#### PARENTS OF THE FIELD.

Interviewee; Professor Johan Galtung

Venue: Arlington, Virginia.

Date: 12th April 2006

Interviewer: Dr. Chris Mitchell.

C. Mitchell: It's April the 12<sup>th</sup>, 2006, and we're here with our friend and

colleague, Johan Galtung - one of *the* founders of the field - to talk about the early days and the development of the field (as it has become) about over the last 40 years. Johan, thank you very much

for being here.

Johan Galtung: My pleasure.

C. Mitchell: It is a privilege to do this with you. My first question really goes

back to the very beginnings of the field. In the early days of peace and conflict studies or whatever we're going to...call it, people came into that field from a whole variety of different intellectual backgrounds and personal backgrounds. So what was yours? How

did you get interested in the field?

Johan Galtung: Well, of course, there are ways of telling the story, and I think I'll

go back to Fall 1951 - 55 years ago. And I was a young former student leader, and I had been given an award as a student leader... as Vice President of the Norwegian National Union of Students for International Affairs, and that was a fellowship in Finland. And I wanted to use the time to find out whether I should become a CO - a conscientious objector - or not, because there was a little

envelope in the mail calling me into military service.

And I had great doubts about it, so I just had brought with me... all kinds of literature, and I found nothing quite satisfactory. And I think that has to do with the fact that - being a kind of upper-class-born Norwegian - the idea of just saying "No" was not good enough. I wanted to have an answer to the question, "What do we do then? What's the alternative?"

I had an inkling of Gandhi, and I had behind me the dreadful occupation of Norway, my father [was] in a concentration camp and that kind of thing. And one day I went to the library out in [the University of] Helsinki and I asked them the question that

became the key to my life, and the question was, "Could you give me some books in peace studies or peace research?"

And that is in Finnish called **[inaudible]**, which doesn't give us much information as such, I must say. So she went through the catalog and she said apologetically, "I find nothing, but I'll call Uppsala - the biggest university in Sweden. She called and they said, "It doesn't exist. There is no such thing."

And it then relatively quickly dawned upon me that I have a function in my life. Now, how to do it, I didn't have the slightest idea, but it struck me that I would like to continue what I was doing, which was natural science, physics, mathematics - particularly mathematics - mathematical statistics, but then add to that social science, and that became sociology. So I got a PhD in mathematics in '56 and a PhD in sociology in '57, then I got a job as a young assistant professor at Columbia University, Department of Sociology, in New York.

And there I was, and still with a kind of promise to myself what I want to do was to find out what could peace studies look like, and at that point I **[inaudible]** because there is a very, very big influential factor in addition to what I've said. It's my father. Not as a person... He was a very, gentle, fine, sweet person. He was a doctor, a physician, and I grew up with words like diagnosis, prognosis, therapy, and the idea of combining scientific insight with practice.

So as you may say that in order to understand my good friend John Burton, you would have to look into his past into his [being in the Australian] foreign office at very young age [in a] very important position, and his feeling that something had to be added to that. To me it was relatively clear what the model would be for peace studies, which would be health studies or medical studies, and some might say I never liberated myself from it. (Others might say I am very happy I didn't!) That was the background.

C. Mitchell:

So what then attracted you mainly to working in this field? Was it the development of a [new and interesting] field?

Johan Galtung:

It was the Second World War - and it was not the field itself because the little I had read made me rather convinced that it didn't exist. You see, it was absolutely clear to me that I was not interested in "war studies", just as I was rather convinced that medical studies were biased towards pathology, towards sickness, [towards] illness studies, and not enough on the wellness and health, so that, in a sense, was clear.

No. It was simply the Second World War - what should we have done? And the Cold War - what can we do? In other words, it was the concreteness of the case. And then, of course, being guided through the completeness of the case to the literature, - which was mainly IR and IS (international studies) and the usual stuff. And I found it long on diagnosis and very short on therapy, and even more dismal when one started making prognoses.

C. Mitchell:

So very rapidly, though, when you were beginning to help to create this field, it seemed to bifurcate... on the one hand there were peace studies and the other hand conflict studies (or conflict research.) Why do you think this happened? Do you think... it's an accurate picture [of what happened]?

Johan Galtung:

I think it is an accurate picture. And let me first say that when I was sitting on a frosty winter morning in 1959 to design the name of a child that we were going to give birth to, my decision was to bridge that gap and call it "conflict and peace studies"... because I refuse to see any contradiction between the two, but that doesn't mean that there wasn't a bifurcation.

And I guess you can say the following: that peace studies was for "peaceniks" and conflict studies was for those who didn't exactly want to do IR, but I saw the conflict as the primary thing. And what has been in a sense to me the major guiding light has been to create a synthesis of the two. And with my last book *Transcend and Transform*, I'm not dissatisfied with the result. And it will come even more now in the coming book called *A City of Peace*.

C. Mitchell: When will that be?

Johan Galtung: Next year it was the hope, but all this comes later than the author

hopes. First of all, the author has to complete it.

C. Mitchell: Well, that's always the difficult bit.

Johan Galtung: Precisely. After that, it usually is – well, we tend to blame the

publisher, but we should blame ourselves in most cases.

C. Mitchell: I've never been in a position to blame my publisher. It's always

me.

Johan Galtung: No, exactly. I agree with you.

C. Mitchell:

Tell us a bit more about the "baby" that you were producing in 1959.

Johan Galtung:

Well, that was the section of the Institute for Social Research in Oslo that later on... became the Peace Research Institute in Oslo. And that was the midwife - to put it that way - was a Norwegian businessman, father and son, because the idea was far too radical for the government. "Peace" at that time was a communist word.

C. Mitchell:

I remember.

Johan Galtung:

Almost impossible to use, and I didn't accept it, but I did agree that... the concept should be married to something, and I saw it as "conflict". I did not use "justice" because I found the term too ambiguous. So it was an institute, and that Norwegian entrepreneur - he was in [business of] paper, timber - had a son who was the head of the Institute for Social Research. And [there were also the] people who stimulated the golden age of Norwegian social scienc - which was quite formidable actually.

And that was in the 1950s, and we are talking now of one more "baby" - namely mine - and that was "conflict and peace studies", and that father and son, they said, "Hum, there is something in that young guy. We'll finance it." And I started. So we started then [with] a number of people and we had five projects to start with. And what I felt was that I should take five projects that would be like small beacons in the desert and then see what we found. But No. 1 was the theory of conflict - just going through theory of conflict - and the decision was: "Let's do it at the personal level, societal level, intersocietal level" - and what came later was interregional level.

Well, today I would say micro-meso/micromega labels, and then just collect, collect, collect, collect and see what comes up... It's been very useful.

And then it went on, and you see the second project was technical assistance in India where the idea was a Norwegian fisheries project in Southern India, and it was presented as a road to peace. It would create better relations between North and South. Now, in fact, it created worse relations because there were so many misgivings and so many misunderstandings and so many bad things connected with it that it actually didn't work at all. But given that, we saw the linkage to development, which was important.

C. Mitchell:

Yes.

Johan Galtung: Because that's where structural violence centers. If you say that

peace, in a traditional sense, is a question of overcoming direct violence, then development may be the question of overcoming structural violence. And we had another project which was quite interesting, a historical project about a transition from duels to due

process of law through courts.

C. Mitchell: I remember your article on "institutionalized" conflict resolution.

Johan Galtung: Precisely, precisely. That came out of that one, and we had a guy

who became professor of history on the basis of his work on duels. Fascinating, and we were interested in the transition. Why did they stop dueling and started courts? Because of obvious [reasons]

- maybe you can learn something from it, and so on.

So these were not projects that were kind of – it was not a grand theory from which you would deduce those projects. It was more that there were things we wanted to do and there are people who could do it, and the idea of having some sort of beacons, guide

lights, lighthouses in the desert.

C. Mitchell: Yes. It was pretty much a desert at that time, was it?

Johan Galtung: I would say so.

C. Mitchell: Not many other places, not many other people?

Johan Galtung: Well, our Institute was the first. There were some inklings in some

parts of the U.S., maybe in colleges. As Ezra Pound used to say, "Long on Jesus and short on funds," The Midwest, and there were some beginnings in some other places, but we were very much alone. The one that came closest to us was at the University of

Michigan, and that was Ken Boulding.

C. Mitchell: Yes.

Johan Galtung: So that was in 1961. They were a little bit after us, but they were

ahead of us in terms of the Journal of Conflict Resolution.

C. Mitchell: Yes, indeed.

Johan Galtung: And they said they chose the word "conflict" because it was less

controversial whereas ours was the Journal of Peace Research in

1964. And it was an excellent **[inaudible]** Boulding and Rapoport were fascinating, so we became very good friends for life.

C. Mitchell: And did you actually visit the University of Michigan?

Johan Galtung: Oh, yes, certainly. Didn't last long, you know. It collapsed fairly

quickly, and the same was the case with - was it Don Michael, his name - in Washington? In Dupont Circle there was an institute, and that was also some sort of bubble that exploded very fast. Now, I think the reason for that, Chris, is that Americans are too concerned with money. "I am funded; hence, I exist.!" It is not the old Decartian/Cartesian... I think and so exist, but I am funded and so I exist - so that means if I am not funded I don't exist, and

they were not funded.

C. Mitchell: So they collapsed?

Johan Galtung: They collapsed. Now, I myself, my then wife, the wife of my best

friend, and a couple of others, we were just simply dedicated, and to us this was [enough]. We would do it, come what may. We worked very hard, and we did not spend much time discussing [or]

debating with people in international relations.

C. Mitchell: Really?

Johan Galtung: No, we didn't. We simply... just rather than being sucked into that

debate and critiquing them, we wanted to show what we could do, just spend full time on the constructive parts of the job, and in a sense that has been almost a trademark every since. And that sometimes irritated them because they felt that I was aloof - which there may be something to - but it was more a question of just simply saying, "You have that much resources, that much energy." We told the authorities in Norway in January '63. We started in '59. "We will present what we have found, and we will do it then in a three-day conference and you are all heartily welcome." And that was highly policy-relevant studies, and the politicians came. And in the afternoon of the first day, they said, "You can actually stop the conference. You have made your point. You will get the money, don't worry." And we got it. So those policy-relevant studies, they felt they could learn something from it. The one about development of fisheries and cattle, for instance, just to say

one.

C. Mitchell: Well, that's very practical - yes.

Johan Galtung:

Very practical, and there was another one which has to do with a summit meeting with Krushchev that was called off, and out of that came studies of summit meetings and summit diplomacy, and the strength and weaknesses of it, and the other diplomats found that very interesting.

And what I said then was that we will have a state council of conflict and peace studies, and that we'll then disseminate the [research] money to. And in addition to that, since I didn't want money to come from only one source, we engaged the Norwegian Research Council, and that got it going for a number of years. And at the end of that time, we had not too many [inaudible] studies, and I then got the world's first professorship - for the time - in peace studies in 1969.

C. Mitchell: This was at the University in Oslo?

Johan Galtung: Precisely.

C. Mitchell: Well, I remember..., and I think it was to the detriment of peace

and conflict studies in England... that there were fierce debates going on between the international relations people and the people in conflict – mainly conflict research [as] it was called in those days. Huge debates. Debilitating - and I thought time-wasting, but

you must have had a very sensible strategy of avoiding that.

Johan Galtung: Just [inaudible] countries [inaudible] exactly what I sensed, and

that confirmed my suspicions [inaudible] just showed what it can

do, and the offspring of this was in Germany where the –

C. Mitchell: Who particularly in Germany?

Johan Galtung: One example of that would be... Ekkehart Krippendorff. And

Ekkehart Krippendorff [was] much more to the left... and Krippendorff was one of the persons who was head of the student revolution of 1968. Not exactly the darling of the establishment, but he wrote why he was working on, an extremely important study [of] the relationship between the military as an institution and war and how it came out of the [international]... state system. A historian by training, so it started blossoming. It started bearing

fruits all kinds of places.

C. Mitchell: Not in France, to my memory.

Johan Galtung: Never.

C. Mitchell: Why did it never –

Johan Galtung: Isn't that interesting? I mean, there was the Institute of... quarrel,

struggle and war. War studies, yes. They are good at that.

C. Mitchell: But not –

Johan Galtung: Never peace studies... but on the other hand, I shall also say

another thing. When they – they have a big museum in [Caen] in Normandy. It's called "Memorial" - the memory place - and it is for the memory of the invasion, the 6<sup>th</sup> of June 1944, [on the] Normandy coast. And that museum has three sections, one for the invasion and the Second World War, one for the Cold War, and then they wanted a museum for peace. And who did they ask to do it? Me.! So there is [a section] where I was given ever so many square meters and they said, "Go ahead." And I felt like Picasso

decorating a church or something of the kind.

C. Mitchell: So what did you put in?

Johan Galtung: Well, it's fascinating because they asked me, "How many peace

cultures do we have?" So I said, "Well, I would work on about six." Let us say the secular Western, the religious Western, if you will; and then you go into the Semitic, the Jewish/Arabic, if you will; and from there you can go on to the Hindu [inaudible] and you could go on to the Japanese [Buddhist] and then several of the lesser traditions, if you will, something like that, so that took six.

When I came back to the museum and they started constructing it, they had made six enormous columns where they were pouring cement in order to have six "kiosks" as they call it. And I said, "For heaven's sake... we have six one day, and the next day we have eight, and then [maybe more] - and here they are in concrete." Shocking. I can still remember that truck pouring the cement into it. Well, okay. I stuck to six. They said, "Well, this is it, Monsieur, you said six, didn't you?" "Okay."

It's not a bad museum, and maybe my part of it is a little bit too abstract, so they also have another room which is more NGOs and demonstrations and peacenik work and things of that kind. But there is a yearning for it, but French intellectuals have never taken up that challenge.

C. Mitchell: How interesting.

Johan Galtung: It is.

C. Mitchell: But just over the border in Belgium, though. It took root in

Belgium.

Johan Galtung: It did in [inaudible].

C. Mitchell: And in Holland, as well, at the Polemological Institute.

Johan Galtung: But that was [in Groningen]...

C. Mitchell: Yes.

Johan Galtung: And it fizzled out, unfortunately, when [Bert Roling] died.

C. Mitchell: Yes.

Johan Galtung: And, you see, he was [always a] very good personal friend, very,

very strong relations between us, and as a very young judge in the Tokyo tribunal, he did denounce the Tokyo tribunal process in a very courageous way. I think it was 37 he was or something, so he did a fantastic job, but his successors were not able to make anything out of it. Remember there are, you see, a couple of things I would demand in a peace studies institute. First of all, that it has proposals, concrete things to do, not just exploring concepts and things about it, and they should be things about – to bring about something more solid than a cease fire. And secondly, in order to do that, you would probably have to go intellectually on some new roads, once in a while. Let us say just to take one thing, you have

to [inaudible]. You cannot stick to any one.

C. Mitchell: The "field" - whatever we're going to call it - has always had that

tradition of trying to be interdisciplinary, hasn't it?

Johan Galtung: Yes.

C. Mitchell: Has it succeeded do you think...?

Johan Galtung: Well, you see, let me say, the way I... decided that I could find a

way of doing it was by creating an [environment] where you just operate with a couple of key concepts. So for me it is... just the definition of conflict - incompatible goals. It could be incompatible values, incompatible interests, but the

incompatibility. That's the "C" for "contradiction" in the ABC triangle that I developed in 1958, and "A" stands for "attitude" and "B," "behavior." And they can both become very wicked and very bad, but I would see them as secondary, relative to the incompatibility.

So the total definition of conflict would then be A plus B plus C, but C is the root part. Okay. You take that into the interpersonal, the guy who says, "What do I want to be? Do I want to be rich or do I want to be a good person?" And sees that as a contradiction, and ends up becoming a person who donates a lot of money for good causes. It is not a bad solution to his problem!

C. Mitchell:

It's good for us.

Johan Galtung:

Good for us. We know a couple of those, precisely. Or you take it into a personal level or you go to North/South relations or whatever, and you suddenly find that, lo and behold, it's the same study. Then you ask yourself - and there are three questions I always ask when I am mediating. The first one is how do we map the conflict? Which are the parties? What are their goals? Where are the clashes, their contradictions? And I start with a fairly primitive conceptualization, and then as I talk to them and dialogue with them, it becomes richer and richer.

Second question; "Are these goals legitimate or not?" We are not going to pursue illegitimate goals. We are not going to mediate between slaver and slave. We are not going to do that. We are going to do something else. And what I find is that the overwhelming majority of conflicts are legitimate against legitimate. Now, if you have "legitimate" against "illegitimate", that would be another situation. You would call the lawyer or the police or you would call [for] non-violence, non-violent resistance, for instance.

And you have "illegitimate" against "illegitimate". My favorite case is Norway and Denmark quarreling about who should own Eastern Greenland. I mean, you have two thieves quarreling about who should have the booty, and the idea that the Greenlanders could have it didn't occur to any one of them when this was [first raised] in 1973.

So the third point then is to try to bridge legitimate goals. Now, that's what we call transit, [to] bridge them. Find an often new reality where the parties can feel that way [inaudible]. That's the creative part and that's the difficult part, and that's where we get into something new.

And the metaphor I use, and which I have found works quite well, you have a little child who has been taught to add and subtract numbers. And the child happily says, "Five plus seven equals twelve," and then he or she discovers seven plus five also equals 12... Then seven minus five equals two. Five minus seven equals what? "Huh? That doesn't work." Complaint. So then comes the next lesson with negative numbers, and happily, five minus seven equals minus two.

And what I sometimes say to diplomats is that, "Gentlemen," – (because they are usually gentlemen, more or less gentle) "you are faced with a problem which is a five minus seven problem and you haven't read about and you don't know about negative numbers. You are in a situation where you need a new reality. In this case, a new mathematical reality."

And Chris, this is where my mathematics came in handy, and I am the most mediocre of mathematicians, but I know a little bit about mathematics. And the point about it is that it is a very rigorous kind of mental activity, but when you run your head against a wall when there is something you cannot solve, you create a new mathematics - which is highly artistic. It in a sense combines extreme rigor with extreme imagination.

C. Mitchell: It's a good metaphor.

Johan Galtung: It is not a bad metaphor, and when a conflict has become stuck, I

would say in general it's not for lack of goodwill. It's not for lack of trust. It's not for lack of chemistry or whatever they call it. It's for lack of imagination and creating a new reality. But that took a

little bit of time, say about 40 years, to [discover this].

C. Mitchell: Well, let's go back –

Johan Galtung: We'll go back.

C. Mitchell: -30 years or so because it was a desert and there were these small

growths of places and people, and now it's the most amazing set of institutions and ideas that I could possibly have imagined - 40

years ago.

Johan Galtung: We've got about 500 places now where it's being taught.

C. Mitchell: Yes... How do you think that came about? Why do you think it

came about? What were some of the major influences that –

Johan Galtung: An idea whose time has come. To argue against it [is] a little bit

like arguing against motherhood, arguing against peace studies.

C. Mitchell: Yes, true. Everybody wants peace.

Johan Galtung: Everybody wants peace they say, but I am afraid there's also

another reason which doesn't please me very much. People take it on the cheap and they think that anybody is mentally equipped to talk about peace and it's easy. And you get people with – the background doesn't bother me, but it's the lack of preparation using that background that bothers me [All] sorts of charlatans in the field, a lot of charlatans, and I hope that will improve and that

students will ask sharp questions.

And I think one of the questions they should ask of their professors is, "Have you ever tried this out in practice? Have you ever been seated 20 or 30 centimeters from a lieutenant general in the Myanmar military government arguing with him?" And that

kind of stuff is...

C. Mitchell: The field has always *tried* to do these two things, and it's always

tried to be theoretical and conceptual. To a large extent, it's also

tried to be practical.

Johan Galtung: Sure.

C. Mitchell: It's been an applied field. Why do you think it has always had

these two things, and do you think it's been successful in

combining them?

Johan Galtung: Well, isn't it a little bit the same situation that medical science was

in 200 years ago or 300 years ago? You see, it was very divided,

very dichotomous.

C. Mitchell: [The physicians] and surgeons.

Johan Galtung: And you had the people philosophizing it and you had the surgeon.

Exactly.

C. Mitchell: Yes.

Johan Galtung: And the real person who was cutting in the field, so a little side of

that is at the high-class level, the diplomat; at the low-class level, the peacenik who is preaching good things, and it's a question of welding these two together, and medical science hasn't done that too badly. What frightens me now, and when I see the – let us say not the end of the road but the limitation of that fine line. We are afraid of "school medicine".

C. Mitchell: School?

Johan Galtung: In a sense "school" medicine - in the sense of something that

becomes dogmatic.

C. Mitchell: Oh.

Johan Galtung: And the kind of dogmatic professionalism which is unaware of its own limitations and unable to critique itself, and of course I'm afraid that the same may happen to all of it as we become

professional. What they asked me to talk about as a keynote in this coming International Peace Research Association in Calgary is "Professionalization of the field". And I am arguing of favor, but

with a critical mind.

Because I have seen myself, in a sense, balancing between foreign offices and the peace movement, and I see it as very simple. The foreign office in many countries says, "Yes, yes, yes," to a certain superpower, and the peace movement says, "No, no, no." And both of them are equally devoid of alternatives. The typical peace movement fare is meetings, resolutions, demonstrations, and they can do it on a big scale, as they did [on] 15 February 2003, before the attack - the attack on Iraq.

It was fantastic, 600 places in the world, 12 million or how many [people] -, fantastic, but it's not good enough. It's not good enough. I have to sit down and think through if I were a decision maker, what would I have done? What would I have done?

I mean, it's just like Iraq today. Pull out the troops - not good enough. It was good enough in Vietnam. The war was lost a long time ago, just like in Iraq, but Vietnam was a country that had been truly divided, yearning to come together. Iraq was never that country.

Iraq was constructed by two civil servants in the British foreign office, and I can almost hear their voices in the desert, "What have you got here, Charles?" ... Excuse me for the British accent.

C. Mitchell: That's all right.

Johan Galtung: You see, that kind of thing - and it was not quite clear what they

had "gotten". So one has to sit down and think that through and then enter into the debate on it. In my case, it has been (in a sense) easy the last years because I am invited to those people and I sit and I debate, and I acknowledge completely their right to say, "Okay, Professor Galtung, have you done your critical stuff by now? Now, what do you have to suggest?" I recognize that completely, and that's the test of the [approach].

C. Mitchell: [The] Same point was made to us by David Singer a little while

ago - the need to have alternatives.

Johan Galtung: Not that he always has had it.

C. Mitchell: Well, at least he has built the idea.

Johan Galtung: David has done a fantastic job, which is in a sense neither critical

nor constructive but empirical. And to me science is trilateral – empirical, critical and constructive – and I see that in architecture, I see it in engineering, and I often find when I have discussion groups with architects and engineers, that they are more imaginative than IR people who know what [exists] because they're so trained in seeing new realities that might be interesting.

C. Mitchell: Yes. I've had the same experience with architect friends of mine.

They see things in space that I can't [see] at all.

Johan Galtung: And they can take that ability and project it into other fields and

not necessarily their own. I think it's the artist in them.

C. Mitchell: So do you think that we - whatever "we" are... we're an art or a

science - or a social science?

Johan Galtung: All of it, all of it! I know myself, when I have done my – which is

quite exhausting - my mediation thing [with] let us say eight parties in a conflict, and I have gone through the images of the future and the past. Their positive idea of the future and what might be bad about it; their negative idea of the past, which they have a very well developed and very clear view of, and [they] become a little bit silent when I ask them, "Was there anything

good in the past?"

But after some time they cannot, so I [have discovered an] enormous amount of information, and suddenly something starts gelling and there is a kind of a jump... a transcending jump, and that's art. It's intuition, and it's not a deductive, logical process, but something is conjured up on the wall, and I then hand it back to them and say, "Could you imagine how would that be? How

would that be?" And then suddenly they start, "Hum, hum, didn't think of that one. Why didn't we think of that?" Well, they were blinded by their conflict, blinded by their emotions, and they fell in love with the negative exchanges, fell in love with it. It's their habit.

C. Mitchell: They do seem to enjoy it, on occasions.

Johan Galtung: Oh, they enjoy it - absolutely. We all do, to some extent, but you

see, that was also the point about not being engaged in the international relations people debate. I knew that I would love it

too much. That's exactly for that reason.

C. Mitchell: April in Calgary – so how did IPRA start? Another flare in the

desert?

Johan Galtung: That was back in 1964, and actually there were some preliminary

explorations of it back in '62, I think. John Burton, by the way,

was extremely negative.

C. Mitchell: Was he? Why?

Johan Galtung: Yes. Well...he was very skeptical about social scientists without

any inkling of experience. He was by himself - rightly so, as the experienced guy who was picking up the social science that he needed and wanted, and he had a point. He had a point. He was very negative, even unnecessarily negative, and later on he...

became a part of it, but in the beginning...

C. Mitchell: So who were the driving forces?

Johan Galtung: That was Elise Boulding, Bob Angel... who had participated very

high up in the Camelot project. Yes, but most of the U.S. social science at the time did that. And Bert Roling and myself and the

friend of John Burton, Tony...?

C. Mitchell: De Reuck?

Johan Galtung: Precisely. And he was the one who had a connection to the

foundation, to Portland Place in London - the Ciba Foundation...

C. Mitchell: And what were you trying to do at that point?

Johan Galtung:

It's actually very clear what we were trying to do. We wanted something like the International Sociological Association [or the] Political Science Association, and so on, and we knew we would get the backing on this... I had very good relations to UNESCO, and we knew that backing would be forthcoming And it was from the UNESCO point of view that logically made it work because that meant - from their point of view - that it could yield one association, and through that one they could have a machine where they could still [organize and support] what they wanted.

C Mitchell:

Right. Instead of little pieces here and there.

Johan Galtung:

Precisely. That's exactly it. And there was a particularly gifted assistant director I guess of the Social Sciences Division, Julian **[inaudible]**, a Social Democrat, whom I cannot praise enough. And his name is not famous enough in the field, but he was the one who [helped with the foundation of IPRS] And we had numerous encounters, and he was sort of testing the waters. Social Democrat means that he was not beloved in his own Poland, so he was [posted to] UNESCO, but he had good relations and he also – he was not a fanatic anti-communist or anything.

He was against violence, and the kinds of things that we were saying came home with him. So what we wanted was exactly... an International Peace Research Association. As a matter of fact, we were not even having much of a quarrel about the name.

C. Mitchell:

So it was "Peace Research" clearly - and that was fine?

Johan Galtung:

Precisely, that was fine. And we didn't want – we wanted just the word "peace" [in the title] and to take the flak that would come with that in a sense...

C. Mitchell:

The early '60s, there would've been some flak, wouldn't there?

Johan Galtung:

There would have been some. There would have been some. And we needed somebody who looked dignified, with white hair - and that was Bert Roling. My hair wasn't sufficiently white at the time. I was a little bit too young. And Bob Angel was a little bit too American, so Bert was just perfect for Secretary General. And he called the first meeting in 1965 in Groningen, and it was successful, in the beginning.

C. Mitchell:

Yes.

Johan Galtung: But then [it] became a little bit less, and I think what happened,

you see, was that it was never able to set sufficiently high standards for the papers, so it became also the kind of place where peaceniks all over the world unite and sing your moralistic songs. And the idea that you had to have your empirical base and you had to have something new to say to do your conceptual work was not

generally accepted.

C. Mitchell: So it became more peace than research?

Johan Galtung: Precisely. That's exactly it. And in the cases where it was

"research", it usually was not "peace". But the fascination with arms races, for instance, arms races developing into war...And sometimes an almost necrophiliac fascination with war deaths, and then counting comes [into the field] in terms of the number of war deaths and things of that kind. Instead of counting peaces, you count wars. And we still haven't quite managed to do that, I would say. We are still not good enough at explaining peace and exploring peace - the fact that, in the overwhelming amount of

cases, human beings get along fairly well, fairly well.

C. Mitchell: I'm remembering something - I think - Abba Eban once said,

which you probably recall, that goes something like, "Human beings usually end up doing the right thing, having tried everything

else first." Do you know that one?

Johan Galtung: Yes, I remember that one. By vicinity and affinity, they're my

least two favorite words of Abba Eban. Vicinity and affinity were the two types of cement that is our human society. Well, I wish he had had more [inaudible] society. I would be more receptive to

him.

C. Mitchell: Yes, me too.

Johan Galtung: He must have passed away a disappointed man, Abba Eban.

C. Mitchell: I'm so afraid you're right. I'm afraid you're right. But of course [

[didn't he] pass away ten years ago - Bert Roling?

Johan Galtung: More than that, more like 15 years ago.

C. Mitchell: Really? Yes, time goes.

Johan Galtung: Time goes.

C. Mitchell: Time goes. So - back to "the desert" to PRIO and IPRA, [to]

people in Germany, not people in France. Who else? Where else

did you find these seeds growing up?

Johan Galtung: Well, let us first say enormous interest in Eastern Europe,

enormous interest. And it was not called "peace studies" really, but people were concerned with it and working on it, and it became a way of having dialogue with people in the East, no doubt about it. A vehicle was [the Pugwash meetings]. And the late – recently late – Joseph Rotblat was a protector of it, although he was not free from the weakness of [his background] which was the elegance of nuclear physicists, seeing themselves as the brightest people the world has produced, and that any thought by a nuclear physicist is by definition superb. So we in the social sciences, we were about three notches below, but they were generously listening to us once in a while. And we found each other to the point that it was – the

idea of a social science... as an alternative to it.

C. Mitchell: So who else did you find? Who else was there and important?

Johan Galtung: Italy.

C. Mitchell: Italians?

Johan Galtung: Italians.

C. Mitchell: Really?

Johan Galtung: Psychoanalysis. It was a professor for NARI at the University of

Milan, another brilliant idea, and his idea was simply this; that throughout life people get traumatized, and the State is the organization that says, "Give us your trauma and we shall give you release." And that release is called a war. So the more traumatized, the better. Now, this is a somewhat short presentation

of [this kind of] thinking, but a little bit in that direction.

C. Mitchell: No. I've never actually met or read him. I don't think I even met

him, so did he not travel? Did he not come to [other] countries?

Johan Galtung: No, no. He didn't travel much. He was – he didn't associate with

the rest of us.

Johan Galtung: And [Gaston Bouthoul] in France...

C. Mitchell: Gaston Bouthoul?.

Johan Galtung: And so for him, his – one of his basic thesis was that war – you

see, again, the concern was with war, understanding war, and of course peace is not just a negation of war. Peace is much more

comprehensive.

But anyhow, for him, war was a trick by old people who were jealous of younger men, for instance as lovers and killed them off.

C. Mitchell: Yes, I've heard that one before. I'm not sure I agree with it even...

Johan Galtung: No. I mean, all such things have five percent truth to them, but

first of all, if the truth is that partial... and secondly, okay, so

what?

C. Mitchell: What do you do about it?

Johan Galtung: What do you do about it? Well, you could give more of the power

over to the young people and they could send the old people into the war for the same motivation. Say that, "You had these women

long enough. Now it's our turn."

C. Mitchell: Isn't that [in] All Quiet on the Western Front? Isn't there a part of

*All Quiet* where somebody suggests that?

Johan Galtung: It was also, curiously [and] interestingly enough, one of the few

referenda we've had in the world on the Army, and that was in Switzerland in 1989, just before the end of the Cold War. And in favor of abolishing the Swiss Army were 36 percent, but those 36 percent were mainly young people. So the old people said, "Aha, that's because they are afraid of becoming [soldiers] " And the young people said, "Well, [if] you are so happy about it, why don't

you join up?" So they were close to it.

C. Mitchell: Scandinavia?

Johan Galtung: Yes. We came to all those countries, Sweden... Then it came to

Holland, to Sweden in the form of {SIPRI] and the institute in Uppsala... and we [established it in] Finland and [in Denmark] And I would say all of that now - the Scandinavian wave, right

now - is more or less over, fizzled out.

C. Mitchell: Really?

Johan Galtung: And the most important country in Europe today is Spain.

C. Mitchell: Why Spain?

Johan Galtung: Well, let us first say, Chris, that all such things go in waves. They

go in waves. Why Spain? I am not quite sure I know the reason. The only thing I know is my own role in it, and that's too egocentric and too idiosyncratic. I started a summer school down in Benidorm where my wife and I have a house, and it was right

after the death of Franco.

C. Mitchell: '76?

Johan Galtung: Precisely, '75 November, and it started right after that. And we

attracted a lot of young people, and they started peace research institutes all over the place.... But, you see, underlying that - and I go back to the '30s - with some of the anarchist dreams and the more positive aspect of the anti-nationalists. You had a Stalinist aspect, but you also had the more positive aspects, and that had survived. And in that there was a challenge to [nationalist] forces in the post-Franco government, if you will, symbolized by Premier Aznar the one who tried to put the blame for the Madrid assault on

ETA, and three days later he found himself out of power.

The Social Democrats had picked up and had been surfing on that wave from the past, and the peace culture of which the Peace Research Institute was a tiny little part, but not totally unimportant, then became very basic to Zapatero. And you find it today, you see, in the deposition I just gave you that I made for the people from the three offices, the three Departments of Defense, Foreign

Affairs and International Development...

I praised Zapatero as doing four things in the relationship to the Muslim world - and Bush and Blair doing zero and zero. Now, why does Zapatero do it? Because he is surfing that kind of wave. That's important, and that wave never touched really England and the United States except as something very, very low underground. And I still find it around Philadelphia and around Bradford with the Quaker element, of course. You find it in [certain] colleges, in circles around Philadelphia, beautiful things, but it tends to be

limited.

C. Mitchell: So the field - as it developed, from your memory and perspective

on it - was very much a European field, but IPRA made strenuous

efforts to reach out to Asia and to other parts of the world.

Johan Galtung: [It] came to Japan. It's now coming to China. And it's coming,

the grand wave, because when the Chinese decide to do something...! And... the bridge has been through the

Reconciliation and Peace Institute in Coventry.

C. Mitchell: Really?

Johan Galtung: Yes. There was a big conference in Nanjing last year, and I was...

called in, mobilized as a "grandfather" - or a great-grandfather,

whatever it is.

C. Mitchell: We call you "Parents".

Johan Galtung: Precisely, that's called parents. Thank you. Thank you. And I

was amazed because, you see Chris, in that room in Nanjing, there was a guy sitting there looking at me all the time very intensely, to the point that I felt slightly uneasy. Turned out that he was China's expert on Johan Galtung and had written a PhD thesis, which he

then gave me [a copy]...

C. Mitchell: In Chinese?

Johan Galtung: In Chinese! And in a sense, I can understand him. If you have

worked 12 years on that, and suddenly "the guy" is there... They took my book *Peace by Peaceful Means*, which is not an easy book, and this happened in March. In January, I got 20 copies of

the publication - in Chinese.

C Mitchell: In Chinese?

Johan Galtung: All translated and all done.

C. Mitchell: How wonderful.

Johan Galtung: And they are now speculating how to go further, and it will be

Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing. Nanjing because of the genocide. And my Japanese wife was with me, and while they were very gentlemanly about it but also very decisive... and my wife and I are working very, very strongly on reconciliation between Japan and China. We have done it for 30 years - One of the many

projects.

C. Mitchell: Yes.

Johan Galtung: India has, of course, announced itself, but it tends to become

ritualistic on their status [as Gandhi's heirs].

C. Mitchell: That's my impression, as well. It dominates still.

Johan Galtung: It dominates too much. And they are not creative about it, because

being an icon, they cannot even dare think the thought, "How can we improve [on Gandhi]?" Because that would mean that there is

something that you should do something about.

C. Mitchell: Not quite perfection.

Johan Galtung: Exactly. For instance, I think Gandhi's non-violence is fantastic,

but his solutions to conflict are sometimes relatively conventional,

not imaginative.

C. Mitchell: Right. Going back to your work and [Fumiko Galtung's] work on

China and Japan, it's interesting because it links in with what you were saying earlier about Spain... One of the things that they have been doing in Gernika is an attempt to reconcile the survivors - or the memory - of the bombing with Germany and with places like

Dresden...

Johan Galtung: They have done important work there.

C. Mitchell: Yes. It's an interesting... sidelight on the way things have

developed in Spain.

Johan Galtung: They have done important work there, but they become very silent

when I point out to them that in 1925 a young general, head of the Spanish forces in Spanish Morocco, rented French planes with American pilots and killed many more people in [inaudible] in

Morocco...

C. Mitchell: Really?

Johan Galtung: And the name of the general was Francisco Franco.

C. Mitchell: Not surprised.

Johan Galtung: Exactly. And you see, the point is this, that the perpetrator very

easily forgets what he has done; the victim, not.

C. Mitchell: Yeah.

Johan Galtung:

So [Gernika and Dresden] was a victim-generated reconciliation, and very few Spaniards [inaudible]...But I totally agree with you that this is one way of starting on important work.

And in China, peace research would get an enormous impetus if Japan could take some steps towards reconciliation, and I am working on something which now has quite a lot of good [possibilities]. It's an alternative [inaudible] shrine. The Ysukuni shrine is dedicated to the souls of the Japanese soldiers who died in the war. That includes the war criminals, and when the Prime Minister of Japan goes to pay his allegiance, it is like the [federal] council in Germany going to [Nuremberg] for Hitler, Goering and Goebbels, which would not go down very well...

C. Mitchell:

Wouldn't go down very well in China, of course.

Johan Galtung:

Precisely. So the question is not – you say what [do I think] I have had a little bit of influence in this... is that I recognize a thing that the left, in general, doesn't recognize. The mothers and fathers bereaved of their sons and the daughters - or the let us say three or four million Japanese soldiers who were killed - have a right to get an answer to the question, "For what did I die?" It's a question of meaning, and you cannot just say, "You were wrong, wrong, wrong - and you deserved to die." You cannot just say that.

And the Yasukuni shrine is an answer to that which the Japanese right wing makes use of. The question is, could there be another answer? Could there be a shrine dedicated to those who were killed on all sides, soldiers and civilians, and dedicated to -let us say - a better world, a world without fault,. Or to start with an East Asian "community of peace". So that's the kind of thing that we are working on.

And very much to my surprise- and to the delight particularly of my wife - suddenly came that email saying, "There is now a group of former Japanese cabinet members, 115 of them from LDP, from the conservative body headed by a former Minister who is working on an alternative shrine and an alternative foreign policy. Could you come and address them?"

C. Mitchell:

An alternative shrine as a symbol of sacrifice by [victims]?

Johan Galtung:

As a part of an alternative foreign policy, but as a symbol of giving...[inaudible], but that doesn't mean we justify the war. There is, at a personal level, there must have been some sense that could come out of it...

C. Mitchell: That would be an interesting symbol.

Johan Galtung: And you see, here again the point is not that that is realized. The

point is that to say it makes a couple of people think a little bit.

C. Mitchell: Let's go back to Johan Galtung - okay?

Johan Galtung: Okay.

C. Mitchell: Major influences on the way you began to think about the field and

subsequently thought about it? You talked about your father, you've talked about medicine, you've talked about mathematics and physics, but what were some of the other influences in the development of your thinking, or who were some of the other

people who influenced your thinking?

Johan Galtung: Social science, of course. I mentioned Gandhi as a practitioner and

[Pitirim] Sorokin.

C. Mitchell: Really?

Johan Galtung: He was for me just simply great. I think it was the scope and the

audacity, and putting in quite a lot of work and taking political risks. Once being sentenced to death as the Secretary General of [the Socialist Revolutionaryies] and demoted from it, and he ended up in the U.S. in competition with Talcott Parsons for a sociology chair at Harvard University. And Sorokin said, "At the end of the '30s, we're going into a very dark period and horrible things will

happen... to the extreme, war and slaughter."

And Talcott Parsons said, "The chances have never been so good and things are very bright," and he of course got the chair and Sorokin not, so everything was logical as it should be. I think [Sorokin's work on] cultural dynamics is something the best that social science ever produced. [It was] brilliant, theoretical and has been important in shaping my own thinking on microhistory, deep culture, deep structure and things of that type, so I would put him

as No. 1.

C. Mitchell: And No. 2?

Johan Galtung: No. 2?

C. Mitchell: Or the next.

Johan Galtung:

Or the next? Then you come to very many people, so let me say immediately Bertrand Russell, mathematician, philosopher. The thing is putting himself over into the practice and combining, if you will, a very acute mind with the obligation to put it at the disposal of some kind of concept of peace. How successful he was can be discussed, but as a kind of model person, important.

So in my autobiography that was published when I was 70 called – exactly called *John Lackland - Johan Without a Country*.

C. Mitchell:

Oh, it's hardly without a place – hardly without houses and homes, though.

Johan Galtung:

That you can [certainly] say, and it ends with my wife and I sailing into the harbor of Kosong [sp?] in North Korea. That's a part of our work in the world and our country. We can trust the world. Now, in that one the work is] dedicated to the three greatest sources of influence, and that is Gandhi, Sorokin and [inaudible], if you will. Then you have oceans of people, and then come [inaudible] and Karl Marx, but... there's one thing perhaps that is important. Maybe I am very much addicted to classics, to the great ones - very much so - and I have a tendency perhaps not to be very generous towards the [contemporary]. But I find that the great ones are enormous... and I can read Sorokin again and find new things.

C. Mitchell:

Contemporaries?

Johan Galtung:

In our field, so to speak?

C. Mitchell:

Yes.

Johan Galtung:

Maybe – what shall I say? There are so many, and you mentioned Dave Singer. I talked about Ken Boulding and Anatol Rapoport, just to take three Americans who are important.

C. Mitchell:

Boulding?

Johan Galtung:

Boulding.

C. Mitchell:

Boulding came from Liverpool.

Johan Galtung:

He came from Liverpool and had a slight Liverpudlian accent. And so... he had quite a lot of things to say about the ill fate that would

have come to him, had he stayed there.

C. Mitchell:

Going back, going to how the field has developed [and to] your part in the development of the field, one of the things that has always struck me... is that it's had a major struggle to establish itself, but perhaps less so in Scandinavia than elsewhere. Is that an unfair view of how the field has come into its present state?

Johan Galtung:

Remember that other Scandinavian countries have had two important experiences. It's possible to establish a peaceful community of states after 800 years of wars. It's possible to do that. You may say it started in 1714, the great Nordic peace, and that the last little war we had among ourselves was 1809 between Finland and Sweden, and August 1814 between Norway and Sweden, and Norway had been... taken away from Denmark and given to Sweden because Sweden had been against Napoleon and Denmark in favor, so we were just shuffled from one camp to the other.

Now, that community functions, so if somebody tells us, "You can't have peace at the interstate level. The best you can have is a balance of power." Then we simply know that's not true, and we can look into it empirically and we can discover a couple of things. Now, the second point, fairly decent societies in the sense of relatively limited [numbers] at the bottom and relatively, what shall I say, limited class distance. Now they are homogenous.

You don't have big disparities between nations, religions and things of that kind. Denmark/Sweden being more feudal; Norway/Finland less feudal. There are some differences, but by and large, of course it makes us somewhat optimistic. Of course it does. And it's really important, to me personally, to have grown up with those experiences. You had to know the history because [these things] are only important if you look into the past and you can say, "It wasn't like that before. There was something concrete that happened." Some people were doing something to bring this about, and we can say, "Do this and this and this and this and don't do that." That's what's important.

For instance, you know a Nordic community which today is in two parts. One part is inside the European Union and the other is outside, but it has functioned, and one reason why it functioned was that no country announced itself as the leading country. During the Kalmar Union, Sweden did. Then Sweden left in 1523, Denmark took over and had only Norway to [control] and Iceland. It didn't work exactly because Denmark had catapulted itself up on a position where we could say, "Aha, you think you are somebody? I'll tell you one thing, you are not that great."

C. Mitchell: So "Know your history!"

Johan Galtung: And - know your history. It was my major message to the 54

conflict specialists from the three U.K. ministries of Foreign Affairs Defense and International Development. You do not understand this unless you know what happened in 1916... treason; in 1917 [the Balfour] Declaration; in 1918, the occupation

of Istanbul and so on.

So when Bin Laden says, "You are now suffering the same humiliation as we suffered more than 80 years ago," do your math;

2001 minus 80 and you find this.

C. Mitchell: We're going to come a little bit closer to now and ask about the

field as it is - now. My impression is that the field - peace studies, conflict studies, peace and conflict research - has become subdivided into a lot of different, small categories that don't quite

hold together.

And when we talk about peacekeeping, peace making and peace building, we [also] talk about conflict settlement, conflict resolution, conflict transformation. When you started the field, did it ever occur to you that it was going to become so diverse and...

cover so many different aspects of peace creation?

Johan Galtung: Well, I saw bits and pieces all over the place, so what I saw as my

task was more to bring them together.

C. Mitchell: And how successful have you - and others - been in that?

Johan Galtung: I think this interdisciplinary "conflictology" has been important.

You simply have agenda, and you see, for that I then need a theory which runs about as follows: That unsettled conflict is to violence what fire is to smoke, so whenever you see some violence, you will find an "untransformed" (as we prefer to say) conflict somewhere underneath it. Now, that gives privacy and privileges conflict as a

concept, and of course [the underlying] etiology behind it.

And I am quite willing to say that there could be places where this paradigm breaks down - where you could find the kind of [spontaneously] generated violence where it is very difficult - or it

becomes artificial - to go back to conflict with this model...

And Riordan [sp?] would say that maybe there is room for the [exception], but by and large I would stand for the following. That there are two discourses competing for attention, and one is the security discourse and the other one is the peace discourse, and the

security discourse runs as follows, and it is by far the dominant discourse in the [contemporary] world.

Point one, somewhere in the world there is something evil, an evil party. Point two, they are looking for an opportunity to do evil like running planes into twin towers or something like that. Point three, the happy tidings, there is a way of preventing this from happening. You can be strong, strong enough to deter or even strong enough to crush them. Point four, if you have that strength, you have security. This summarizes my view about 90 percent of Western thinking in the field - and I am not convinced.

So - alternative paradigm. There is somewhere in the world - an intractable conflict. That means an intractable contradiction, and there may be more than one [involved]. Point two, its non-transformation tends to express itself in violence. One or more of the parties just go for it, grab it, sometimes [loses] patience and boredom waiting for something to happen. Point three, the happy tiding; solve it. Just take it as an enormous challenge, go ahead... Solve it for heaven's sake.

Point four; if you do this in a reasonably egalitarian way, which means that you have to have a process where all parties in the conflict formation are involved and they don't exclude anybody, which means you sometimes have to negotiate with terrorists and you have to deal with fairly unappetizing parties to get peace. And I would then claim that peace is a better way to security than security to peace.

So let us now say that I believe 90 percent in what I just said. I am not blind to the possibility that there is room for the security [paradigm]. For instance, I just bought two security doors in my house in Spain because I had the idea that there are some evil people out there called "thieves", and they are just lurking... and they aim at one thing - only to get something in my house. And my happy tiding was a solid door which looked like the Bank of Norway, something like that, and through that I get security and I don't waste one second's thought on solving whatever conflict I might have with these roaming around - Eastern Europeans or whoever they are.

So Chris, I am confessing that I am not saying [I am] 100 percent peace [believer]. I am just saying much, much more than today. And if you take these four parts, identify the conflict, see it as an enormous risk, but it's not only that you solve conflict in order not to have the risk of [violence], but you solve conflict to come forward, to liberate people from the albatross around their neck which is to be weighed down by that conflict that makes their life much less than it could be.

Then you initiate these conflict transformation processes that are complex and you get something. And it's been my privilege to be invited into a number of them by people very, very high up, and – well, I have seen it at close quarters. I have – and I had - some successes, to put it that way, and some not yet successes.

C. Mitchell: Ah, well, that was going to be my next question.

Johan Galtung: Okay.

C. Mitchell: Not so much about personal successes, but successes for the field

as a whole. How well do you think we've done?

Johan Galtung: I would measure it by the fruits of the tree and not by the brilliance

of the concepts and the brilliance of the articles or papers. And I

am not so sure that I am that impressed.

C. Mitchell: Disappointed?

Johan Galtung: I'd like to be able to get into – no, not necessarily. I think it's too

early yet. And, you see, if I look into myself and I ask myself, "Why do I do it?" Well, I come from an upper-class family in Norway. I'm not frightened by social things. I am not a sight that frightens, sitting next to a president. I can look him in the eyes. We can exchange jokes, and so I am saying class is one factor. So just as I said in the beginning, if you want to understand me, take my beloved father's profession into account. And if you want to understand what I can do in practice, take the class[factor into account] and my father was also the deputy mayor of Oslo and

sometimes the mayor of Oslo.

Well, out of that comes a certain social security, a sort of feeling of safety, and most people in the field don't have that privilege. It's a privilege, and I [am not able to] say that this is good or bad. I'm just saying that it is kind of a fact. If you want to get into the field, you need that kind of personal feeling that, "Yes, I can do it. I can handle the situation socially. I am not afraid when the secretary beckons and says, 'The president is waiting for

you."

C. Mitchell: So... hopes and dreams for the field when you started...?

Johan Galtung: I think it was mainly intellectual, trying to come to grips with it.

And I must say, when it comes to the practical aspect, I have come

light years further than I ever dreamed that I would. I had no idea things would happen that way. Now, it was an intellectual challenge. How do you conceptualize conflict? How do you conceptualize peace? And so in this relation between what's underneath - and I think what I myself consider perhaps most important - is the work on deep culture and deep structure and the dialectic between the two[levels] and what I call trilateral science – empirical, critical and constructive – which has to do with the philosophy of science.

C. Mitchell:

So intellectually do you think we, as a field, have now some understanding that is useful, that we can pass on to people?

Johan Galtung:

Partial understandings, but maybe we need more generalists. Maybe, in a certain sense, if you take the field of medical science, or as I prefer to call it, health science. As you pointed out, Chris, you have this fragmentation, and they have that in medical science. And you have the patient's feeling that he is only concerned with this or that organ and he doesn't understand me, the me-ness of it and the context.

Maybe we need more generalists, and maybe, just as you say, that we have specialists on mediation, specialists in settlements, specialists on arms races. So take David Singer, for instance. He knows more about that than anybody else in the world since 1815, and so on and so on.

The generalist, the GP in the field who can, so to speak, be called in and who has something sensible to say. They are publishing **[inaudible]** handout of *Peace and Conflict*, and Charles **Gravel** and I are the editors, and we have put together some 30 articles, chapters, that is an effort to produce that with the hope that, if you read those, you have some sort of grounding that could be a good GP "tool chest"... summarizing what we call the "Transcend Method", which is then a kind of general philosophy theory and practice for a GP in the field.

C. Mitchell: GP is a vanishing species in England, you know.

Johan Galtung: I know.

C. Mitchell: And here as well.

Johan Galtung: And maybe that's exactly the same problem.

C. Mitchell:

Yes - could be. Again... looking back to where we were and where we've come from and where we are now, is there anything that surprised you over that period of time? Is there anything that surprised you positively or did anything surprise you negatively?

Johan Galtung:

The end of the Cold War didn't surprise me. What surprised me was that it didn't surprise people more because you had something that could have become a major catastrophe and suddenly it fizzled out. And somebody, namely the then Prime Minister of your country, Margaret Thatcher, said, "Nobody could have predicted this," and that was repeated by everybody. It was the easiest thing in the world to predict.

If you were down on the ground, you knew what the international society was doing. You knew the demonstrations and [protests]. You knew how they had lost the nerve and the power and the spirit... on both sides... And the peace movement in the West... and the conflict between the two and then it suddenly disappeared. I am surprised that not more people have tried to draw some lessons from that.

C. Mitchell:

That's a positive surprise, I think.

Johan Galtung:

It's a positive surprise. I found it fantastic. Anything negative? Well, when I am asked, "Johan, what was the major wrong prediction you made in your life?" Well, I get tired of listening to how clever I think I am at making predictions. So I say the major wrong prediction I made was the idea that the U.S. would learn from the Vietnam War.

C. Mitchell:

It looked as though it had for a while.

Johan Galtung:

That was what I thought because I didn't know enough about all the [preparations] made by the Pentagon during that period. Well, of course they concluded that next time, for heaven's sake... control the journalists, and also, for heaven's sake, [don't let it drag on] make it [end] quickly and so on. All those things that they started practicing then in the Gulf War in February and March '91.

Well, I thought I had come to the conclusion that there are limits to the use of the military for political purposes, especially in the current contemporary world where the people's war is coming up as something even more important than nuclear weapons, and right now it takes the form of a suicide belt. It could take many forms. These are just some forms. There are many forms to come, and only a total idiot would confront the U.S. with a battleship or

40 tanks in a V-shaped formation or something like that. [One] would have to be a total idiot to do that. Saddam Hussein tried it in '91. He didn't try it a second time.

Now, if you look at that, you could have imagined that a conclusion could have been, "We have to change." So I was interested in, "Why didn't they change?" That became my challenge, and this is how the concept of deep culture evolved, started developing.

And I gave a talk once at this institute in La Jolla, this global conflict institute in San Diego at the University of California. And that was on the United States foreign policy as [pathology], and a further development I gave at George Mason University is the Lynch Lecture.

C. Mitchell:

Yes, I remember you're giving that one.

Johan Galtung:

Exactly, and they are coming out as a book now with [details to] bring you up to date. So the idea, the basic idea was that any state is run not only by the logic of the state but also by the deep logic of the dominant nation. And I am particularly concerned with what I call CGT, Chosenness, Glory and Trauma - and DMA, Dualism, Manicheism and Armageddon. Now, the U.S. has both of them, and it's coming. The difference between George Bush the younger and the rest of the U.S. presidents is that he says it in his – well, these are primitive, simple ideas, so his [method of] articulation is sufficient. And the Chosenness means that you have higher forces behind you, and if something turns out wrong, it's because you haven't paid allegiance to those higher forces. You have broken the commandments, the covenant, the broken covenant. Now, many people have been working in this direction and I have brought it a little bit further and [publicized] it.

C. Mitchell:

Yes.

Johan Galtung:

So - the collective subconscious... and I am then coming out with a book now on the collective subconscious in 25 countries, and in two genders and three classes, and in some four or five professions. In other words, not only nations. So if you now take the worst profession and the worst gender in the worst nation and put it into a strong state, what do you get? Well, you get - for instance - the U.S. empire.

If you take the opposition to that, so say these remarkable English ladies who have been, very often, soft Christian, little bit Labour Party inspired, middle class, NGO-oriented, internationalist Quakers, you get a very solid opposition to slavery and colonialism and to war. And those people have been the antidote to a large extent. I wish there were more of them.

C. Mitchell:

Yes... we need a much more effective antidote.

Johan Galtung:

Precisely, but if you look at the work they did in connection with slavery and colonialism, you can really say that might... so that kind of thing, in other words, what kind of baggage are you carrying? What are your hidden assumptions? And Chris, I'll just take one example. If you believe that a conflict has two parties. If you believe that Israel and Palestine can be handled with two parties, then you look at them. Well, which two? Where are they? Okay. You take the Labor party from Israel and then you take PLO from Palestine. Okay. PLO, their labor party there. You leave out [Hamas] and the left-wing... okay. Both of them are today in power. Why? ... partly because they were left out.

And if you are left out of the conflict as a party and the conflict transformation process, you will of course ask, "Uh huh, we are left out. You will be hearing from us." Fatal mistake, and I'm talking now about my own country's Foreign Minister who believes strongly in the figure two as the key to a conflict, and they made exactly the same mistake in Sri Lanka with exactly the same consequences, only Sri Lanka is Israel and Palestine in slow motion.

That is a hidden assumption - deep culture. Some of it is [religious], it has to do with God and Satan, good and evil and things of that kind. And the Chinese have a terribly different way of conceptualizing, but let's leave that aside. That was since my answer to the question.

C. Mitchell:

Well, unfortunately, I think it is also something to do with us as members of a field which tends to dichotomize conflicts. All the textbooks do - most of the textbooks.

Getting towards the end now, but let's switch to the future. How do you see the field developing over the next ten years or so, and where would you like to see it develop?

Johan Galtung:

Academically, [institutes will] become faculties, and it will become a full [university study] in five years... so like you have a law school, you will have a peace school, peace and conflict school or whatever it is called.

C. Mitchell:

This is going to be a fairly universal phenomenon?

Johan Galtung: I think so. I think so. And I think the field will solidify, and I think

the key will be integration more than fragmentation, and the –

C. Mitchell: Intellectually, you mean, or organizationally?

Johan Galtung: Intellectually to become more trans-disciplinary. And as we know

very well, the difficulty with that is that - imagine you are an economist but you're very interested in peace, and you write something about peace economics. Well, you may not get a professorship in peace studies nor in economics if you do that. So what we need is to legitimize trans-disciplinary studies. And all ministries of education, all cultural ministers, whenever they have meetings they always say fantastic things about interdisciplinary

[studies] but don't practice it.

C. Mitchell: And then they do nothing.

Johan Galtung: Then they do nothing, precisely. But there's a typical

academic trade union... aspect to it, but it is important. So the warning light then comes on when you get these faculties and you get certain certificates, then are you sure you have a sufficient critical awareness of what you're doing and how do we build that in it? I see, with some skepticism, the master's degrees that are now flourishing all over Europe in development studies and things

of that kind.

C. Mitchell: Here as well.

Johan Galtung: Precisely. They're just churning them out in record time, assembly

line, and the old advantage of the university when I was younger was that you took your time and you developed your critical talent while you were there, so that's one point. Now, will this be to the good? I think it will, and my optimism is based on one thing, essentially one thing. This idea of solving conflict is feasible; it

works.

You have two branches. One is the present conflict; it's called mediation. The other one is the past conflict; it's called conciliation. Mediator, conciliator. You have two roles, and I have seen in my own country, where we now have a sort of second wave which has to do with the organization I started, TRANSCEND and TRANSCEND Nordic. The second wave

which is in a sense another wave after PRIO.

Then suddenly a lawyer comes to me and says, "Look, this is what you need in law. We need it not only for neighbors and not only for couples with difficulties. We need it also in criminal law." And suddenly he has ten percent of Norwegian lawyers organized in his "Lawyers for Dialogue". It is [set up] in terms of dispute resolution, but a little bit more imaginative.

C. Mitchell:

Good.

Johan Galtung:

And there's a little bit more sense that we are creating a new reality, and suddenly it reaches the Supreme Court. Suddenly the judges there start getting interested in it.

I see things of that type moving, so in other words it's a kind of spirit and idea that starts taking root. School systems come and they ask, "How can we teach this to the ten-year-olds?" So suddenly we have a committee of teachers and people, including publicity people who are fantastic at marketing ideas. And I am, of course, skeptical with shaky hands and looking at it with nervousness, but I must say I am impressed.

C. Mitchell:

Really?

Johan Galtung:

I am impressed.

C. Mitchell:

I would be scared.

Johan Galtung:

Of course I'm scared, but we have a contract saying that we have the ultimate conceptual control. And they had a little bit, you see, the idea that peace is a question of "They come together and discuss it," - and we said, "That's not good enough." You should not assume that everybody somehow is born with ideas of how a good solution could be. You have to bring in something from the outside, too. Could be the teacher but the teacher needs more training.

Okay. Suddenly you see that blossoming and flourishing, so from that point of view, I would say it is not under professionalism of the school of peace, but it is also in more of the mystic "can-do" - to talk American - attitude to conflict, and the delight when you suddenly see that you not only avoid violence but you can liberate people.

I'll give you one example because I was asked to mediate an Italian couple... and it was very hot and very heated, and so I followed my practice which is I always talk to one of them at a time. I don't bring them together. That comes later. They are not

prepared for it. And as you bring them together, they will be trying to get my support and things of that kind, and the woman will talk incessantly and the husband will signal with his eyes, "Do you understand my problem?" Yeah, that's one. I mean, there are tricks, all kinds of tricks like that going on.

So the woman says, "He is good with his ceramics, the tiles in the bathroom... but he has now said he will no longer work overtime. He will go to a bar instead with his comrades and friends. That means no overtime. That means no security for me. I am eight years younger than he is. Being Italian, I'll live eight years more than him. Sixteen years without security and nothing in the bank."

Okay. That's a legitimate question. He says, "My wife has no idea what it is to be creeping behind the toilet and under the sink in the bathroom and put the fucking tile at that part, and how my back is aching and I am entitled to a little bit of a good life now, and she can go out and get a job. She can do that." So this went on for ten years, and one day she said to him, "You know who you are? You are a —" and then she used the technical term for erectile dysfunction.

Okay. So he, "bang," and she shouted and cried and the neighbors called the police, the police came and took him. Now, they had heard worse things than that in their lives, so they are not very impressed, but they said, "Next time prison and you will get a minimum half year for that, minimum."

So somebody knew somebody who knew somebody who knew me. And I'll go straight to the point and just say what I came up with. It was to run a bar together, husband and wife running a bar together. He loves the bar atmosphere and he would then be standing behind the bottles at the counter and the comrades would be hanging there and they will be exchanging the latest news about women and look out on the street and see what's passing by. She will be serving, and lo and behold, the bar functions flawlessly.

C. Mitchell: And she'll have the security.

Johan Galtung: Precisely. She had the security; he had the bar life. There was the

question on how do you divide the profit, and he wanted to divide by three, two parts for him and one part for her, and I said, "No,

you divide by two." In other words, [equality]. .

C. Mitchell: Yes.

Johan Galtung:

So I give you as an example, and now what came to my mind when they said, "Why didn't we get that idea?" was that the only idea they had in the Italian culture was either he wins or she is able to [be] strong enough and he weak enough, to push her will through, or they find a compromise that he doesn't go to the bar every day, only every second day, or he pays some [money] corresponding to what he spends on drinks into a common fund, a fund for her [future security]. This idea of a new reality doesn't exist. The new reality, the imagination [to create it] and then people take to it. They just love it, so I cannot enough say that that is a kind of opening and [it] applies to all levels of conflict.

C. Mitchell: So you sound optimistic. Are you optimistic?

Johan Galtung: Yes, I am. I am. But Chris, also for a very bad reason and

personality characteristic - because I find pessimism is good enough for the intellectually less gifted and...it's like one of the

seven cardinal sins... Can you live with it?

C. Mitchell: I can live with that. I'm subject to several of the other cardinal

sins myself, so -

Johan Galtung: I blame capitalism for those. You cannot run capitalism without

those sins.

C. Mitchell: Well, I sometimes think you can't run an interesting life without

some of them.

Johan Galtung: No doubt about it.

C. Mitchell: Last two questions. As you know, we are doing this particular

project and calling it "Parents of the Field". Now, we've now done something like 25 interviews with people of your generation and my generation, but... allowing for the fact that we can't interview Kenneth [Boulding], we tried to interview Anatol [Rapoport] but he's really not interviewable any longer. Who else would you

advise us to talk to?

Johan Galtung: Well, Bert Roling passed away. Kenneth Boulding passed away.

These are people we have been talking about.

C. Mitchell: Yes.

Johan Galtung: Dave Singer you have done.

C. Mitchell: Dave Singer we've talked with.

Johan Galtung: You have talked with him. I have a feeling that I cannot imagine

anybody you haven't come up with.

C. Mitchell: Somebody from home, somebody from Scandanavia, Ekkehart

[Krippendorff] perhaps?

Johan Galtung: Ekkehart Krippendorff, yes, from Germany.

C. Mitchell: Dieter [Senghass]?

Johan Galtung: And Dieter, both of them would be very good.

C. Mitchell: Okay.

Johan Galtung: They would be excellent, but since you said Scandinavia, how

about [inaudible]? ... He's in nineties now.

C. Mitchell: Is he still around?

Johan Galtung: Oh, yes. He may be not quite so sprightly as he used to be but

interviewable.

C. Mitchell: That's a good idea.

Johan Galtung: Absolutely. I mean, he meant a lot to me personally. The – let me

just think a little bit more now. There is nothing in Sweden,

Denmark and Finland that I could think of.

C. Mitchell: Okay. What about your Polish colleague from UNESCO?

Johan Galtung: No, he passed away. He passed away. He was not a thinker; he

was an administrator, and he was the one who saw connections that

could be used and saw the significance of it.

C. Mitchell: Very important in developing the field.

Johan Galtung: It's very important - very, very important.

C. Mitchell: Well, if anybody else occurs to you, just let us know.

Johan Galtung: I certainly will tell you. If you go to Spain, you will find

[interesting people] in Barcelona.

C. Mitchell: In Barcelona? Okay.

Johan Galtung: And you will find people in Saragossa who are just remarkable

people and they have been working very hard in this field. In Granada you will find Francisco Munoz [sp?]who has a done a tremendous job, and he has brought peace thinking into antiquity being a professor of the history of antiquity - into the field. More academic in a sense and very, very useful. Also **Maria Tortoso** at

the University of [inaudible] very useful.

C. Mitchell: All right.

Johan Galtung: So without any hesitation, I would say Spain is the dynamic

country and from there it spreads to other places.

C. Mitchell: Well, presumably it will spread to Latin America.

Johan Galtung: Precisely. That's exactly it.

C. Mitchell: All right. My last question... is if you were interviewing Johan

Galtung, what question would you ask him that I haven't asked?

Johan Galtung: Well, the moments of doubt, the moments of difficulty, and what

have been your strategies? I think my greatest doubts have been why I didn't have more doubt, so that must have been because I had a strong – a compulsive sense of mission, and that I admit rightly, but I don't necessarily see it as bad. It was almost like a lightening, this experience in that library in Helsinki - at the

University of Helsinki.

C. Mitchell: That there was nothing there.

Johan Galtung: There was nothing. Peace studies didn't exist, and you have

security studies and war studies and all of that. What? What is this? And then that started, you see, sort of revolving around, so when the same year in December I wrote my application to the Ministry saying that I am not going to go in for the military service, and -however that is a negative act - my positive act would be to devote my life to peace studies, to developing the

field. So that became kind of a promise.

And I often ask myself, "How could I be that dogmatic?" There must be something bad in it somehow, or could it be that I have become blind to something? And I guess that, in some periods, I have been a little bit blind and have been not sufficiently open to truths that are not within my own paradigms, so that's why you sense this example of my security doors in Spain and the conclusion I draw. Maybe there is some truth to the other aspect, but on balance we have to make sure.

That's been one point. Now, strategies, well, there have been difficulties, but you see, I guess my strategy has been to work on so many things at the same time. But if something gets blocked, I just jump to another one. And if, for instance, there is absolutely nobody who is interested in any practice - start writing books. And it's been a tremendously rich life. I'm just so grateful and feel that the culminating point in my life is still ahead of me. It's a wonderful feeling.

C. Mitchell:

Looking back, Johan, what do you think has been your largest contribution to the field? What are you happiest with? What do you think is the most important?

Johan Galtung:

In a couple of words, integration of theory and practice.

C. Mitchell:

Well, say a little bit more if you would.

Johan Galtung:

Integration of theory and practice - five words. Let me say a little bit more. So I see myself as having worked on two tracks. So one is the track that you have explored in your questions essentially, and that is the theory, academic, conceptual, books, publications, articles track - and I love that track. I am professor and remain a professor, and as a professor, I profess concepts and theories and books and so on.

So the second track is to put it into practice, to practice it, and as I mentioned there are... two points of gravity, mediation and conciliation. I (on purpose) don't say "reconciliation" because that presupposes there was something before, so let me now say conciliation and mediation.

And the first thing that I happened to do in that field was done in the United States - in Charlottesville, Virginia, not very far from us. I was doing a very academic study on desegregation, and suddenly some journalist discovered that I knew more about Charlottesville than the sheriff and the mayor. He organized a contact, and the question they were concerned with was - would there be violence? And that was a question which was very deep

to my heart, but I hadn't come to it intellectually. It somehow didn't fit into my concepts at the time. It had more to do with social distance and scales of that type and so on.

And I gave them a couple of answers to it, and suddenly they also said that I had discovered that some people had some solutions, and suddenly I was, for the first and last time, on the front page of the *Washington Post*. "Norwegian sociologist thinks the desegregation conflict will end peacefully," - and so it did. And looking back at what I did at the time, I could say that it was work against pluralistic ignorance because when you sit through 2,000 interviews, then you know more than the people who are only listening to those who talk most loudly.

So that was – I can't say much more about it, but I am now 70 conflicts later in my life, and I think I can say, hand on heart, that everything I have done theoretically I can use in the concrete mediation and conciliation work. It's a lot of psychology, a lot of theology, enormous amounts of history, economics, sociology, political science, international studies... and integrated conflictology. So I think that is something for which I am sort of proud.

And I can then give you one little thought. When I am sitting in a room together with a colleague - because we usually come as two, that colleague, at times, is my wife - and on the other side of the table is a president or a foreign minister who comes with an assistant. He needs that to take notes for one thing. Another thing is to have somebody as a witness in case I come out and say, "The president agreed with me entirely," or nonsense of that type, which I would never say but I can understand that he needs that kind of security. And there are, of course, listening devices in the room and maybe some security man behind a hidden door and things like that. It's okay.

When I do that, I know one thing, that my entrance ticket is not my brilliant analysis of his conflict. The only legitimate entrance ticket is that I have something to propose because I see him - more or less - as a little boy lost in a dark tunnel with no light. That's not the way he tries to appear when he is on television. And he sees me as a wild academic, completely out of touch with reality, but somebody has told him, "Nevertheless, listen to him."

And I say something like, "How about...? Could you imagine...? Would it be possible...?" and he says, "No."

And then I say, "Could you be kind enough to explain to me why this is unfeasible...?" "Well, but it's obvious." "Well, it's not obvious to me." And so then he starts talking, and then I ask questions. In a dialogue you ask questions. After ten minutes he

starts asking questions, and that's when the breakthrough takes place.

And we go on asking each other questions - but it only happens if you have something to propose that has substance to it. And of course his first reaction would be, "It cannot be good since I didn't say it, since I never thought of it. Cannot be good. Must be something wrong in it." But he is also testing me, and he's also testing; "Can he take it?"

So you had to have - of course - dreadfully good nerves in that situation, or something just more important than good nerves. You just have the professionalism - and you relax and you let it happen, because you have been through it before. Sometimes you hear strange things but it's okay.

The entrance ticket is that one. Now, that means that the bridge between theory and practice is your ability to construct, in your mind, a new reality. It's not good enough to be an empiricist, but you have to be that at the same time. You have to know what didn't work in the past, for instance. So if – I would say that is perhaps... how it happens, and I am trying to convey this to as many people as possible. I don't see it as a monopoly. I don't sell it as a commodity. I just try to tell them: "It happens like I just told it to you."

C. Mitchell:

Let me just follow up on that line of thinking and we'll come back to theory and ideas in a minute. I think you've had a fairly unique experience in this, because one of the things that people say about "the failure" of the field is that we haven't conquered this problem of getting our ideas across to policymakers... The problem is occasionally we manage to get them to take up some of these ideas and then they adopt them but they don't really understand them or they reinterpret —

Johan Galtung: Or they take one little element –

C. Mitchell: Right.

Johan Galtung: – out of context, and things like that.

C. Mitchell: Yes, that's right.

Johan Galtung: Bend and twist it around...

C. Mitchell: Are we in a "hurting stalemate", or something like that.

Johan Galtung:

Yes.

C. Mitchell:

So why is it... that you think that you have... managed to get to this point where people will listen to you and... generally speaking, the field hasn't. There's this gap between the production of ideas and the transmission of ideas to people who can make a difference - because they're policymakers. What's the secret?

Johan Galtung:

Well, I think the secret is to have something to say, and that something to say means something to propose, so I can jump straight into the Western world versus what I call Al-Qaeda.

When I presented the ideas to the three ministries in England, then I was greatly helped by the fact that I had a concrete something to point to in Spanish politics - Zapatero's great approach to it. And so I analyzed the conflict in six components and saw that Zapatero had done something basic with four of them. "You have done zero and Mr. Bush has done zero. You will get more violence on your side...."

Of course, it's an enormous [help] if you can back up what you're saying with an empirical case. It's an enormous advantage. You may often not be able to do that because there is no empirical case, so when I was sitting with the [Ecuadorean?] ex-president and suggested a bi-national zone with a natural park, I had no empirical case. He asked for an empirical case and I had nothing. I just said... I invited him to share an image. He rejected it but the younger people in the presidential organization took it [up].

And that zone was then accepted three years later, in 1998 in the treaty. And the interesting thing, there is now a guy making a PhD thesis about it. It functions marvelously and has spawned mini zones along the border. Peace breeds peace, but you can see my problem is to try to make something with no empirical counterpart... and I'm not quite sure that I am good at it always. It's a question of [details...] and how to sort of describe it in detail, and the other side has to be willing to follow you to some extent.

And I had to listen to him, which I did with pleasure, and there is a... kind of ping-pong dialogue about it. So my advice to the field then would be put more of your energy into creativity, into solutions, and less into the empirical analytical work.

C. Mitchell:

But the problem is that to have a convincing case, which is what you're saying –

Johan Galtung:

Yes.

C. Mitchell:

- you have to know about the case. Now, there wasn't one for the Peru-Ecuador border, but there was the nice one in Spain that you could talk about when you were in London. So there has to be this balance... because I've had this experience as well, where somebody says, "Show me somewhere where this works."

Johan Galtung:

Yes.

C. Mitchell:

And sometimes I can and sometimes I can't... It seems to me that you are saying that's crucial.

Johan Galtung:

It's an... American pragmatic, question. Be aware of the cultural boundaries. It's called pragmatism and I'm not in any way legitimizing it. I'm just saying that, in other parts of the world, it may be less necessary So I can do without the empirical "crutches" but in that case you have to be good at "painting" it - in detail.

C. Mitchell:

Because you are painting a vision.

Johan Galtung:

You are painting a vision - and you have to be good at also seeing the negative aspects of it. Chris, the way I go about it has four stages. I ask each party in the conflict first to tell me, "What does the Middle East look like that you would like to live in?" Positive vision on the future. I ask him to say it.

C. Mitchell:

Yes.

Johan Galtung:

Then I say, "Tell me a little bit about the past, negative things. What happened? How do you see it? When did it occur?" Now, that part, as we all know, they are very good at - extremely good at it - and there is something wrong with humanity because it's so good at that part and so bad at that first part. So I must tell you that there comes a point where I say, "Okay, enough. I promise you we will come back to it, but can you kind enough to tell me about something good in the past? It cannot all have been that bad"

And then – hesitating - they're stuttering, and something comes, and then I go to another [stage] and start it up by saying, "The Middle East of the future]?. Could you mention something that might not work?" So you see now the dialectic between past and future and between negative and positive and double yinyang. And then you do that ten times. You go around the [procedure] ten times, and what these brilliant people in Norway are doing, they are now making a carpet with four fields called

positive, negative, past and future, and they invite school children to stand in one of the fields. : And they invite two of them to have a debate with each other from the angle of the fields, and we are even making a carpet where couples with troubles can sleep in the positive future field at night. (So we are selling that at a profit, of course.!)

You see, I mean, the point is that you – are they willing to join in this? They are only willing to join in this if they feel that you have something to offer.

C Mitchell:

Yes

Johan Galtung:

And they are not willing to join in it as a game, - and they shouldn't waste their presidential time to do it, either, I would say. But the point that comes then is they invite me back. "I want to hear more. Could we continue? Last time we left out this and that part." So if you have 500 good anecdotes about successful conflict transformation in your head, remember you don't have time to consult your books... Don't think you can switch on your computer and bring them up. They have to be just right here and in your heart. That's where they have to be, and they have to come out quickly. If you have those 500 [examples] you are very [persuasive]..

C. Mitchell:

The trouble is my short-term memory is getting worse!

Johan Galtung:

Well, take your favorite ones.

C. Mitchell:

Yes, that's true. Switching back from the practical to the theoretical and the conceptual, what do you think are the most important ideas that have driven your work? You have already mentioned a couple of them, but there's another aspect to that question. What do you see as the way in which other people in the field think about Johan Galtung and his most important contribution? What do you think your most important contribution was and what do you think your reputation as your most important contribution is?

Johan Galtung:

I would say deep culture and deep structure, theoretically speaking, and the trilateral concept of science - that empiricism is to combine the foreseen and unforeseen with the empirically observable and non-observable. Criticism is the empirical with values... and constructivism - the way I use the term - is to combine what you would like to see with what you would like to have, and that means you go beyond the [limits of]social theory. So a good social theory then becomes, to my mind, a question of something deep down, deep culture and deep structure and the dialectic between them, and that brings us into micro-history where I have done quite a lot of work.

So theoretically, the book I am writing on now, *The Coming Decline and Fall of the U.S. Empire*, is – and I think I tried to show that it is a kind of almost natural law that it is coming to an end. There is nothing much you can do about it, and there is nothing much you should do about it... It would be an enormous liberation for the United States of America to get rid of the empire, and this is... [some] detail how the processes work.

If you have a sense of those processes, then you can hitch onto something. You are sitting, let us say, with the National League for Democracy in Myanmar, Burma, and with the military government in Myanmar. And there is a process called democratization and human rights, but there is also a process called – and there is a process called globalization and there is a process called autonomy. None of these processes are there. Now, how do you reconcile them...?

Well, I come up with the idea, and I mention this because I have not succeeded in it, and I may but I have not [yet] succeeded. A pact where the military government says, "Yes. We did something wrong in 1990 when we cancelled election results," And the National League for Democracy says: "We also did something wrong. We have hitched all our activity to 1990 and we have forgotten the future, so let us now remove 1990 from the political agenda and join together for the future in the democratization process."

So I tried that, which is a heavy thing. It was a heavy thing, quite heavy [but]... doing it without threat. Sanctions will not work. U.S. attack will not work. They have moved the capital into the place where they have all the caves and they have all the resources and everything, and they are good at [guerrilla] fighting... They are brutal, but I can also see their logic. They have managed to keep the country together and they have managed to keep it independent of India and China, squeezed between the two, and the U.S. and the U.K. and Japan - all five - which is no minor feat.

So if you look at it that way, you have to come to the conclusion that you cannot move further without also accepting the positive things in the military government and also some of the negative things on the other side - even if my heart isn't in it.

Okay. You try to do all this. It asks for quite a lot, and... it's a very dynamic view of society, and I try then to indicate to them these processes and that [they] can only neglect those processes at their own considerable risk.

In 1980, Chris, I predicted that the wall around Berlin would fall within ten years, and as predicted two months before my deadline, and that day the Soviet empire will fall. It did. And I had theory for that. The demoralization following the synergies of synchronizing contradictions, to put it in social science-ese. I'll not spell it out. I will only say that... when I made a corresponding prediction in 2000 for the U.S. empire, that it would crumble before 2025. It had a longer-term perspective, because it was better made.

George Bush was elected president and I shortened it by five years since I saw him as an accelerator of a process that was doomed to come anyhow. He certainly is. He's performing according to my script quite well.

C. Mitchell: I wish he wasn't.

Johan Galtung: Yes.

C. Mitchell:

I was about to tell you about my biggest mistake when we were talking about mistakes and doubts. The one that I always tell people about, my predictions, was talking to an unbelievably attractive Ethiopian girl in Addis Ababa who was about to go on holiday in England, and she was worried that there might be some trouble in the Middle East - Israeli-Arab trouble.

And I assured her that she could go on holiday to England without any problem at all because I had just been in Cairo and I had talked to President Nasser, who had reassured me that the Egyptians had no intention of attacking Israel, so she should go to London. So she went to London and she came back and just as she got back into Addis Ababa - the date was May 1967.- the Middle east war broke out about a week after she got back

Sso that was my success rate for predictions - a poor prediction, totally inaccurate... but it's a story that I always tell people about prediction in international relations in those days... I think I would probably have been in conflict if I had been in Addis Ababa when she got [back] there.

Johan Galtung:

It's a beautiful story. I can tell you right now because[I have a]... very much longer story about how Gorbachev came into power, and I would not have been able to predict it... That depends on

how densely you pack the future, you see. You can measure it in time in years or you can measure it in [varieties] of experiences...I can give you an example of my agenda for May.

C. Mitchell: Don't frighten me, but tell me about it.

Johan Galtung: It may well frighten you.

C. Mitchell: Well, what are you going to be doing in May?

Johan Galtung: Okay, 14 to 16 May, I am invited to Turkey as a consultant for...

the Turkish [government].

C. Mitchell: I don't envy you...

Johan Galtung: I don't envy myself, but you see, it's the same thing when you

have been through this so many times. All you can say is just that

I'll do my best.

15 to 17 June in New Delhi for a meeting about the plan for Kashmir with the former Pakistani Prime Minister and top people from India; 18 to 20 May it is in Myamar with the National League for Democracy and with the military on the theory and practice of reconciliation; and 21 to 23 May, Cambodia, again on the theory and practice of reconciliation; and 24 to 27 May, Korea... and I am arguing in favor of a joint historical commission to clear up the Korean War, which did not start in 1950. But now it's more than sufficiently [if we] change it to the 3<sup>rd</sup> of May 1948. And from there to Japan [on] the 1<sup>st</sup> of June and address together [some] 115 former cabinet members who have a plan for an alternative memorial shrine, and from there to Manassas, Virginia, [to talk

about] U.S. foreign policy.

C. Mitchell: You're coming back?

Johan Galtung: That will be a very short trip. A little trip because I am going on to

Mexico and Brazil... and in Turkey the issue will be the 1915 genocide and... between you and me, when the Turks say that they didn't do it, they are not quite wrong because they asked the Kurds to kill Armenians for them, and as a premium the Kurds would get liberty and freedom. They killed Armenians and did not get

freedom.

C. Mitchell: Well, no wonder the Kurds...–

Johan Galtung: That's it. A nice little trilateral conflict.

C. Mitchell: Well, it's more than trilateral if you think about the Kurds on the

other side of the borders.

Johan Galtung: Of course... You see, the question I didn't really elaborate just a

little bit, this thing about getting to policymakers... Yes. I made it and. as I said, at some point I'm just surprised, you see. Just

surprised myself...

You see, if I should take one specific point or theory that is blatantly wrong, and the theory is taught [verey generally] is that the mediator should not suggest anything. It should come from the parties, so that they have "ownership" of it. It is beautiful. If it works that way, fine. The problem is the parties don't have enough insight. And if the mediator is worth his grain of salt, he can see things they will never see, like that Italian couple...It simply isn't good enough, but the mediator [should never] impose that idea. He should expect it with a greating most

that idea. He should suggest it - with a question mark.

End of audio.