implementation of their action plans. This can be done cost-effectively through mentoring of national and county level officials, and continuation of the resource center;
- continued technical assistance to the NEC on planning for the upcoming districting and voter re-registration and the other actions that will be needed to implement the electoral reform package; and
- continued mentoring and technical assistance to the Legislature which is essential in the absence of any other assistance to this body.

**Medium term (2009 – 2012): An integrated program of continued assistance to strengthen the EPP process** (with a common strategic vision and shared objectives) **and a more robust program of institutional strengthening for the National Legislature** than the one currently underway (with its own strategy and objectives but which also supports achievement of the EPP objectives).

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not anticipate the CDC or Liberty Party), and demonstrated the professionalism and crucial importance of the NEC.

This program should focus on the following areas:

**Strengthening the electoral and political processes in Liberia:** An integrated package of assistance to the electoral and political processes leading up to the 2011 elections. This would include the constitutional reform process, re-districting, re-registration of voters, constitutional referendum, local elections and the national elections, through the seating of the newly elected officials. The type of assistance would look very similar to the package of assistance provided in USAID's 2004 program description and include:

- continued technical assistance and mentoring to the NEC at the national and county levels;
- increased links for the NEC with election commissions within Africa that can serve as good role models;
- continued assistance to strengthen the multiparty system through party building, provision of elections-specific support and party agent training at the national and county levels. Party assistance should also include developing issue-based platforms and public policies and linking the parties with their legislators and party legislative caucuses;
- technical assistance for electoral and constitutional reform that is made available to NEC, legislature, parties and CSOs ;
- increased engagement of strong and credible CSOs in monitoring the reforms and electoral process and advocacy for its improvement;
- increased use of the media, especially radio, in all program activities to ensure widespread dissemination of information; and
- international observation for the constitutional referendum and national elections, and locally based-international observers for the local elections to deter problems and ensure widespread acceptance of the results.

**Institutional strengthening of the national legislature:** A full scale program of institutional strengthening is needed for the national legislature. This includes developing its systems, strengthening its permanent staff and building its institutional capacity to perform its legislative and oversight roles. This program should remain cognizant of the upcoming electoral schedule and target its interventions appropriately, but its main objective would be to build the institutional capacity, systems and structures for the 52<sup>nd</sup> and 53<sup>rd</sup> legislatures. Depending on what other donors would cover, the team recommends:

- focus on the key departments and committees within both houses that are critical to the functioning of the legislature, especially enactment of the annual budget and passing reforms that are critical to the development of good governance and sustaining the democratic transition.
- develop strategy plans with key committee chairs and department heads on such things as technology and communications solutions;

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- help develop committee and permanent staff and the systems used for their work in the key departments, and support the research section and legislative library with resources related to the needs of these critical committee and legislative processes, such as budgeting, comparative election law and public administration;
- help meet key institutional needs including: bill tracking system and the training of staff to support it; audio/visual equipment to facilitate recording of legislative sessions and bill mark-up in committees; stenographic or transcription staff and equipment to create a record of plenary and committee sessions; regular publication of records of legislative debates, bills introduced in plenary and committee sessions and law maker votes; and institutionalization and reform of the standing rules and committees of both houses;
- support to CSO watchdog groups to restart the Legislative Scorecard (updated as needed) or other similar efforts for monitoring as well as advocacy for critical issues before the Legislature;
- continued support of transparency mechanisms such as public hearings and use of the print and broadcast media to widen and broaden the public debate and level of citizen knowledge of legislative activities; and
- some continued support for constituent outreach town hall meetings, but targeted around the major issues on the legislative agenda such as the annual budget, security sector reform or poverty reduction as well as other issues such as political and fiscal decentralization and constitutional amendments<sup>16</sup>.

**Political party strengthening:** USAID should support political party capacity building in ways that promote parties that are sustained in between elections rather than serving as short term vehicles for personalities with patronage and that function peacefully and effectively within the democratic system. Programs on institutionalizing their party constitutions, decision making processes, presence across the country, and ability to raise their own funds are worth supporting. Initiatives to increase the parties' ability to engage in issue-based campaigns should be linked more clearly to legislative strengthening through party caucuses and programs to link party activities to broader public policy debates. Parties also play an essential role in validating elections and support should be provided to reinforce that role and build their capacity so that they can constructively and effectively monitor the process, including critical pre-election activities such as voter registration and voter information, through poll watching, the count, aggregation of the results and the electoral complaints and appeals processes.

Recent examples from around Africa (Kenya, Zimbabwe) raise the potential that a losing party (whether incumbent or challenger) might have incentives to engage in protests and violence in order to gain a power-sharing pact that would give it a substantial portion of power. In Liberia, such violence could quickly escalate and potentially return the country to war. The best guard against such a scenario is to build up effective electoral systems, notably a strong NEC, strong political party poll agents, and international observers so that it is harder to cry foul after a well run election.

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<sup>16</sup> The evaluation believes a strong institutional strengthening program is needed for the legislature. The amount of constituency outreach would be dependent upon the amount of other donor assistance that would be available for institutional strengthening.

**Cross cutting issues:** USAID's cross cutting issues should continue to be representation, accountability, gender and youth. Gender in particular needs to be mainstreamed as women now are being treated as a separate issue which separates them and their interests from the larger political and electoral issues.

## ANNEX I: EPP RESULTS FRAMEWORK

### 2004 -2006

**Strategic Objective:** Support key institutions and processes in order to: a) realize successful Liberian national general elections in October 2005; and b) help ensure a successful transition from conflict to a newly elected government based on democratic principles of participation, representation and accountability

- **IR:** Carry out an effective, credible electoral process that results in the election of legitimate political leaders for Liberia's new, post-war government
- **IR:** Enhance public participation and political party and government accountability at the national and local levels during elections as well as immediately after the elections and during the transition period
- **IR:** Build a more representative and competitive multiparty system in Liberia by improving political party capacity for internal organization, policy and platform development, and political party contact with citizens leading to greater participation and accountability in the political process

### 2006 -2008

**Strategic Objective:** Democratic governance enhanced (Governing Justly and Democratically)

- **IR9.4.** Political processes strengthened (legislature, elections, political parties, legal reform)
  - Legislative capacity to represent constituencies and provide oversight of executive branch operations
  - NEC actions to promote voter education, political party liaison and election law reforms
  - Political parties with permanent offices in at least eight counties

### August 2008

- Added indicators for **IR.9.4**
  - Number of elections officials utilizing new skills and knowledge
  - Number of USG-assisted political parties with functioning formal operations
- Also new indicators for **IR9.1** *Transparent and accountable management of public resources by selected public sector entities* that are relevant:
  - Number of national executive oversight actions taken by legislature receiving USG assistance
  - Number of national legislators and national legislative staff attending USG sponsored educational events

## ANNEX 2: CEPPS AGREEMENT AND MODIFICATIONS

COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT NO. 669-A-00-005-00013				
Dates	IFES	IRI	NDI	Total
12/14/04 – 4/30/06	\$4,880,000 NEC support:\$2,413,000 Other \$2,387,000	\$1,000,000	\$1,000,000	\$6,800,000
Modification No. 1 Date: 7/12/05 Revise PD Add: \$2,646,231	\$5,325,001	\$1,912,230 Add Intl Observation	\$2,200,000 Add domestic & intl observation	\$9,446,231
Modification No. 2 Date: 12/29/05 Revise PD Add: \$369,866	\$5,325,001	\$1,966,096 (cover \$ shortfalls from 1 <sup>st</sup> R obs)	\$2,525,000 Add 2 <sup>nd</sup> Round observation & subgrant to TCC	\$9,816,097
Modification No. 3 Date: 4/28/06 LOP: 7/31/06 Revise PD Realign Budget	\$5,375,000 PD = revised work-plan	\$1,716,097	\$2,725,000 PD = revised work-plan	\$9,816,097
Modification No. 4 Date: 8/1/06 LOP: 8/31/06	\$5,375,000	\$1,716,097	\$2,725,000	\$9,816,097
Modification No. 5 Date: 9/1/06 LOP: 10/31/06 Add: \$747,466 + realign budget Revise PD	\$5,600,000 PD = LEAP 9/1/06-10/31/06	\$1,965,577 PD= EPP Strengthening 9/1/06-10/31/06	\$2,997,986 PD = Strengthening Leg/Constituent Relations 9/1/06 – 10/31/06	\$10,563,563
Modification N. 6 Date: 11/01/06 LOP: 11/30/06 Realign budget	\$5,653,000	\$1,955,577	\$2,954,986	\$10,563,563
Modification No. 7 Date: 11/30/06 LOP: 12/15/06	\$5,653,000	\$1,955,577	\$2,954,986	\$10,563,563
Modification No. 8 Date: 12/15/06 LOP: 12/30/06	\$5,653,000	\$1,955,577	\$2,954,986	\$10,563,563
Modification No. 9 Date: 12/20/06 LOP: 10/31/08 Add: \$4,252,534 Revise PD	\$8,093,000	\$4,316,097	\$5,407,000	\$17,816,097 Incrementally fund to \$14,816,097
Modification No. 10 Date: 9/7/07 Add incremental funding	\$8,093,000	\$4,316,097	\$5,407,000	\$17,816,097 Incrementally fund to \$15,563,563
Modification No. 11 Date: 6/16/08 Add incremental funding	\$8,093,000 Fully funded	\$4,316,097	\$5,407,000 Fully funded	\$17,816,097 Incrementally fund to \$16,962,953

## ANNEX 3: RESULTS CHART

INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTION SYSTEMS 11/01/04 – 10/31/08		
<b>2007 – 2008</b>		
<b>OBJECTIVE 1:</b> Electoral processes strengthened through legal reform and capacity building.		
<i>Results: In process.</i>		
<b>Result 1:</b> Improved legal framework for elections		
<i>Results: In process. Bills now with the legislature for action. Once passed will improve legal framework substantially in terms of equalizing electoral districts and improving electoral calendar.</i>		
Indicator	Current Status	Result
1.1.1. Number of laws or amendments to ensure credible elections drafted with USG technical assistance	<i>Four (4) electoral related bills were submitted by the NEC through the Executive Branch of Government</i>	<i>Once adopted will support a more transparent credible electoral process, a more level playing field and can be expected to increase citizens confidence in the democratic process</i>
<b>Result 2:</b> Increased coordination and dialogue between key electoral process stakeholders		
<i>Results: Appears to have met this objective.</i>		
Indicator	Current Status	Result
1.2.1 Number of consultative sessions between key electoral process stakeholders supported with USG assistance	<i>2007: Forty (40) related consultations held with various stakeholders with specific focus on the Special Joint Stakeholders Collaborative Committee (SJSCC) process.</i>	<i>Increased acceptability, confidence and ownership by citizens of the eventual outcome of the process due to their participation &amp; input into the process.</i>
<b>Result 3:</b> Increased transparency and effectiveness of voter registration process		
<i>Results: To be determined by events in next few months</i>		
Indicator	Current Status	Result
1.3.1. Number of electoral administration procedures and systems strengthened with USG assistance	<i>2007: 20 EAP 2008: 15 EAP</i>	<i>According to IFES: Increased awareness, transparency and input into activities of the NEC</i>
<b>Result 4:</b> Increased transparency and effectiveness of boundary delimitation process		
<i>Results: Process to date has been transparent and effective to date, but the difficult work of passing this legislation remains.</i>		
Indicator	Current Status	Result
1.4.1. Number of consultative sessions between key electoral process stakeholders supported with USG assistance	<i>SAME AS 1.2.1</i>	<i>SAME AS 1.2.1</i>



<b>Result 5:</b> Increased transparency and effectiveness of NEC operations		
<i>Result: IFES was instrumental in supporting NEC development into a more competent, independent and professional electoral commission</i>		
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Current Status</b>	<b>Result</b>
1.5.1. Number of election officials trained with USG Assistance (number of men/women)	2007: 110 elections officials (96 males; 14 females) trained in two phases of BRIDGE trainings 2008: 75 elections officials (65 males; females) including key stakeholders of the NEC	Increased professionalization among the staff and commissioners leading to a more professional institution at both the national and county levels
<b>OBJECTIVE 2:</b> Anticorruption institutions strengthened through interagency coordination and capacity building.		
<i>Results: Discontinued 1/08</i>		
<b>Result 1:</b> Improved coordination between key anti-corruption stakeholders		
<i>Result : Discontinued 1/08</i>		
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Current Status</b>	<b>Result</b>
2.1.1. Number of consultative sessions between key anti-corruption stakeholders supported with USG assistance	<i>Discontinued 1/08</i>	<i>n/a</i>
<b>Result 2:</b> Increased levels of public information on the nature of corruption in Liberian society		
<i>Result: Discontinued 1/08</i>		
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Current Status</b>	<b>Result</b>
2.2.1. Number of media reports on the nature of corruption in Liberian society	<i>Discontinued 1/08</i>	<i>n/a</i>
<b>Result 3:</b> Increased capacity of Liberian CSOs to combat corrupt practices		
<i>Result: Discontinued 1/08</i>		
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Current Status</b>	<b>Result</b>
2.3.1. Number of corruption monitors trained with USG assistance (number of men/women)	<i>Discontinued 1/08</i>	<i>n/a</i>
<b>Result 4:</b> Increased capacity in the Ministry of Justice to combat corrupt practices		
<i>Results: Discontinued 1/08</i>		
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Current Status</b>	<b>Result</b>
2.3.2. Number of corruption monitors trained with USG assistance (number of men/women)	<i>Discontinued 1/08</i>	<i>n/a</i>
<b>OBJECTIVE 3:</b> Increased citizen awareness of rights and responsibilities in a democratic society		
<i>Results: Increased awareness for those that received training directly.</i>		

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<p><b>Result 1:</b> Improved coordination between key civic education stakeholders</p> <p><i>Result: Done during 2005 but not visible during evaluation period.</i></p>		
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Current Status</b>	<b>Result</b>
3.1.1. Number of consultative sessions between key civic education stakeholders supported with USG assistance	22 consultations in ten counties	Increased understanding of citizens civic responsibilities and ability to use information for those that attended
<p><b>Result 2:</b> Increased citizen knowledge of the Liberian electoral process</p> <p><i>Result: There is increased citizen knowledge for those that received training directly.</i></p>		
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Current Status</b>	<b>Result</b>
3.2.1. Number of people reached with USG assisted voter education	2005: 882,857 persons reached 2006/2007: 311,466	According to IFES, these persons are more aware of the roles of their leaders and more interested in issues of civic life.
<b>2004 – 2006</b>		
<p><b>OBJECTIVE 1:</b> Electoral foundation provides a solid foundation for the credible conduct of the electoral process</p> <p><i>Result: Electoral foundation provided a good foundation for the credible conduct of the elections.</i></p>		
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Current Status</b>	<b>Result</b>
1.1. Framework promotes participation for all eligible Liberian voters	Framework was completed and allowed for the participation for eligible Liberian voters.	Contributed to a more transparent and inclusive electoral process.
1.2. Framework promotes a level political playing field	Certain electoral laws were suspended to ensure the broader participation of political parties and individuals	Created a broader participation of Liberians in the 2005 electoral process
1.3. Framework clearly details all key aspects of the electoral process, such as seat allocation/boundary delimitation, voter registration, nomination, polling, counting and announcement of results	Completed and met acceptable best practices of countries conducting elections in a post conflict process.	Contributed to a more transparent and inclusive electoral process and greater acceptability of the results by the international community
1.4. Framework includes legal means of control and the solving of legal conflicts and disputes	Completed and indicator met	Mechanisms for elections adjudication and conflict resolution was clear leading to less litigation and fewer conflicts before and after the elections
1.5. Framework is accepted as the rules of governing the conduct of the electoral process.	Framework was carved out with substantial support and input from political parties, civil society organizations and the government of the day.	Led to greater acceptability by key stakeholders and help diffuse the potential for conflicts.
<p><b>OBJECTIVE 2:</b> Enhanced capacity of the NEC to organize elections.</p> <p><i>Results: IFES assistance directly enhanced the capacity of the NEC to administer the elections of</i></p>		

**LIBERIA ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL  
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<i>2005(along with the large level of international technical and logistical support provided by other donors) and for subsequent by-elections (without the large level of other international technical support)</i>		
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Current Status</b>	<b>Result</b>
2.1. NEC develops an operational plan and detailed elections budget.	<i>An operational plan and detailed elections budget was developed with critical input from international partners including IFES</i>	<i>Budget appears to have been adequate for 2005 elections but given the role of the international community, most of the credit probably needs to go to them</i>
2.2. NEC establishes a presence in several counties	<i>IFES built six (6) counties offices and refurbished all the others in the 18 magisterial areas and provided furniture and equipment.</i>	<i>NEC had a physical and management presence in all the counties which was essential to the credibility of the elections.</i>
2.3 NEC conducts civic outreach activities.	<i>Completed</i>	<i>Voter turnout was 75% for the 1<sup>st</sup> round and 61% for the second round</i>
2.4 NEC establishes a forum to consult regularly with political parties.	<i>Formation and support for the Inter Party Consultative Committee (IPCC) Also assisted by IRI.</i>	<i>Regular communications eased tensions between NEC and parties and increased PP participation and buy-in to the process.</i>
<b>OBJECTIVE 3:</b> Professional skills of NEC staff are increased		
<i>Results: NEC had become a professional organization that is widely respected.</i>		
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Current Status</b>	<b>Result</b>
3.1 Participants in IFES training demonstrate ability to apply learning from training	<i>The NEC has conducted five by elections since the conduct of the 2005 general and presidential elections with minimal support from international partners</i>	<i>Increased ability of NEC personnel to handle critical issues of electoral election management.</i>

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**January 1, 2007 – October 31, 2008**

SO: Political Process Strengthened (political parties)		
<i>Results: Several of the main parties have increased capacity and cite IRI workshops and follow-up as a contributing factor. Some would like to be less dependent on standard bearers with external funding and are starting to think about fund raising.</i>		
<b>Intermediate Results 1:</b> Strengthened capacity of political parties		
<i>Result: Major parties have action plans to develop county-level capacity for organization and fundraising. Many parties have started to implement these plans. National party structures also in process of becoming more internally democratic through holding of conventions and election of leaders. Major parties have held or plan to hold national conventions in the near future.</i>		
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Current Status</b>	<b>Result</b>
1.1. Political parties with permanent offices in at least 8 counties	<i>Baseline 2006: 0 2007: Target 2, Actual 2</i>	<i>Political parties have plans to open offices in the counties. In</i>

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	2008: Target 3, Actual 4	Margibi, only UP could point to its office while others asserted they were “under renovation.”
1.2 Number of political parties with functioning formal operations	Baseline 2006: n/a 2007: Target 0, Actual 0 2008: Target 10, Actual 17	While a few of the largest parties have functioning formal operations, it is unlikely that this extends to 17 of them.
1.3 Number of individuals who receive USG-assisted political party training	Baseline 206: 837 (493m/334f) 2006: Target 825 (495m/330f) Target 2007: 1,533 (738m/795f)	A large number of individuals participated in one or another of IRI’s political party training events.
1.4 Number of political parties and political groups receiving USG assistance to articulate platforms and policy agendas effectively	Baseline 2006: Target 20; Actual 22 groups (20 pps, WLC, IPCC) 2006: Target 6: Actual 8 (6 pp, IPCC, WLC 2007: Target: 8; Actual 10 (6 pp, IPCC, WLC, COPPPWIL, FLY)	The six major parties as well as the four political groups listed have received assistance to articulate their agendas more effectively. Although several of parties require work in developing modern political party platforms.
1.5 Number of organizations receiving USG support to promote development of and compliance with political finance regulations and legislations	2006: Target 15; Actual 21 2007: Target 21, Actual 21 2008 – no data	Political parties are aware of this need but not all have complied. In addition, NEC regulations contributed to this as IRI workshops and IFES assistance to NEC
1.6 Number of actions taken by county parties to strengthen their structures	2006: says n/a 2007: Target 1; Actual 1 2008: Target 2; Actual 2	Number of actions seem greater than what is reported. More than two parties appear to have taken action to strengthen their structures in the counties, which was visible in evaluation visits to Grand Bassa and Margibi.
<b>Intermediate Result 2:</b> Expanded participation of women and youth in the political process		
<i>Result: Women’s party organizations extremely active and engage in advocacy (Women’s Legislative Caucus) and consciousness-raising (COPPPWIL). Youth less visible as their focus is on finding employment but they are interested in participating.</i>		
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Current Status</b>	<b>Result</b>
2.1 Number of political parties implementing programs to increase the number of candidates and members who are women, youth and from marginalized groups	2006: Target/Actual 0 2007: Target 50; Actual 81 2008: Target 200; Actual 269	The numbers must reflect persons and not parties. The major political parties articulate an interest in reaching out to youth and women.
2.2 Aggregate score on an advocacy index (Women)	2006: report says n/a 2007: Target/Actual 0 2008: Target 2; Actual 4	COPPPWIL is active but it is less clear how much they engage in advocacy in contrast with consciousness raising.
2.3 Aggregate score on an advocacy index (youth)	2006: report says n/a 2007: Target/Actual 0 2008: Target 1; Actual 2	Advocacy index not available to team

<b>Intermediate Result 3:</b> Enhanced voter outreach strategies		
<i>Results: Parties have a better idea of how to do outreach and A number of parties had access to polling data in several areas.</i>		
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Current Status</b>	<b>Result</b>
3.1 Number of parties that use USG supported public opinion polling to design voter outreach strategies	2006: Target 3; Actual 5 2007: Target 4, Actual 5 2008: no data	A number of parties had access to polling data in several areas if they used it is unclear to team.
<b>Intermediate Result 4:</b> Transparent electoral process (proposed)		
<i>Results: Process was more transparent through IPCC mechanism and parties fielded poll watchers for by-elections and brought complaints from those observations to the NEC.</i>		
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Current Status</b>	<b>Result</b>
4.1 Progress of steps taken by political parties to strengthen the electoral process.	2006: Target 1; Actual 1 2007: Target 1; Actual 1 2008: Target 2; Actual 2	Parties advocating on electoral reforms currently before legislature.
<b>2005-2008<sup>17</sup></b>		
<b>Objective 1:</b> To improve political party capacity to implement voter-oriented, effective campaigns.		
<i>Results: National and County-level campaign school trainings trained party leaders on use of effective campaign tools. Issue-based Communication Workshops and debates built capacity for parties to engage voters and IRI's debates gave them some practice.</i>		
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Current Status</b>	<b>Result</b>
Not Available		
<b>OBJECTIVE 2:</b> To enable political parties to develop long-term organizational development plans.		
<i>Results: IRI facilitated six major parties in developing long-term organizational development plans that are starting to be carried out to various degrees.</i>		
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Current Status</b>	<b>Result</b>
Not Available		
<b>OBJECTIVE 3:</b> To strengthen political parties' ability to contribute to Liberia's governance		

<sup>17</sup> Per CEPPS letter 8/1/08:

IRI objectives 1/1/07 - 10/31/08;

- Increasing transparency and accountability within political parties in advance of local elections and encouraging the participation of youth and women in those elections.
- Improving political party capacity to implement voter oriented, effective campaigns
- Enhancing political parties to strengthen long-term organizational development plans
- Strengthen political parties' ability to contribute to Liberia's good governance
- Assessing public attitudes about political processes and institutions, political parties, government effectiveness and corruption in order to identify constituents needs and strengthen political parties outreach efforts.

IRI objectives 10/05 - 12/31/06

- Improve political party capacity to contribute to transparency and accountability, and local level elections, especially encouraging the participation of youth and women
- Assess public attitudes about political processes, political parties, government effectiveness and corruption

IRI original objectives

- Provide an independent assessment of Liberia's 2005 election process
- Provide independent recommendations to the new government of Liberia and the NEC in particular on how to make future elections more credible, transparent and democratic.

These differ from IRI framework given to Team on 9/29/08

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<i>Results: Not visible</i>		
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Current Status</b>	<b>Result</b>
Not Available		
<b>OBJECTIVE 4:</b> To promote party participation to ensure credible and peaceful electoral and political processes.		
<i>Results: Parties participated peacefully in 2005, fielded poll watchers and accepted election results.</i>		
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Current Status</b>	<b>Result</b>
Not Available		
<b>2004</b>		
Objective 1: To improve the capacity of Liberian political parties to participate effectively in the coming elections and support the potential for a competitive multi-party electoral system	<i>Work done towards this objective in 2004.</i>	<i>A large number of parties did participate with varying levels of effectiveness in 2005. This result advanced the potential for a competitive multi-party system as 11 parties won seats in the National Legislature.</i>
Objective 2: To strengthen the organizational viability of political parties.	<i>Work done towards this objective in 2004.</i>	<i>Six major parties still active in 2008 despite a history of parties disappearing between elections.</i>

<b>NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 11/01/04 – 10/31/08</b>		
<b>STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE (11/01/04 – 7/31/06):</b> Enhance public participation and political party and government accountability at the national and local levels during elections as well as immediately after the elections and during the transition period.		
<i>Results: Not enough baseline or subsequent data collected to be able to measure this and attribute the results to NDI work. However, there does seem to be an increased awareness and expectations to hold leaders accountable.</i>		
<b>12/15/06 – 10/31/08</b>		
<b>Objective 1 (Numbered as Objective 4 on NDI table):</b> Strengthen the capacity of legislative committees to perform lawmaking roles and to exercise constructive oversight of the executive branch.		
<i>Results: Select committees and some staff appear to have increased capacity to introduce, amend, and pass bills that represent the interests of the Liberian people but this is still extremely limited.</i>		
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Current Status</b>	<b>Result</b>
4.1 [AID] Number of national legislators and national legislative staff attending NDI sponsored workshops or educational events	<i>To end 2007 = 292 2008 = 559 [target 150] Total = 851</i>	<i>All legislators coached on constituent relations appears to have eased their concerns on constituency relations. Some departmental and committee staff trained but lack of means inhibit use of training.</i>
4.2 [AID] Number of national	<i>2008 = 10 [target 15]</i>	<i>Public hearings held on budg-</i>

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executive oversight actions taken by legislature receiving NDI assistance	<i>Total = 10</i>	<i>et and other important issues that started some good debates.</i>
4.3 Number of institutional capacity building materials on legislative matters produced using NDI assistance	<i>To end 2007 = 2 2008 = 1 [target 5] Total = 3</i>	<i>Products produced but actual use by consumers unknown</i>
4.4 Number of legislative committees that demonstrate an understanding of rules and procedures and committee roles and responsibilities	<i>2008 = 11 [target = 11] Total = 11</i>	<i>Not enough data available for evaluation to make a determination</i>
4.5 Number of legislative staff who demonstrates an understanding of their roles and responsibilities to support lawmaking and oversight processes	<i>2008 = 60 [target = 60] Total = 60</i>	<i>Not enough data available for evaluation to make a determination. Some appeared competent with an understanding of their roles.</i>
<p><b>Objective 2 (Numbers 5 on chart):</b> Strengthen the ability of Liberian legislators to represent the interests of their constituents.</p> <p><i>Results: Lawmakers have increased awareness on the use of town hall meetings to gain constituent input and some increased knowledge and skills on engaging with their constituents on public policy.</i></p>		
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Current Status</b>	<b>Result</b>
5.1. [Mission] Number of public forums resulting from NDI assistance in which national legislators and members of the public interact	<i>To end 2007 = 109 2008 = 1 [target = 30] Total = 110</i>	<i>Nearly all legislators participated (the remainder are scheduled to participate), and verbalized an appreciation for their constituents needs.</i>
5.2 Number of reports assessing the Liberian legislative process produced	<i>0 out of 2008 target of 1</i>	<i>None</i>
5.3. Number of legislative staff who demonstrate an understanding of their roles and responsibilities to support constituent representation processes.	<i>0 out of 2008 target of 20</i>	<i>None</i>
<p><b>Objective 3 (Number 6 on NDI chart):</b> Strengthen the ability of Liberians to communicate citizen interests to legislators and to assist in holding elected and public officials accountable</p> <p><i>Results: After constituency outreach sessions and CSO capacity building, a wider number of individual citizens have been able to articulate their issues through these sessions and some participating CSOs have greater capacity to aggregate citizen interests and relate them to individual legislators.</i></p>		
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Current Status</b>	<b>Result</b>
6.1 [Mission] Number of NDI assisted CSOs that participate in legislative processes	<i>To end 2007 = 1 2008 = 0 [target 3] Total = 1</i>	<i>Project-assisted CSOs appeared to participate more in constituency outreach activities than in legislative processes</i>
6.2 [common] Number of CSOs using NDI assistance to promote	<i>To end 2007 = 3 2008 = 3 [target 3]</i>	<i>CSOs related to increasing women's participation and</i>

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political participation	<i>Total = 6</i>	<i>Phase 1 voter education are actively working after the end of NDI funding. CSOs that participated in Phase 2 town halls appear to be less likely to continue the work without continued funding.</i>
6.3 [common] Number of CSOs using NDI assistance to improve internal organizational capacity	<i>To end 2007 = 3 2008 = 3 [target 3] Total = 6</i>	<i>NDI-assisted NGOs have increased capacity for accepting and managing international donor funds and increased ability to produce desired results. Extent of improvement is unknown</i>
<b>10/05 – 12/14/06</b>		
<p><b>Objective 1:</b> International election observers provide an independent assessment of Liberia’s 2005 election process that demonstrates international commitment to and interest in Liberia’s democratic and post-conflict transition processes, and provides independent recommendations to the new Government of Liberia, and the NEC in particular on how to make future elections more credible, transparent and democratic.</p> <p><i>Results: Election observation mission supported a peaceful and credible election process that resulted in all parties accepting the results.</i></p>		
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Current Status</b>	<b>Result</b>
Not Available		
<p><b>Objective 2:</b> Support partner civic groups’ engagement in the electoral process through the implementation of a monitoring program that promotes the transparency, integrity and peaceful conduct of all election-related activities during the pre-election period and Election Day.</p> <p><i>Results: Domestic monitoring built capacity among CSOs and provided an independent validation of credibility of electoral process and results. These CSOs are still observing the by-elections and political processes</i></p>		
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Current Status</b>	<b>Result</b>
Not Available		
<p><b>Objective 3:</b> Partner civic groups educate citizens and strive to hold government officials and political parties accountable to the public during the electoral period.</p> <p><i>Results: Partner CSOs conducted a widespread civic education campaign that resulted in lower %s of invalid votes and higher turnout rates in assisted counties (although with the available data it is not know if this can be directly attributed to the NDI program.</i></p>		
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Current Status</b>	<b>Result</b>
Not Available		
<p><b>Objective 4 (added 8/06):</b> Assist Liberian legislators and constituents to develop a better understanding of expectations for legislator-constituent relations and representation.</p> <p><i>Results: Coaching sessions and town hall meetings with constituents increased issue-based dialogue and caused lawmakers to begin thinking about constituency sensitive public policy (i.e. national budget).</i></p>		
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Current Status</b>	<b>Result</b>
Not Available		



<p><b>Objective 5 (added 8/06):</b> Provide Liberian legislators and constituents with basic tools to enhance the fulfillment of their respective roles and responsibilities.</p> <p><i>Results: Coaching sessions and community issue development town hall meetings provided some basic skills in constructive methods for interaction between legislators and constituents, resulting in increased substantive discussions.</i></p>		
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Current Status</b>	<b>Result</b>
Not Available		
<b>11/04 – 10/05</b>		
<p><b>OBJECTIVE 1:</b> Partner civic groups educate citizens and strive to hold government officials and political parties accountable to the public during the electoral period.</p> <p><i>Results: Partner CSOs conducted a widespread civic education campaign that may have contributed to a lower % of invalid votes and higher turnout rates in assisted counties. It may have resulted in some increased accountability during the electoral process but not enough information is available to be able to make a real determination.</i></p>		
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Current Status</b>	<b>Result</b>
Not Available		
<p><b>OBJECTIVE 2:</b> Partner civic groups support the electoral process through the implementation of a monitoring program that promotes the transparency, integrity and peaceful conduct of all election-related activities during the pre-election period and on election day.</p> <p><i>Results: Domestic monitoring built capacity among CSOs and provided an independent validation of credibility of electoral process and results.</i></p>		
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Results</b>
Not Available		

## **ANNEX 4: TECHNICAL MISSIONS AND EXPERTS**

<b>IFES EXPERTS AND MISSIONS</b>		
<b>Dates</b>	<b>Expert</b>	<b>Purpose</b>
May 21-23, 2008	Skye Christensen, Electoral Cycle Specialist, IFES/DC	Electoral Democracy Training Conference
Oct 29-Nov 16, 2007	Sara Staino, International IDEA	BRIDGE, Second Phase
Aug 30-31, 2007	Dr. Magnus Ohman, Advisor IFES/Sierra Leone	Training of Political Parties in Campaign Finance Reporting
June 11-21, 2006	Theophilus Deowetin, IDEA	BRIDGE Training
	Sara Staino, IDEA	
June, 2006	Dr. Marcin Walecki, IFES Senior Advisor for Political Finance	Auditing of Election Campaign Finance Reports
April 2006	Subah Belleh and Associates	Strategic Planning Process
August 2005	Jacques Zahles, Graphic Designer	Graphic Design for ballots and other electoral materials
July 2005	Janet Lord, Disabilities Expert	Capacity Building of DPOs
July 2005	Dr. Marcin Walecki, IFES Senior Advisor for Political Finance	Political Finance
April 2005	Criag Donsanto, Expert	Political Finance: Disclosure and Enforcement Regulations
March 2005	Susan Palmer, IFES Senior Advisor for Africa and Governance	TA to the NEC
January 2005	Criag Donsanto, Expert	Political Finance: Disclosure and Enforcement Regulations
January 2005	Hubert Akumiah, Director of IT, Electoral Commission of Ghana	Voter Registration
	Ronan McDermott, Expert	
1-9/05	Carmina Sanchis-Ruescas, IFES	Voter Education and Outreach
<b>STAFF</b>		
/06 – present	Almami Cyllah	Country Director
11/04-/06	Chedomir Flego	County Director
3/05	Brett Massey	General Operations
11/04-05	Brian McMahon	Project Manager

<b>IRI EXPERTS AND MISSIONS</b>		
<b>Dates</b>	<b>Expert</b>	<b>Purpose</b>
August 14 – 20, 2006	Bob Carpenter	Opinion Poll Research
June 14 – 15, 2007	Bob Carpenter	Opinion Poll Research
August 12 – 14, 2008	Bob Carpenter	Opinion Poll Research (4 days)
August 2008	Scott Pool	Public Policy/Political Communications Workshop (2 days)
March 17-18, 2008	Chief A Ogbe	Facilitator in political party workshop: "The Nigerian Democratic Experience"

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May 2007	Joseph Agustini	Constitutional Writing & Communication Training (3days)
December 5 - 8, 2006	Stephanie Blanton	Program Assessment; Meeting with Stakeholders
	Elizabeth Dugan	
September 2006	Martin Kajwan	Capacity Building for Women
July 9-13, 2006	Jim Arnold	Trainers in political party training
	Michele Marie Davis	
	Doug McAlarney	
	Bill R. Phillips	
June 30, 2006	Prof. Yakubu Ochefu	Facilitated sessions at IRI National Party leaders' academy and assisted in finalizing political party action plans
March 22-29, 2006	James Fisfis	Visited Monrovia to facilitate a focus group re-search exercise and trained IRI-Liberia local staff and temporary student assistants on the techniques of focus group recruitment and moderation
February 8 -9, 2006	Kwesi Jonah	Inter Party Consensus Building
August 10-12, 2005	Demetrios Karoutsos	Led training "Enhancing political party effectiveness"
August 10-12, 2005	Xav C. Hagen	Trainer in "Enhancing political party effectiveness"
August 25 - September 13, 2005	James Viray	Assess the pre-election political environment / campaign season; liaison between IRI Washington headquarters, USG and local government officials, as well as program grantees and partners in the field; IRI's representative on a National Democratic Institute (NDI)-led delegation
May 15 2005	Geoff Connor	Monitored voter registration process and met with stakeholders
	Richard E. Gribbin	
	Amelia May	
	Ashley Barr	
	Keith Jennings	
	Kwesi Jonah	
August 2005	Yomi Jacobs	Platform and Message Development
<b>NATIONAL EXPERTS</b>		
8/30/2008	Samuel Jackson	Facilitators during the Public Policy/Communications Workshop in Monrovia
	Peter Korvah	
	M Jlateh	
7/22/2008	Honorable Alomizer Barr	Facilitators Regional Women Forum Kakata
	Honorable Clarice Jah	
	Honorable Elizabeth Williams	
	M Fyneah	
	W Kobbah	
	Honorable Victoria Lynch	
7/22/2008	Ibrahim Nyei	Facilitators Regional Youth Forum, Kakata
	I Doegma	

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7/21/2008	P Moiwa	Poll facilitators
	A Armah	
	Beatrice Kear	
	J Selmah	
	A Wureh	
	Christine Tardey	
	A Kamara	
	H Kollie	
	H Sirleaf	
	F Ndomahan	
	M Dukuly	
	P Dunbar	
7/9/2008	Emmanuel Bowier	Presenter at Political Roundtable, Monrovia: Proliferation of violent land disputes in Liberia; remote and immediate cause's and implication for democratic consolidation in Liberia
7/9/2008	Thomas Nah	Presenter at Political Roundtable, Monrovia: Overview of the findings of the Governance Commission Consultative Committee Report
6/25- 6/26/2008	Guankeun Gwesiah	Youth facilitators at Regional Youth Retreat, Gbanger
	Begeorge Cooper	
6/18/2008	Honorable Corpu Barclay	Facilitator at Regional Women's Forum Gbarngar: challenges to women's political participation
	Honorable Nouh Kidau	facilitator at Regional Women Forum, Gbanrga: political education of women
5/26/2008	Miss. Satta Sedi	Youth facilitator at Regional Youth Retreat, Tubmanburg: "planning advocacy"
	Miss. Euphiemia Swen	Youth facilitator at regional youth retreat: "conflict mitigation and negotiation strategies"
	B Konneh	Youth facilitator at Regional Youth Retreat, Tubmanburg: "office management"
	M Jarbo	Youth trainer at regional youth retreat
May 1-2; 6/10-6/11/08; 6/18-6/19/08	Maraya Fyneah	Facilitator at political party women workshop II; Facilitator at Regional Women Forums in Bomi, Grand Gedeh, Bong and Margibi: "mobilization techniques;" facilitator at political party women workshop III: "office management and procedures"
3/18-3/19/08; May 1-2; May 21-22	Weade Kobbah Wreh	Facilitator at political party workshop; facilitator at political party women's workshop II; facilitator at regional women's forum: "effective communication and leadership"
3/18-3/19/08	Dr. Amos Sawyer	Facilitator and keynote speaker at capacity strengthening workshop on political parties, national government, and the democratic process
3/18-3/19/08	Hon. Morris Dukuly	Facilitator at political party workshop: "strengthening ties between political parties and their representatives in the national legislature"
3/18-3/19/08	Prof. Alaric Tokpa	Facilitator at political party workshop: "Democratization of political parties in Liberia"
2/9/2008	Wilfred Selmah	Moderator during Margibi county by-election

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		Public Debate
2/29/2008	Prof. Alaric Tokpa	Facilitator at political party roundtable workshop;
2/29/2008	Hon. Morris Dukuly	Facilitator at political party roundtable workshop;
July 19-21 2007	Weade Kobbah Wreh	Facilitator at 52nd National Legislature House of Representatives retreat
April 11-12	T. Tipoteh	Keynote speaker at political party conference
April 11-12	George Williams	Facilitators at political party conference
April 11-12	Weade Korbah Wureh	
April 23-25	Boakai Kanneh	Consultant for unity party conference
6/18/2007	Prince Zituamon	Poll facilitators
	Yaya Kromah	
	Amara Kamara	
	Juilius Johnson	
	Beatrice Kear	
	Ernest Maximore	
	Julie Selmah	
	Hawa Sirleaf	
	Hamlet Kollie	
	Christine Tardey	
Alphonso Armah		
Nov 20 - Dec 7, 2006	Rudolph Travers	Training, report prep for coalition of political party women in Liberia workshop
August 10-12, 2005	George W. Williams	Trainer in "Enhancing political party effectiveness"
<b>IRI STAFF</b>		
3/08-present	Yomi Jacobs	Acting Resident Country Director
10/07 - 3/08	Monte McMurchy	Resident Country Director
5/07 - 3/08	Yomi Jacobs	Resident Program Officer
5/06 - 1/07	Pete Meachum	Resident Country Director
4/05-6/06	Xav Hagen	Resident Country Director
8/05-5/06	Jeremy Eckstein	Resident Program Officer
2005 - present	Mahamad Boakai	Program Officer

<b>IRI OBSERVATION MISSIONS</b>		
<b>Dates</b>	<b>Expert</b>	<b>Purpose</b>
October 7 - 12, 2005	Constance Newman	Election Observation
October 7 - 12, 2005	Judy Van Rest	Election Observation
October 5 - 12, 2005	Richard Williamson	Election Observation
October 5 - 12, 2005	Jeffrey Krilla	Election Observation
October 5 - 12, 2005	Gregory Simpkins	Election Observation

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October 5 - ?, 2005	Noah Wekesa	Election Observation
October 5 - 13, 2005	Alex Younoszai	Election Observation
October 7 - 14, 2005	Timothy Taylor	Election Observation
October 5 - 12, 2005	Donald Bogue	Election Observation
October 5 - 13, 2005	Nic Cook	Election Observation
Sept 28 - Oct 14, 2005	Adebowale Olorunmola	Election Observation
October 5 - 15, 2005	Amelia May	Election Observation
October 5 - 13, 2005	Peter Pham	Election Observation
October 5 - 13, 2005	Bon Van Duker	Election Observation
October 5 - , 2005	Maimunat Adaji	Election Observation
October 2 - , 2005	Kwesi Jonah	Election Observation
October 7 - 12, 2005	Geoffrey Connor	Election Observation
October 7 - 12, 2005	Mattias Naab	Election Observation
October 5 - 13, 2005	Giovanni Ruffini	Election Observation
October 5 - , 2005	Vikki Cherwon	Election Observation
October 5 - 12, 2005	Richard Wall	Election Observation
October 5 - 12, 2005	Eric Dell	Election Observation
October 5 - 12, 2005	Anne Marie Mullen	Election Observation
October 5 - 12, 2005	Renuka Singh	Election Observation
October 5 - , 2005	Lauren Ploch	Election Observation
October 5 - 13, 2005	Shawn P. Beighle	Election Observation
November 3 - 11, 2005	Amelia May	Election Observation 2
November 3 - 12, 2005	Charles Twining	Elections Observation 2
November 3 - 11, 2005	Maureen Farrell	Election Observation 2
November 5 - 9, 2005	Glenn Giokaris	Election Observation 2
November 5 - 9, 2005	John Cavanaugh	Election Observation 2
November 5 - 9, 2005	Jack Webb	Election Observation 2
November 5 - 9, 2005	Marty Ryall	Election Observation 2
Oct 26 - Nov 11, 2005	Patrick Johnson	Election Observation 2
November 5 - 9, 2005	Robert Lloyd	Election Observation 2
November 5 - 9, 2005	Stephanie Bell-Rose	Election Observation 2
November 5 - 9, 2005	Afet Suleymanova	Election Observation 2
November 3 - 11, 2005	David Woodruff	Election Observation 2
November 2 - 12, 2005	Susan Jay	Election Observation 2
November 8 - 13, 2005	Paul Fagan	Election Observation 2
November 5 - 9, 2005	Georges Fauriol	Election Observation 2
November 8 - 13, 2005	Lisa Gates	Election Observation 2
November 3 - 11, 2005	Jason Roe	Election Observation 2
November 3 - 12,	Robert Krill	Election Observation 2

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2005		
November 3 - 13, 2005	Ranca Tuba	Election Observation 2
November 4 - 11, 2005	Volodymyr Kozoriz	Election Observation 2
November 2005	Kassim Sule Afegbua	Election Observation 2
November 8 - 13, 2005	Samuel Imende	Election Observation 2
November 3 - 11, 2005	Kwesi Jonah	Election Observation 2
November 2005	Yomi Jacobs	Election Observation 2
November 2005	Rhoda Margesson	Election Observation 2
Oct 27 - Nov 12, 2005	Mojoyin Onijala	Election Observation 2
November 3 - 11, 2005	Margaret Ateng Otim	Election Observation 2
November 2005	Robina Namusisi	Election Observation 2
November 3 - 11, 2005	Jason C. Roe	Election Observation 2

**NDI EXPERTS AND MISSIONS**

<b>Dates</b>	<b>Expert</b>	<b>Purpose</b>
	Information not provided	
	<b>STAFF</b>	
2007-present	Alexander Chavarria	Resident Director
2005-present	Thomas Du	Senior Program Officer
2005	Sidi Diarwara	Country Director
2005	Titi Pitso	Senior Elections Program Manager

**NDI/CARTER CENTER OBSERVATION MISSIONS**

<b>EVENT</b>	<b>EXPERT</b>	
Pre-Election	Mark Clark, NDI/Nigeria County Director	James Viray, former IRI Program Officer for Liberia
	Tom Crick, Liberia Project Director, The Carter Center	Ashley Barr, Country Director, Carter Center Liberia
	Almami Cyllah, Former NEC Commissioner, Sierra Leone	Linda Patterson, Program Officer NDI/Washington
	Olayinka Lawal, Executive Director, Constitutional Rights Project Nigeria	
Presidential Elections	Jimmy Carter, Former US President	Nicephoro Soglim Former President Benin
	Rosalynn Carter, Co-Founder, The Carter Center	Diana Acha Morfaw, Vice President, National Elections Observatory, Cameroon
	Ashley Barr, Liberia Country Director, The Carter Center	Alexander Bick, Former Acting Liberia Country Director, TCC
	Rebecca P. Carter, Director of Government Relations, the Nature Conservancy	Viwemi Chavula, LTO, Malawai

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Presidential Elections, cont.	Barrie Hofmann, Senior Advisor, NDI	Ilana Bleichert, LTO, Canada	
	Almami Cyllah, Former Elections Commissioner from Sierra Leone	Malik M. Chaka, Policy Analyst Subcommittee on International Terrorism & Non Proliferation, US House of Representatives	
	Nicholas Jahr, LTO, TCC	James E (Chip) Carter, III, Consultant	
	Jim Della-Giacoma, Senior Advisor NDI	Rindai Chipfunde, National Coordinator, Zimbabwe Election Support Network	
	William Krause, Information Systems Consultant	Tom Crick, Conflict Resolution Program Senior Political Analyst, TCC	
	Vivian Lowery Derryck, Senior VP, AED	Segametsi G Modisaotsile, Emang Basadi Association, Botswana	
	Jeremy Levitt, Associate Professor of Law, Florida International College of Law	Chris Fomuyho, Senior Associate for Africa, NDI	
	Fatoumata S. Diallo, Management Consultant, Guinea	David Harris, LTO, TCC	
	Thoko Matshe, Gender Expert	Koki Muli-Grignon, Advocate, High Court of Kenya	
	Theophilus Dowetin, Program Officer, Association of African Election Authorities	John Prendergast, Senior Advisor, International Crisis Group	
	Pat Merloe, Senior Associate and Director of Electoral Programs, NDI	Mary Miller, Assistant Program Coordinator, TCC	
	John Moor, Associate Director of Public Information, TCC	Girum Tesfaye, Former UN Electoral Advisor	
	Linda Patterson, Program Officer, NDI	Rebecca Tinsley, Director Waging Peace,	
	Daniel Reilly, Senior Operations Officer, NDI	John Yoder, Professor of Political Science and History, Whitworth College	
	Monica Clark, Senior Program Assistant, NDI	Vandetta Sawyerr, Head of Administration NDI/Sierra Leone	
	Brittany Danisch, Program Officer, NDI	Aleksandar Sukiban, NDI/Serbia	
	Run-off Elections	Ruffin Mayaka, Staff Accountant, NDI/DRC	Maud Nyamhunga, LTO TCC
		Tomsie Priscilla Philips, Independent Electoral Commission, South Africa	Jean Freedberg, Director of Public Affairs, NDI/South Africa
Akeem Jagun, IT program Officer, NDI/Nigeria			
Alex Ekwueme, Former Vice President Nigeria		David Carroll, Democracy Program Director, TCC	
Ashley Barr, Liberia Country Director, TCC		Chris Fomunyoh, Senior Associate for Africa, NDI/Cameron	
Ilana Belichert, LTO, TCC		Courtney Creek, Program Assistant for Africa, NDI	
Malik M. Chaka, Policy Analyst, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Non-Proliferation, US House Representative		Tom Crick, Conflict Resolution Program, TCC	
Viwemi Chavula, LTO, TCC		Fatoumata S. Diallo, Management Consultant, Guinea	
Mary Miller, Assistant Program Coordinator, TCC		Margot Gould, Assistant Program Officer for Africa, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Australia	
David Harris, LTO, TCC		Wandra Mitchell, International Legal Expert	
Barrie Hofmann, Senior Advisor, NDI	Nicholas Jahr, LTO, TCC		
Zainab Kamara, MP, Sierra Leone	Nina Robbins, International Development Consultant		
Beverly Baker Kelly, Law Professor, Gol	Vandetta Sawyerr, Head of Administration,		



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Run-off Elections, cont.	den Gate University School of Law	NDI/Sierra Leone
	William Krause, Information Systems Consultant	Girum Tesfaye, Former UN Electoral Advisor
	Bretty Lacy, LTO, TCC	John Yoder, Professor of Political Science and History, Whitworth College

ANNEX 5: POLITICAL PARTIES AND IRI ASSISTANCE

PARTY	Est.	SEATS						ASSESSMENTS				ACTIVITIES																							
		1997		2005		TOTAL		2004-2005	2006	2007	2008	2004-2005			2006			2007			2008														
		SENATE	HOUSE	TOTAL	SENATE	HOUSE	TOTAL					Consultations	Poll Agent Training	Party Effectiveness	Campaign School	Party Sustainability	Political Sustainability	Finance	Party Agent Training	Party Sustainability	National Leadership	Leadership	Campaign School	County Leadership	PP Finance	Women Forum	Youth Retreat	Public Policy	Party Sustainability						
<b>TOTAL Parties</b>								1			1			18	9		20	17		11	5	6	6	5	17	6	6	6	12						
<b>TOTAL Persons</b>								N/A			N/A		80	99		191	50		29		45	94	131	50	447	370	66	500							
All Liberia Coalition Party		2	3		1	2								✓		✓													✓						
Alliance for Peace & Democracy					3	5								✓		✓							✓												
Liberian People's Party								✓					✓			✓							✓												
United People's Party								✓																											
Alliance of Political Parties		-	2															✓						✓											
Liberia Action Party													✓			✓								✓											
Liberia Unification Party																																			
Coalition for the Transformation of Liberia					7	8																													
LAP	1984													✓		✓								✓											
Liberian Unification Party																																			
People's Democratic Party of Liberia																																			
True Whig Party																																			

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PARTY	Est.	SEATS				ASSESSMENTS				ACTIVITIES																			
		1997		2005		2004-2005	2006	2007	2008	2004-2005			2006			2007				2008									
		SENATE	HOUSE	TOTAL	SENATE	HOUSE	TOTAL					Consultations	Poll Agent Training	Party Effectiveness	Campaign School	Party Sustainability	Political Finance	Party Agent Training	Party Sustainability	National Leadership	Leadership	Campaign School	County Leadership	PP Finance	Women Forum	Youth Retreat	Public Policy	Party Sustainability	
Congress for Democratic Change	2005		3	15																									
Liberian People's Party			1																										
Liberty Party	2005				3	9																							
National Democratic Party of Liberia	1984				2	1																							
National Patriotic Party	1997	26	64		4	4																							
National Reformation Party					1	1																							
New Deal Movement	1999				3																								
United Democratic Alliance						1																							
Liberia National Union																													
Liberia Education & Development Party																													
Reformation Alliance Party																													
United People's Party			2																										
Unity Party	1984	3	7			8																							
Free Democratic Party																													

**LIBERIA ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL  
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PARTY	Est.	SEATS						ASSESSMENTS				ACTIVITIES																										
		1997		2005		TOTAL	HOUSE	SENATE	2004-2005	2006	2007	2008	2004-2005		2006		2007		2008																			
		SENATE	HOUSE	TOTAL	SENATE	HOUSE	TOTAL	2004-2005	2006	2007	2008	Consultations	Poll Agent	Training	Party Effectiveness	Campaign School	School	Party Sustainability	Political Finance	Party Agent Training	Party Sustainability	National Leadership	Campaign School	Leadership	County Leadership	PP Finance	Women Forum	Youth Retreat	Public Policy	Party Sustainability								
Freedom Alliance Party of Liberia																																						
Labor Party of Liberia																																						
Liberia Destiny Party																																						
Liberia Equal Rights Party																																						
Liberia National Alliance																																						
Independent Democratic Party of Liberia																																						
People's Progressive Party																																						
National Party of Liberia																																						
Reformed United Liberia Party																																						
Union of Liberian Democrats																																						
United Democratic Party																																						
Progressive Democratic Party																																						

## ANNEX 6: STUDY TOURS

STUDY TOURS BY IFES		
DATE	STUDY TOUR	PARTICIPANTS
7/25 – 7/7/08	Observation of local elections in Sierra Leone	James M Fromayan, Chairman NEC
		T. Ernest Kruah, Deputy Executive Director for Operations
		Joseph A Yarsiah, Political liaison
		Alfred W. Tokpa, Regional Coordinator Lower Montserrado County
		Voepa S. Gongloe, Magistrate, Lower Montserrado County
		Deddeh Mulbah-Buway, Magistrate, Margibi County
		Honorias Saylee, Magistrate, Maryland County
		Miatta Johnson, Acting Magistrate Upper Montserrado
		Esther Barcon, Acting Magistrate, Bomi County
		M. Woninyan Bryant, Regional Coordinator, Region IV
		James Cordor, Magistrate, Lower Bong County
		Sylvester G.J.Wah, Magistrate, Sinoe County
		M. David B.Armah, Magistrate, Grand Cape Mount County
		Saye W. Zalebah, Regional Coordinator, Region III
		Bledor Flomo, Magistrate, Lower Nimba County
		Albert Smith, Magistrate, Lofa County
David Logan, Magistrate, Grand Bassa County		
Daniel Newland, Magistrate, Upper Bong County		
9/07	Observation of Run Off Elections in Sierra Leone	Names not provided
June-July 2007	Observation of General and Parliamentary Elections in Sierra Leone	James Fromayan, Chairman
		Voepa Gongloe, Magistrate
		David Logan, Magistrate
		William Tompoe, Magistrate
		Albert F. Smith, Magistrate
		Duke Sannor, Magistrate
		David Armah, Magistrate
		Daniel Newland, Magistrate
		James Cordor, Magistrate
		Princeton Monmie, Magistrate
		J. Bledor Flamo, Magistrate
		Mulah Pantoe, Magistrate
		Gbaye K. Synyenatu, Magistrate
		Joseph Yarsiah, Political Officer
Daniel Gegbeson, Regional Coordinator		

**LIBERIA ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL  
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		W.M Bryant, Regional Coordinator
		Saye Zelebah, Regional Coordinator
		Alfred Tokpa, Regional Coordinator
		Sylvester Wah, Magistrate
		T. Ernest Kruah, Dep Direction For Operations
		Esther Beakon, Asst. Magistrate
		Miatta Johnson, Asst. Magistrate
		Deddeh M. Buway, Magistrate
		Honoriam Saylee, Magistrate
1/05	Computerization of the voters' registry at the Electoral Commission in Ghana	Names not provided
11/28 – December 12, 2004	NEC Delegation to Ghana 2004 elections	Hon. James Chelley, Elections Commissioner
		J. Dweh Doeyan, Head, External Relations
		Enerst Kruah, Head of Operations
		John Langley, Sr. Policy Advisor
		M. Woninyian Bryant, Regional Coordinator
		Saye W. Zelabah, Regional Coordinator
		Daniel Gegbeson, Regional Coordinator
		Alfred Tokpa, Regional Coordinator
		William B. Tompoe, Election Magistrate
		Duke G. Seth Sarnor, Election Magistrate
		Albert F. Smith, Election Magistrate
		William J. W. Draper, Election Magistrate
		John F. Nyeswa, Election Magistrate
		Joseph N. Cheechea, Election Magistrate
		Samuel S. K. Watkins, Election Magistrate
		Alexander D. Seo, Election Magistrate
		Bledor Flomo, Elections Magistrate
		Primceton Monmia, Election Magistrate
		William H. Davis, Election Magistrate
		George Gpakolay, Elections Magistrate
		Sherdrich M. Jackson, Elections Magistrate
		Washington Farmah, Election Magistrate
		M. David B. Armah, Jr. Elections Magistrate
		Taweh Johnson, Election Magistrate
		Tarnue B. Collins, Elections Magistrate

**STUDY TOURS BY IRI**

<b>DATE</b>	<b>STUDY TOUR</b>	<b>PARTICIPANTS</b>
Dec 7, 2004	Ghana Election Observation	Hon. Dusty Wolokollie, Chair, CDC

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		Wilson Gaye, Chair, New Deal Movement
		Peter Vaku, True Whig Party
		Prince Dunbar, Radio Veritas
July 19-27, 2006	Nigeria Party Activity Study Tour	Joshua Sackie, Acting Chair, CDC
		Geraldine Doe-Sheriff, Co-Chair, CDC
		Hon. Peter Korva, Secretary General, UP
		Mambu Davis, Vice Chair, UP
		John Whitfield, Secretary General, NPP
		Laurence George, National Chairman, NPP
		Hon. Cletus Sieh, Secretary General, LAP
		Hon. Isaac Manneh, National Chairman, LAP
		Blamoh Sieh, Dir. Of Civic Education, NEC
2008	Tour of Lofa, Gbarpolu, and Bong Counties to discuss women's concerns	Hon. Alomizer Ennos-Barr, Chair, WLC (CDC)
		Hon. Regina Sokan-Teah, Sec. Gen., WLC (CDC)
		Maliyam Jalibah, Member, WLC (ALCOP)
		Corpu Berkeley, Member, WLC (UP)
		Victoria Lynch, Financial Secretary, WLC (CDC)
		Haja Fata Siryon, Member, WLC (NDPL)
		Hon. Elizabeth Williams, Chaplain, WLC (UP)
		Sen. Jewel Howard-Taylor, Member (NPP)

<b>STUDY TOURS BY NDI</b>		
<b>DATE</b>	<b>STUDY TOUR</b>	<b>PARTICIPANTS</b>
Nov 28 - Dec 12, 2004	Observation in Ghana	Theresa Davis, Women NGO Secretariat
		Dan Saryee, Liberia Democratic Institute, CODEL
		Segbe Nyanfor, Cener for the Promotion of Democracy in Liberia, CODEL
		Bettie Neal, Liberian Women Initiative, Women NGO Secretarita
		Pearl Fahnbulleh, Naitonal Women Commission of Liberia
		K-Hastings Panyonnoh, Center for Democracy and Elections
		Gbenimah Slopodoe, Liberia Productivity Agency
		Gabriel Smith, Bassa Concern Citizens Movement
		Rev. Christopher Toe, Inter-religious Council of Liberia
		Thomas Du, NDI/Liberia
		Elizabeth Hoff, Press Union of Liberia
Daniel A Towalid, National Association of Liberia School Principals, CSM/L		
	No other information available	

**ANNEX 7: SUBGRANTS**

<b>SUBGRANTS ISSUES BY IFES</b>				
<b>DATE</b>	<b>RECIPEINT</b>	<b>\$</b>	<b>PURPOSE</b>	
	Crusaders for Peace	53,689	Voter Information Campaign	
	Press Union of Liberia	20,912	Elections Report Training	
	Subah Belleh & Associates	51,960	Applied Research (what does this mean?)	
	Subah Belleh & Associates	4,000	NEC strategic planning process	
	UNOPS	229,522	Construction of 6 office buildings for NEC	
	St. Obert's Society of the Visually Handicapped (SOSOVIH)	4,955	Civic Education	
	Organization for the Social Integration of the Liberian Deaf	4,965		
	Christian Association of the Blind (CAB)	5,000		
	Association of Disabled Women in Liberia (ADWIL)	4,988		
	Apostolic Foundation Deaf School (AFDS)	5,000		
	Disabled Organization Rehabilitation Organization (DRCO)	4,500		
	Group of 77 Disabled Center	5,000		
	Islamic Da'Wah Agency (IDA)	5,000		
	Liberia National Association of the Blind (LNAB)	4,990		
	Liberia National Association of the Deaf (LNAD)	5,000		
	Liberia National Muslim Association of the Blind and Disabled (LNMABD)	5,102		
	Liberia National Association of the Physically Disabled (LNAPD)	4,825		SubTotal DPOs: \$59,325
12/04-10/31/08	<b>TOTAL SUBGRANTS</b>	419,408		

<b>SUBGRANTS ISSUES BY IRI</b>			
None			

<b>SUBGRANTS ISSUED BY NDI</b>			
<b>DATE</b>	<b>RECIPEINT</b>	<b>\$</b>	<b>PURPOSE</b>
4/15/08 – 10/15/08	Resource Center for Community Empowerment and Integrated Development	29,985	Community based Women's Political Mobilization and Democracy Project
4/15/08-10/15/08	Women in Peacebuilding Network/West Africa Network for Peacebuilding	34,978	Community based Women's Political Mobilization and Democracy Project



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4/15/08-10/15/08	Effective Activities to Restore Stability to the Masses	35,000	Improve Legislative Constituent Relations
6/1/05 – 2/31/05	Carter Center – Liberia	209,000	International Elections Observation
5/1/05 –12/31/05	West Africa Network for Peace-building	80,950	Domestic Elections Monitoring
5/1/05 –12/31/05	Coalition for Democracy in Liberia	92,956	Domestic Elections Monitoring
5/1/05 –12/31/05	Inter-Religious Council of Liberia	78,822	Domestic Elections Monitoring
5/1/05 –10/31/05	Foundation for Human Rights and Democracy	14,215	Rebuilding Liberia Democracy: Helping Citizens of Grand Bassa Make Informed Choices
4/1/05 –10/31/05	Center for the Promotion of Democracy in Liberia	11,697	Voters Education Radio Program

## ANNEX 8: ANALYSIS OF VOTER TURNOUT AND INVALID VOTES IN COUNTIES RECEIVING NDI CIVIC EDUCATION IN 2005 AND UNASSISTED COUNTIES

As illustrated in the chart below, the average number of invalid votes in counties receiving NDI civic education was lower than that in unassisted counties for both rounds of the 2005 Presidential election. Similarly, the average turnout was greater in recipient counties in both rounds of voting than in unassisted counties. While these data are suggestive of a positive impact from the NDI program in the level of participation and understanding of the election process among voters in recipient counties, none of these differences are statistically significant (i.e. there is a fairly high chance that these differences are due to chance alone), due to the small sample sizes. In addition, it is unknown whether these counties were predisposed (due to education levels or proximity to Monrovia, for example) to greater participation and a better understanding of the process.

County	Voter Turnout 2005 (%)		Invalid Votes 2005 (%)	
	1st Round	2nd Round	1st Round	2nd Round
<i>Bomi</i>	73.38%	62.43%	4.83%	2.39%
<i>Gbarpolu</i>	66.94%	56.09%	3.01%	2.73%
<i>Grand Bassa</i>	68.75%	45.15%	4.08%	3.95%
<i>Grand Cape Mount</i>	72.11%	51.43%	3.41%	3.78%
<i>Montserrado</i>	80.66%	74.88%	2.88%	1.76%
Bong	75.08%	53.84%	6.61%	3.01%
Grand Gedeh	73.76%	71.80%	2.41%	1.37%
Grand Kru	77.10%	52.42%	3.85%	2.52%
Lofa	61.98%	52.97%	5.76%	3.35%
Margibi	72.70%	59.19%	4.41%	2.90%
Maryland	71.73%	55.97%	4.96%	3.23%
Nimba	74.44%	52.62%	3.14%	2.84%
River Cess	66.89%	43.03%	4.82%	3.48%
River Gee	72.28%	42.40%	4.43%	2.19%
Sinoe	71.80%	53.01%	2.69%	1.66%
<b><i>NDI Assisted Area Average</i></b>	<b>77.53%</b>	<b>67.79%</b>	<b>3.17%</b>	<b>2.13%</b>
<b><i>Non-Assisted Area Average</i></b>	<b>72.23%</b>	<b>54.38%</b>	<b>4.55%</b>	<b>2.82%</b>
<i>National Average</i>	74.86%	61.04%	3.84%	2.44%
<b>Significance (&lt;5% = sig)*</b>	<b>82.07%</b>	<b>20.86%</b>	<b>16.32%</b>	<b>27.45%</b>

\*2-tailed t-test at alpha of 5% on the difference between assisted and non-assisted counties. A percentage lower than 5% indicates a significant difference. No differences were significant.

## ATTACHMENT A: SCOPE OF WORK

### 1. PURPOSE

The purpose of this statement of work is to define the requirements for an external evaluation of USAID/Liberia's Elections and Political Processes Strengthening Program being implemented by the Consortium for Elections and Political Processes Strengthening (CEPPS) under Associate Cooperative Agreement no. 669-A-0500-00013 (henceforth "the Agreement") since 2004. CEPPS consortium partners include the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and IFES.

### 2. BACKGROUND

USAID/Liberia awarded Associate Cooperative Agreement no. 669-A-0500-00013 (as part of the CEPPS Leader with Associates Award no. DGC-A-00-01-0004-00) on 12/14/2004 to CEPPS to undertake a variety of activities in support of Liberia's democratization following 14 years of civil war, political and social disintegration, and a negotiated transitional governing period leading to landmark multi-party elections in October 2005.

During the initial period of the Agreement (from 12/14/2004 as amended through 07/31/2006), the overall goal of USAID/Liberia's democracy and governance objective was to support key institutions and processes in order to (a) realize successful Liberian national general elections in October 2005, and (b) help ensure a successful transition from conflict to a newly elected government based on democratic principles of participation, representation, and accountability.

To achieve this goal, three objectives were developed to guide implementation of CEPPS projects.

1. Carry out an effective, credible electoral process that results in the election of legitimate political leaders for Liberia's new, post war government.
2. Build a more representative and competitive multiparty system in Liberia by improving political party capacity for internal organization, policy and platform development, and political party contact with citizens leading to greater participation and accountability in the political process.
3. Enhance public participation and political party and government accountability at the national and local levels during elections as well as immediately after the elections and during the transitional period.

After the successful elections in October 2005 and the transfer of power from the Transitional Government to the Sirleaf Administration, the political climate was extremely delicate and challenging. USAID and CEPPS agreed on modified activities to be responsive to the political and atmospheric challenges. In July, 2006, USAID and CEPPS began negotiations for a revised program based on a clearer political picture emerging in Liberia. During this "bridge period USAID and implementing partners were retooling efforts to respond to immediate post election needs, attend to assisting by-elections. This bridge period was a sensitive time and USAID seeks an evaluator to determine if support during this period was effective and whether or not USAID received value for the use of its funds. Effective 12/20/2006, a major program and budget modification to CEPPS was completed to implement a new phase of elections and political process strengthening assistance through 10/31/2008. This new program took into account the successful trans-

## **LIBERIA ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PROCESSES PROGRAM EVALUATION**

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fer of power from the National Transition Government of Liberia, negotiated under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, to a legitimately-elected president and national legislature. The revised program description was drafted to reflect the new political dispensation and technical assistance needs of the Government of Liberia. The Political Processes Strengthening Program was revised to support the Strategic Objective “Democratic Governance Enhanced” and Intermediate result 9.4 Political Processes Strengthened (to include legislature, elections, political parties and legal reform).

The stated program objectives are:

1. Strengthen the new legislature to represent the interests of constituents, engage in law-making, conduct oversight, and model transparency and accountability in its own activities.
2. Provide civic and voter education and encourage citizen participation in the political process, including constitutional and legal reform.
3. Improve political party capacity to contribute to transparency and accountability, and local level elections, especially encouraging the participation of women and youth.
4. Support electoral systems and preparations for elections, including local and municipal.
5. Assess public attitudes about political processes, political parties, government effectiveness and corruption.
6. Conduct anti-corruption research and coalition building.

For the duration of these activities from December 2004 until the present a total of USD \$17,816,097 has been obligated to CEPPS.

Since the inception of CEPPS’ presence in Liberia in support of USAID democracy and governance programs (presently under the “F” framework the nomenclature has changed to Governing Justly and Democratically (GJD) and shall be used henceforth), a formal impact evaluation has not taken place. Performance evaluations are an important part of responsible performance management as stated in USAID ADS 203.3.6. Liberia has entered a new political phase, has established new and expanded relationships with donors, and has successfully emerged from protracted conflict. In order to be responsive to a different development paradigm (from conflict, destabilization and a crisis in governance to relative stability and a legitimate government), USAID/Liberia intends on conducting a thorough impact evaluation of its Elections and Political Processes Strengthening program to inform management of the effectiveness of the activities and their impact in achieving the intended objectives. In addition the evaluation will provide input for decisions about revised activities in its GJD portfolio.

### **3. SCOPE OF WORK**

The contractor will undertake a thorough impact evaluation of the CEPPS portfolio of activities since the award was signed in December 2004 as modified through October 31, 2008. The purpose of this evaluation is to assess the impact of the program, the actual results achieved versus targets, and to make recommendations on future programming based on the results achieved so far and the needs in the sector. This will be done by reviewing actual intended results and objectives versus planned progress, identifying problems, challenges, delays and the reasons for them, and also focus on what met or exceeded expectations and how progress can be sustained. The contractor will take into account the stated goals and objectives of the agreement to assess the impact of USAID funded programs implemented by CEPPS. The contractor will design a meth-

odology to be approved by USAID/Liberia's GJD office to answer the following questions under each heading.

**A. Impact of the program**

- Have USAID-funded programs achieved their intended results? Why or why not and to what degree?
- What factors contributed to success or failure?
- To what degree was sustainability of the interventions achieved?
- What were major constraints hindering success, if applicable?
- What impact has there been working with political parties, especially with regards to national Party Leadership Training??
- What impact has there been working with the Women's Caucus in the national legislature?
- How effective was the methodology used to help citizens communicate with legislators?

**B. Management of the program**

- Was management of CEPPS implementation effective? Was assistance responsive and delivered in a timely fashion?
- Were USAID customers satisfied with the assistance? (customers/beneficiaries and stakeholders will include ultimate beneficiaries such as political party leaders, elected members on the legislature, election administration officials and staff, others).
- Based on an assessment of the impact of the program and the factors leading to success or failure (or degrees of either), what changes in management and implementation are recommended that would contribute to future success in elections and political process strengthening?
- Was the budget allocation sufficient to achieve the results?
- Does it make sense for the diverse program to be consolidated into one management unit (or implementing mechanism)?

**C. Recommendations for future assistance**

- What should be the follow on programmatic focus for USAID in the area of elections and political process strengthening?
- What opportunities are there for continued assistance in the area of elections and political process strengthening?

As stated in Section C.2 Background, there are two (2) major periods of this program to be evaluated: (1) Inception of program through inauguration of President Sirleaf and the legislature and the post-transfer period, December 2004-July 2006; and (2) from the major program modification in December 2006 through the present. The offeror will focus 25% of efforts for the pre-election period and 75% of its efforts on the post election period through the present. USAID is less concerned about evaluating CEPPS efforts in the first period as it is universally accepted that the elections were successful and resulted in a legitimate government. Particular attention will be made on the post-election period through the present as USAID/Liberia shifted program objectives and activities to attempt to be responsive the particular challenges facing Liberia.

USAID/Liberia recognizes the difficulty of operating in a country in serious transition and uncertainty. Therefore the offeror will focus mainly on implementation in the second, critical period of

performance, which includes the bridge period from after the elections through September 2006 and from the major modification in December 2006 until the present. USAID/Liberia is particularly interested in whether or not the immediate post-transition activities were successful or not, whether or not USAID got value for its funds, and what lessons can be learned from operating in a fluid, challenging, rapidly evolving political environment.

#### **D. Methodology and Approach**

In order to answer the questions above to help USAID/Liberia determine the factors leading to success or failure, and seeking to improve future implementation of projects in elections and political process strengthening, the contractor will provide a methodology of data collection and analysis. The following are possible methodologies.

- Literature review (scholarly papers, donor reports, think tank papers, etc. on Liberia's democratic development with a focus on donor interventions)
- Key informant interviews (election officials, political party members, community leaders, elected members and staff of Liberia's house and senate)
- Review of legislative proceedings and records to assess effectiveness in oversight of executive branch
- Community level focus groups in communities where CEPPS conducted civic education activities to gauge level of change in understanding about democratic governance. Consider also using a control group from a community where civic education was not applied.

## ATTACHMENT B: METHODOLOGY

### WORKPLAN

#### I. Team Preparation. September 10 – 22, 2008

Desk study of available and relevant documents including: USAID reports; CEPPS reporting; 1997 and 2005 election materials; other election/political assistance program reporting and academic and informal publications on Liberia's democratic transition and development.

Refinement of evaluation methodology and work plan and arrangement of logistical support for the work in Liberia.

Interviews in Washington DC with:

- International Republican Institute (IRI)
- National Democratic Institute (NDI)
- International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)

#### II. Field Work: September 23 – October 10, 2008

**Week One:** Entry briefing with USAID and initial meetings with IFES, IRI and NDI as well as other donors and MPs who are about to go on recess. Collection and review of additional documentation from IFES, IRI and NDI on program implementation, monitoring and evaluation and program management, including use of budget.

**Week Two:** Continuation of meetings in Monrovia with other donors, CSOs, political parties, National Elections Commission, legislative committees and other government offices; political observers, including journalists and academics. Field trips to CEPPS-assisted and control areas for meetings with local officials, CSOs, parties and program beneficiaries. To cover more areas for evaluation, the team anticipates splitting into two sub-teams during these visits.

Weekly status report to CTO.

**Week Three:** Completion of interviews in Monrovia and follow up field work if required. De-briefing for USAID with power point presentation of major findings.

#### III. Report writing: October 13 – 24, 2008

**Drafting:** Drafting of report by team and submission to USAID by October 25, 2008

**Finalizing:** Finalizing of report within five business days after receipt of USAID comments.

#### IV. DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY

The Evaluation Team will answer the following questions for this Evaluation:

- Extent of the CEPPS program achievements and if they met their intended results;
- Identification of contributing factors to success/failure and the program's major constraints;

- Degree of sustainability and local ownership of the programs;
- Impact of the CEPPS program on civil society, parties and government;
- Quality and effectiveness of program design, implementation approaches and targeting;
- Quality of program management and reporting;
- Responsiveness of program to the evolving situation in Liberia, especially in the immediate post-election period and after December 2006;
- Level of customer satisfaction; and
- Adequacy of funding levels and cost-effectiveness of program.

The Evaluation Team will also make recommendations to USAID for areas of future programmatic focus for electoral and political processes (EPP) strengthening and areas of opportunities for future assistance. It will also identify the key lessons learned and best practices in providing EPP assistance in a rapidly evolving political environment.

The Evaluation Team will assess the two major periods of this program<sup>18</sup>:

- December 2004 – July 2006 (using approximately 25% of the Team’s effort)
- August 2006 – Present (with approximately 75% of Team effort)

## **V. METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH**

The Evaluation Team will use the Cooperative Agreements and Amendments as the basis for the evaluation and compare actual results and activities against those anticipated in the Agreements. This will be supplemented by the Work Plans and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Plans submitted to USAID by each implementer. Output data will be collected and compared against the indicators and targets set in the work plans and M&Es. Results-level impact will be determined for each objective and M&E indicator. The Team will pay particular attention to the factors affecting the ability of the CEPPS implementers and their subgrantees/subcontractors to successfully implement their programs.

During the preparation phase, detailed M&E information was not available to the Evaluation Team and we are unable at this point to determine whether or not enough detailed baseline and subsequent M&E information was collected to allow for a thorough impact evaluation. However, the Team will work with IRI, NDI and IFES to collect whatever data is available to supplement Evaluation interviews with participants, non-participants and program implementers so that we can develop a qualitative understanding of the program’s effects and relative success.

As part of its evaluation effort, the Evaluation Team will undertake:

- **Review of documents.** This includes: academic literature and informal publications (i.e. web publications, unpublished studies, internal memos) on the history and current status of democratic development in Liberia; other donor EPP assistance programs; election reports; party assessments; UN and CSO reporting; public opinion surveys; think tank analysis; NEC documents; relevant legislation and Committee records; as well as USAID’s and the CEPPS partners’ program documents and reports.

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<sup>18</sup> Dates for these periods may shift slightly once the Team receives copies of the Cooperative Agreements and can see the actual dates for program amendments.



- **Interviews.** Interviews with the CEPPS implementers head offices in Washington, DC were held prior to the start of the field work. Interviews in country will include the CEPPS implementers, their partners/sub-contractors; USAID; UNDP; UNMIL; EC; bilateral donors; National Elections Commission (commissioners and staff); Governance Commission; Anti-Corruption Commission and other Government of Liberia Offices; Legislature (including party leaders, Women’s Caucus, Committees, Senate and House Committees related to electoral and political processes); Special Joint Stakeholders Collaborative Committee; political parties and coalitions both in office and those which were not successful in the elections; Coalition of Political Party Women; Inter-Party Consultative Committee; civil society observer groups such as NACEM and democratic-watch CSOs. Interviews will be held both in Monrovia and at the district level in both assisted and non-assisted areas.
  
- **Use of “control” groups and areas.** To help determine impact of CEPPS assistance versus development that occurred spontaneously or assisted by other donors following peace and the 2005 elections, the Evaluation Team will identify where possible “control” groups and areas that were not a focus of CEPPS attention. This will allow for comparison of results and attitudes between assisted and non-assisted areas. Possible control areas and groups will be determined in coordination with USAID/Liberia during the Team’s entry briefing. It should be noted, that the selection and use of “control” groups for this evaluation is unlikely to meet rigorous social science research standards, but should prove useful in giving the Evaluation Team a better understanding of EPP progress made in areas that received less CEPPS attention.
  
- **Use of group interviews.** The Team will arrange for a number of group interviews to help assess the level of democratic understanding among the major stakeholder and beneficiary groups affected by the CEPPS program. These will be done in both Monrovia and at the community level during field trips to the districts. In these group interviews, a short list of standard questions will be asked in addition to allowing for wider conversation on EPP issues to enable comparisons among groups and their responses. The list of questions will be developed following the Team’s initial briefing with USAID and the three CEPPS implementers as each group will be asked to provide the two major questions they would want answered if they were doing the evaluation. The Evaluators will then complete the list of questions to ensure all relevant issues required for the evaluation are covered.



## ATTACHMENT C: PERSONS MET

### In Liberia:

#### **Association of Disabled Women in Liberia**

Agnes F. Effiong, President

#### **Bassa Youth Congress**

Sam Jammeh, Chair

Numen Winston, Secretary General

Sis Lebing, Treasurer

#### **Carter Center**

Thomas K. Crick, Senior Political Analyst

#### **Center for Transparency and Accountability in Liberia (CENTAL)**

George Ever, Media Director

#### **Christian Association of the Blind, Kakata Branch**

Jerry K Flomo, Former DPO Trainer, Margibi

George Flomo, Margibi

#### **Congress for Democratic Change**

Geraldine Doe-Sherif, Acting Chairman

Acarous M. Gray, Assistant Secretary

John McArthur Dewart, National Youth Coordinator

Psalm B. Karmo, Secretary, Margibi

#### **Coalition of Political Parties Women in Liberia (COPPWIL)**

Morais Fanieh, Chairperson

Roseline Cooper, Margibi

Representatives from Grand Bassa County, representing the following parties: LINU, LAP, NDPL, LP, NPP, UP, and CDC

#### **Effective Activities to Restore Stability for the Masses (EARS)**

Aaron L. Daye, Executive Director

#### **Free Democratic Party (FDP)**

Francis G. Subah

#### **Federation of Liberian Youth (FLY)**

Joseph Jimmy, President

Madea Peters, Deputy Secretary

Jerry Tarblo, Youth Employment Officer

Blama Goll, Bomi County Coordinator

Joseph Tamba, Head Youth Adult and Adolescent Group, Bomi

#### **Government of Liberia**

Walter Wisner, Deputy Minister for Research and Development Planning

Sansae Fofanah, Acting Superintendent, Margibi County

Mayor, Buchanan, Grand Bassa County

Traditional Leader Council, Buchanan, Grand Bassa County

#### **IFES Liberia**

Almami Cyllah, Country Director

Barzie Zinnah, Deputy Director

Senesee G. Freeman, Program Officer

## **LIBERIA ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PROCESSES PROGRAM EVALUATION**

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Moses G. Clarke, Program Associate  
Roseline Kpodi, Finance and Administrative Assistant  
Sampson W. Benson, Sr. Driver  
Abbey Ajani, Driver  
Alber Bertee, Office Assistant  
Charline Reeves, Intern  
Prince Tucker, Temporary Driver

### **Inter-Religious Council of Liberia**

Rev. Freeman, Secretary

### **IRI Liberia**

Yomi Jacobs, Acting County Director  
Mahamed Boakai, Program Officer

### **Justice and Peace Commission**

Samul Kofi Woods, Director

### **Liberian Action Party (LAP)**

Francis B. Manneh, Deputy National Coordinator  
Isaac Brown, Accountant

### **Liberia Democratic Institute**

Dan T. Saryee, Sr., Executive Director

### **Liberian National Association of the Blind**

Myer N. Raymond Mifor, National President

### **Liberian National Association of the Deaf**

Charles Saypahn, Secretary General

### **Liberty Party**

Israel Akinsanya, Chairman  
Tameh Johnson, Chairman, Bomi County  
Chester Neese, National Youth Wing Chairman  
Vice Chairman for Administration, Grand Bassa

### **Liberian National Union (LINU)**

Aaron S. M. Wesseh, National Coordinator

### **Liberian People's Party**

Dr. Togba-Nah Tipoteh

### **NDI Liberia**

Alexander Chavarria, Resident Director, Liberia  
Thomas N. Du, Senior Program Officer

### **National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)**

Michael Nayou, Acting Chair  
Mambu B. Momo, Political Officer, Bomi County  
J.G. Yelegar Kennedy, Chair Margibi

### **National Elections Commission**

Hon. James M. Fomayan, Chairman  
Cllr. Elizabeth J. Nelson, Co-Chairman  
Jonathan Weedor, Commissioner  
Della King-Reeves, Commissioner  
John Langley, Executive Director

Joseph Yarsiah, Outreach Officer  
Fumba Swaray, Assistant Magistrate, Margibi  
Luther Dean, NEC Deputy Magistrate, Bomi

**National Legislature**

Hon. Tokpah Mulbah, Deputy Speaker, House of Representatives  
Hon. Jewel Howard-Taylor, Senior Senator, Bong County; Chairperson, Bong County Legislative Caucus  
Hon. Blamo Nelson, Senator, Chair Joint Modernization Legislative Committee  
Hon. Gabriel Smith, Chairman House Committee on Elections  
Hon. Alomisa Barr, Chair Women's Legislative Caucus  
Atty Jr. Kaisa, Chief Clerk, House of Representatives  
Mildred Sayon, Deputy Chief Clerk, House of Representatives  
S. Benedict Kumeh, Deputy Director, Library, House of Representatives  
Ike Farrah, Office of Legal Counsel, Senate  
Mr. Coppa, Deputy Director, Budget Department, House of Representatives  
Jerome Seka, Administrative Assistant, Senator Blamoh  
McCarthy Weh, Director, Research Department, Senate  
Mr. Manston, Deputy Director, Research Department, Senate

**National Patriotic Party**

John F. Whitfield, Jr., Secretary General  
Lord-Nentor Gaye, Acting Secretary, Margibi

**National Vision Party (NATVIPOL)**

Rev Washington S. McGill

**National Youth Movement for Transparent Elections**

Eddie Jarwolo, ED.

**Progressive People's Party (PPP)**

Cllr. Chea Cheapoo, Standardbearer  
Elizabeth D. Pennoh

**Press Union of Liberia**

Peter M. Quaqua, Secretary General

**PRODEMP**

Garbla V. Williams

**Radio Veritas**

Ade Kekuleh, Acting Station Manager

**Resource Center for Community Empowerment and Integrated Development (RECEIVE)**

Barthomew B. Colley, Executive Director

**Search for Common Ground**

Oscar Bloh, Country Director

**Star Radio**

James K. Morlu, Station Manager  
Wellington Smith, News Editor

**Union of Liberian Democrats (ULD)**

Steven Saysay

**United Nations Development Fund for Women**

Bayer M. Dennis, Program Assistant, Women Legislative Caucus  
Zahara Nampewo, Gender Justice Program Specialist

## **LIBERIA ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PROCESSES PROGRAM EVALUATION**

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### **United Nations Development Programme**

Cleophas O. Torori, Policy Specialist; Chair, Legislative Strengthening Donor Coordination Group  
Phillip Saa Tall, Jr., Electoral Programme Officer

### **United Nations Mission in Liberia**

Ademola Araoye, Deputy Head, Political, Policy and Planning Section  
Benson T. Chiweshe, Political Affairs Officer, Political, Policy and Planning Section  
Deborah Schein, Senior Political Officer

### **United States Embassy**

Kristen K. Grauer, Political Officer  
Jenkins Vaugehn, Political Section

### **Unity Party**

Henry Boima Fahnbulleh, Secretary General  
Dr. Charles Clarke, Chair  
Omega S. Brown, Chairman, Youth Secretariat  
Bill Davis, Acting County Chairman, Grand Bassa County  
Jeremiah Quaye, Chair Margibi  
Steven Gowehe, Secretary Margibi  
James Watkins, Chairman, Bomi  
Bill Davis, Acting Chair Grand Bassa

### **USAID**

Pamela White, Mission Director  
Sharon T. Pauling, Supervisory Program Officer  
John Stamm, Office of Democracy and Governance  
Louise Fahnbulleh, Office of Democracy and Governance  
Brian Aaron, Contracting Officer

### **Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET)**

Lena Cummings, Monrovia  
Rebecca Boakai, Head Bomi Branch

### **World Bank**

Rebecca Simson, Research Analyst  
Errol G. Graham, Senior Economist, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management

### **In Washington, DC:**

#### **IFES**

Anne O'Toole Salinas, Acting Regional Director, Africa  
Abigail Wilson, Program Manager, West Africa  
Rosanna Zetina-Yglesias, Program Associate, West Africa and Haiti  
Daniel Laurent, Program Officer, West Africa and Haiti

#### **IRI**

Scott Pool, Deputy Regional Director, Africa Division  
Claire Delahaye-Rhye, Program Officer, West Africa

#### **NDI**

Brett Lacy, Senior Program Officer, Central and West Africa  
Jenny Wade, Agreement Administrator, Program Coordination  
Gemima Neves, Senior Program Manager, Central and West Africa  
Sophia Moestrup, Senior Program Manager, Central and West Africa  
Brittany Danish, Senior Program Officer, Central and West Africa

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