

**Institute for Conflict Analysis  
and Resolution**

**Occasional Paper 6**

**Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution:  
A Decade of Development**

**By  
The Honorable Samuel W. Lewis  
President, United States  
Institute of Peace**

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**George Mason University**

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## About the Author

When he delivered the Fifth Annual Lynch Lecture on April 6, 1992, Ambassador Samuel W. Lewis was president of the United States Institute of Peace, an independent government institution established by Congress to promote peaceful resolution of international conflicts. In January 1993 he was appointed director of policy planning for the United States Department of State.

*A cum laude* graduate of Yale University, with a master's degree in international relations from the Johns Hopkins University, Ambassador Lewis was a foreign-service officer for 31 years. In his last post, he served for eight years as United States ambassador to Israel, first appointed by President Carter and then reaffirmed by President Reagan. He was a prominent actor in Arab-Israeli negotiations, including participation in the 1978 Camp David Conference, which led to peace between Israel and Egypt, and in United States efforts to bring the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 to a peaceful conclusion.

He has also served as assistant secretary of state for International Organization Affairs, as deputy director of the Policy Planning Staff, as a senior staff member of the National Security Council, as a member of the United States Agency for International Development's mission to Brazil, and in lengthy assignments in Italy and Afghanistan.

Ambassador Lewis retired from the State Department in 1985. Before assuming the presidency of the Institute on November 1, 1987, he was Diplomat-in-Residence at the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute and Guest Scholar at the Brookings Institution.

## About the Institute

The Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University has as its principal mission to advance the understanding and resolution of significant and persistent human conflicts among individuals, groups, communities, identity groups, and nations. To fulfill this mission, the Institute works in four areas: academic programs, consisting of a Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) and a Master of Science (M.S.) in Conflict Analysis and Resolution; research and publication; a clinical and consultancy service offered through the Applied Practice and Theory Program and by individual Institute faculty and senior associates; and public education.

The Applied Practice and Theory (APT) Program draws on faculty, practitioners, and students to form teams to analyze and help resolve broad areas of conflict. These three-to-five-year projects currently address such topics as crime and conflict, jurisdictional conflicts within governments, conflict resolution in deeply divided communities (Northern Ireland, South Africa, Beirut), and conflict in school systems.

Associated with the Institute are a number of organizations that promote and apply conflict resolution principles. These include the Consortium on Peace Research, Education, and Development (COPRED), a networking organization; the National Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution (NCPCR), offering a biannual conference for conflict resolution practitioners; Northern Virginia Mediation Service (NVMS), offering mediation services to Northern Virginia residents involved in civil or minor criminal disputes; and Starting Small, teaching conflict resolution and problem-solving skills to children.

Major research interests include the study of deep-rooted conflict and its resolution; the exploration of conditions attracting parties to the negotiation table; the role of third parties in dispute resolution; and the testing of a variety of conflict intervention methods in a range of community, national, and international settings.

Outreach to the community is accomplished through the publication of books and articles, public lectures, conferences, and special briefings on the theory and practice of conflict resolution. As part of this effort, the Institute's Working and Occasional Papers offer both the public at large and professionals in the field access to critical thinking flowing from faculty, staff, and students at the Institute.

These papers are presented to stimulate critical consideration of important questions in the study of human conflict.

## Foreword

In the decade since its founding in 1982, George Mason's Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution has become part of a ground swell of development of new institutions for addressing serious societal and world conflicts. Among the most significant of these new institutions is the United States Institute of Peace, established as a federally funded nonprofit corporation by Congress in 1984.

Guiding the development of the Institute as the only research and information unit in the United States government devoted solely to peace and peacemaking techniques has been its first president, Ambassador Samuel W. Lewis. Under Ambassador Lewis's leadership, the Institute has played a major role in raising the government's and the nation's level of awareness about the development of the field of peacemaking and conflict resolution.

The Institute has become a focal point for analysis and strategizing about conflicts facing the United States and the world. Its publications, conferences, consultancies, and public outreach—including a nationwide annual peace essay contest for high school students—have added immensely to our knowledge of peacemaking processes.

The George Mason Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution is honored to be able to present a review of developments of the decade of its existence in peace and conflict resolution by one of the major architects of that development.

*James H. Laue, Lynch Professor of Conflict Resolution*

## The Fifth Annual Lynch Lecture on Conflict Resolution

Address by  
The Honorable Samuel W. Lewis  
President, United States Institute of Peace  
George Mason University  
April 16, 1992

### **Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution: A Decade of Development**

It is not only an honor but a little intimidating being here tonight, particularly after I looked at the program and realized that the previous lecturers in the Lynch Lecture Series were none other than James Laue, John Burton, Elise Boulding, Kenneth Boulding, and Richard Rubenstein. That is a powerful group to follow, and I am happy to say that two of them have been intimately involved with the United States Institute of Peace as well as with this Institute.

John Burton was one of our Distinguished Jennings Randolph Fellows for the better part of a year and did a good deal of work while he was with us on his epic four-volume treatise on conflict resolution. And Jim Laue's contributions to our Institute are well known to anyone who knows the history of the Peace Academy Campaign, which led to passage of the United States Institute of Peace Act in 1984. When I became president of our Institute in 1987, John Norton Moore, then our chairman, told me there was one person who could really educate me about the history of our unique institution, and sent me to Jim Laue. Had Jim not been around to give me some very sober, serious, and excellent advice in the early months of my tenure, I am sure that I would not be here tonight.

George Mason University, and all of you who founded and have nurtured its Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, should be extraordinarily proud of what you have achieved. It is clear that this Institute, now 10 years old, has been a real pioneer in developing innovative, new approaches to both the theory and the practice of conflict resolution and peacemaking. Some of the contributors who ornament your masthead are friends or ex-colleagues of mine, and there's no institution that should be prouder of those who have been associated with it than this institution.

What is particularly striking is the fact that the decade we are celebrating tonight at this Lynch Lecture, this decade of your Institute's de-

velopment, has coincided with the most extraordinary upheavals in the international state system since World War II. It could even be argued that these were the 10 most significant peacetime years in modern times. Ten years ago the world was locked in a Cold War of incalculable lethal potential. In 1992 the world looks incredibly different.

This century has been scarred by many violent international conflicts: World War I, World War II, Korea, the War in Vietnam and Cambodia, two India-Pakistan wars, nine major wars in the Middle East, and many other conflicts. The decades we have passed through have been decades of almost endless warfare in one or more regions, punctuated by brief moments of peace. The names remind us of a violent era: Afghanistan, Sahara, Somalia, Ethiopia, Angola, Yemen, and on and on. Many so-called minor wars have produced hundreds of thousands of casualties. The bloodiest war of the twentieth century—with the exception of the two great world conflicts—the Iran-Iraq War, dragged on for eight years of wholesale bloodshed. The 1991 Gulf War was the shortest war of the twentieth century, but it was also very bloody. And, of course, in the part of the Middle East where I have spent most of my last 20 years, the Arab-Israeli front, the record spans Israel's War of Independence in 1948-49; the Suez War in 1956; the major Six Day War in 1967; the 1969-70 War of Attrition between Egypt and Israel—somehow often left out of the record books but actually one of the bloodier of the Arab-Israeli wars and one of the longer—the 1973 Yom Kippur War, a surprise attack on Israel on the holiest of days for Israelis and Jews everywhere; and the 1982 Lebanese War, the first “war of choice” for Israel since the Suez Crisis. And outside the Middle East, the Associated Press once identified more than 300 “small wars” that were underway at that particular moment around the world.

Of course, the United States has not been at peace all this time either. We have not stayed at war for a long period of time since Vietnam. But during this decade of your Institute's existence, the United States deployed more than 500,000 troops against Iraq in Operation Desert Storm and was also involved in military operations of a “peacekeeping” or “policing” nature in Lebanon, Libya, Grenada, and most recently Panama.

Meanwhile, the dramatic changes in the last two years—the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, the renewed independence of Eastern Europe's nations, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the reunification of Germany—have now seemingly eliminated any likelihood of a nuclear exchange among major powers. Yet those events have also lifted the lid of long-festering ethnic and national conflicts, not only in Eastern Europe. The world seems to be entering an era of escalating interethnic,

interreligious, and internecine civil conflicts from Yugoslavia to Nagorno-Karabakh to Kurdistan to Somalia.

So while the Cold War is over, there is no “new world order” in sight. If anything, there is a world of newly revealed disorder, a world in which proliferating weapons of mass destruction, cheap and easily accessible technologies of death and destruction, and a diffusion of arms sellers all around the world make the prospect of widespread conflict more likely than ever. Such conflicts are far less susceptible to even the unsatisfactory restraint previously exerted by the Cold War deterrent structure, which kept a kind of uneasy peace in the world for generations. Weapons are getting cheaper and more destructive and more available. Newly revealed, newly listened-to demands for self-determination among peoples long suppressed by empires and by the international state system—those demands are now intersecting with newly reawakened ethnic, tribal, and religious demands for sovereign identity. Add to these demands the growing pressures of environmental degradation, escalating poverty and disease, and competition for scarce resources, as well as the fact that there are still many old-fashioned tyrants in many parts of the world motivated by old-fashioned greed for power, tyrants who seek nothing more complicated than hegemony over their neighbors—it all makes for a depressing prospect for any idea of a “new world order.” As we approach the end of this century, we can see that we have survived horrible upheavals and bloodshed. We have seen the end of a Cold War that threatened to extinguish mankind. And now we look around and see a thousand sword cuts on the peace of the world, drawing blood at every turn.

Yet this decade has also witnessed the development and refinement of both new international institutions and old ones, new approaches to peacemaking and traditional ones. Deterrence has gone out of style, but it is still relevant. Traditional diplomatic agendas have not disappeared just because the traditional standoff between East and West has disappeared. The international system remains in many respects a nineteenth-century state system, and some of the balance-of-power principles that have produced uneasy periods of peace in the past are still worth thinking about. Arms-control treaties and alliances for collective security like NATO, traditional forms of diplomatic mediation and negotiation—none have become irrelevant. I submit that all of this is still quite relevant, for we are in a world of transition that will go on perhaps for generations, from the traditional state system to something better.

Yet many new ideas have sprouted during this decade, and they are beginning to take root. One of them is actually an old idea: the idea embodied now in the United Nations and earlier in the League of Nations

that our old-fashioned state system could be transformed into an effective system of collective security by a charter and by adherence to that charter by all the major governments of the world. For much of the post-World War II period, the idea that the UN could serve successfully as a collective security instrument for keeping the peace has been totally thwarted. The Cold War made it impossible for the UN Charter and the UN Security Council to function in the peace and security area as it was intended to function. Now the Cold War is over, and one of the benefits certainly has been a refocusing of attention on the Security Council and the Secretary General, and their respective roles as peacemakers and peacekeepers.

One should also take note of the way in which international law is evolving in and around this newly rejuvenated United Nations. An impressive framework of international law already exists. It is embodied in many multilateral instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Genocide Convention, and, of course, the UN Charter itself, together with many other documents. In the last five years, with the Cold War no longer thwarting every effort to bring the weight of world opinion behind those norms, international bodies have been able to focus the spotlight on the transgressions of individual states. The instruments of international law are beginning to bite. One positive by-product of the Gulf War is a breaking of new legal ground about humanitarian intervention. The protective cloak thrown by allied forces and the UN around the Kurds may well be a harbinger of a new and much more effective role for multilateral organizations. The world community may be less likely in the future to stop at an international border while tyrants within countries massacre their own people. Humanitarian intervention by United Nations peacekeeping and peace-enforcing troops on behalf of the conscience of the world, in chaotic situations like Somalia, is now becoming a real possibility for the first time. We are just at the beginning of the evolution of new law and new doctrine, and the Gulf War and its aftermath have stimulated a process at the United Nations that should not be underestimated. It is not merely a process of cloaking United States power under the mantle of an international organization. Rather it is applying American leadership in a new effort to use the instruments of the world community for the good of the world community.

With an active American leadership role, it was relatively easy to reach agreement among members of the Security Council to oppose Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. Such leadership also enabled the Council to send a peacekeeping force of unprecedented size to Cambodia; indeed, to take on responsibility for rebuilding that country out of the

ruins left by the Khmer Rouge a decade ago. These are both precedents that the UN must build on, must understand, must not exaggerate. They are, however, the beginnings of a renewed dedication to the principles embodied in international law and expressed collectively on behalf of the world community.

But while these more traditional trends were evolving in the past decade, there was also developing a number of promising different approaches in the new fields of peace research and conflict resolution. Evidence of that is right here, in the birth and evolution of institutions like yours, dedicated to research and education and training in new approaches toward the age-old problem of achieving peace. The 1980s were fertile years for spawning new institutions, teaching techniques, courses, and scholars. Peace research, which focuses on the causes and the prevention of war, had earlier developed in academia during the 1950s and 1960s, along with new developments in the behavioral sciences, psychiatry, psychology, anthropology, economics, law, and so forth. The field of conflict resolution focuses on a variety of systems and techniques for resolving conflicts of many kinds. It owes much to methods first developed in dealing with labor-management disputes, as well as to the Civil Rights movement, which had produced certain techniques now employed for the nonviolent resolution of conflict. It also owes something to the "alternate dispute resolution" procedures developed by the American Bar Association and to those early practitioners in psychology, psychiatry, and family therapy. This decade has truly been extraordinary as, amoeba-like, new disciplines and new institutions have been spun off during a period of danger and fear in the international system and growing fear, poverty, and despair in our domestic environment. While the world was slipping backward, the discipline that this Institute symbolizes was leaping forward.

Let me tick off a few of the extraordinary institutional developments in the field during the 1980s. In 1982 there was the founding of this Institute. Also in 1982 the National Institute for Dispute Resolution, a major private funder in this field, focused on the domestic dispute agenda. In 1983 the National Conference on Peace Making and Conflict Resolution was born, based here at George Mason since 1987. It had its first conference in Athens, Georgia, in 1983, and subsequent conferences in St. Louis, Denver, Montréal, and Charlotte, with as many as 1,000 people from 37 countries in attendance. A direct spin-off, conceived at Montréal, will be the first European conference on peacemaking and conflict resolution scheduled for April 24th of this year, in Turkey. Between 1983 and 1991, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation launched a major effort to develop and support conflict theory programs,

and put in substantial multiyear funding. By 1991 that program had expanded to 14 universities plus a Rand Corporation program. The universities include Colorado, George Mason, Georgia Tech, Georgia State, Harvard, MIT, Tufts, Simmons, Hawaii, Michigan, Minnesota, Northwestern, Penn State, Rutgers, Stanford, Syracuse, Wayne State, and Wisconsin. Also in 1983 the Program on Negotiation was founded at Harvard, and Roger Fisher began his famous campaign for "Getting to Yes." The National Association for Mediation and Education was also founded in 1983. Then, of course, in 1984, Congress, after decades of hard work by many people in this room, finally enacted legislation establishing the United States Institute of Peace, America's national institute of peacemaking. In 1987 the Carter Center in Atlanta established its International Negotiation Network, and former President Carter began what has become an extraordinary venture in unofficial mediation of conflicts around the world, drawing on other individuals of stature to assist him in this work, a work worthy of an ex-president. In 1988, George Mason added a Ph.D. program to its M.S. program, and that clearly is a landmark.

In addition to new research and educational institutions formed during this decade, many practitioner organizations were also created; NIDR counts more than 30 organizations now doing policy mediation. The ABA lists more than 700 community mediation centers, many of them connected with the courts. One such program is the D. C. Mediation Service, which mediates thousands of cases a year; another is the Northern Virginia Mediation Service, founded and operated out of this Institute. And courses in negotiation are now being offered in 50 percent of the accredited law schools around the United States. I could go on and on. There are so many institutions now that you have to have a directory of the directories of all the institutions and programs. One thing the United States Institute of Peace has been doing is to assist in supporting publication of some of these directories. And so, since 1980, both peace research as a discipline and conflict resolution theory and practice have achieved widespread professional recognition in the United States and abroad.

Yet one must say that they remain thus far largely untested on an international scale. Despite the proliferation of undergraduate peace-studies and dispute resolution programs in colleges and universities all over the nation (I think 300 peace-studies programs are now easily identifiable), many scholars continue to question whether peace research or conflict resolution are truly rigorous, coherent academic disciplines like history, international relations, or political science. And beyond the skepticism of academics, there is yet another question unanswered: How

much practical application to the real-life agenda of violence and bloodshed in the international system can these new academic disciplines provide? There remains enormous skepticism, particularly among government officials, among diplomats, those who, unlike Harold Saunders, have not seen the light. They wonder about this new field and whether it has anything truly useful to offer in the international arena. There certainly are many suggestive examples that demand much more research and evaluation in order to get over this skepticism. For example, the type of activity first labeled "Track II Diplomacy" by Joseph Montville warrants increased study and evaluation. There are numerous examples of unofficial contacts between adversaries that undergird the formal diplomacy carried on by the governments. These private or semi-official exchanges often have paved the way for formal negotiations to eventually succeed. Yet until quite recently there has been little systematic research or writing about the ways in which these unofficial, semi-diplomatic tracks operate.

Hal Saunders and I were talking about the gap just prior to this lecture. Since he retired from the Department of State in 1980 after a distinguished career, Hal has deeply immersed himself in unofficial Track II diplomacy in many continents and under many auspices. He can testify, as can I, about specific instances that attest to the crucial importance of this kind of work. For example, we were both centrally involved in the Carter administration's diplomacy, which led to the Camp David Accords and the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. The ingenious and innovative negotiating techniques employed by the American delegation at Camp David under President Carter's leadership have been subjected to extensive scholarly analysis, but one aspect of that diplomatic tour de force has received far too little attention. That is the "prenegotiation" process that went on for months before Sadat visited Jerusalem in November 1977. It was a kind of Track II diplomacy going on quietly behind the scenes between Israeli officials and Egyptian officials both directly and through private individuals as well as through leaders of other governments, like Romania and Iran. Had Moshe Dayan not gone in disguise to Morocco in September 1977 to meet with one of President Sadat's most intimate advisers and oldest friends, and had that meeting not convinced both sides that there was a "ripeness" for agreement hovering on the horizon, formal negotiations could never have subsequently succeeded.

In a later phase of the United States's role in the Arab-Israel peace process, we see another example. If private intermediaries had not gone back and forth between Stockholm and Tunis and Washington during 1988, I doubt that George Shultz would have reached the conclusion that

he and President Reagan should finally acknowledge that the Palestine Liberation Organization had adequately met long-standing United States conditions, which permitted the United States to initiate official contacts with the PLO.

And regarding another deep-seated conflict, had there not taken place, under the auspices of your Institute, quite unattributed meetings between leaders of various political currents in Northern Ireland (parenthetically, I should say, with the financial support of the United States Institute of Peace), the formal negotiations that subsequently took place would probably not have been possible.

One can go on down a long list of such Track II endeavors. There are many practitioners now in the United States and abroad of unofficial "supplementary diplomacy." Professor Herbert Kelman at Harvard carries on one variety in his "interactive, problem-solving workshops." A friend of mine who operates under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations has been engaging for some years in a delicate effort to lay the groundwork with the various parties for an eventual settlement of the central Arab-Israeli problems. The "Dartmouth Conference" was the unofficial precursor for arms-limitation agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States. Twenty years of informal "second track" discussions between United States and Soviet experts under the umbrella of that Dartmouth Conference laid the basis for what subsequently became the SALT I agreement and those East-West arms-control agreements that came later.

All of this "Track II" informal diplomacy is part of the broader conflict resolution field. Jim Laue likes to refer to it as part of the process of "getting to the table," but, in fact, laying this groundwork may take years before anybody is ready to think about coming to the table. Richard Haas and William Zartman have both written extensively about the "ripeness question"; that is, what elements must be present before an international conflict is ready for negotiation, much less resolution. The ripeness factor is extraordinarily important, yet as Hal Saunders has often pointed out, the task of the peacemaker is not just to sit under the tree and wait for the fig to get ripe and fall on your face. The task of the peacemaker is to help the ripening process, and it is in these informal contacts, out of the public eye, that ripening often occurs. This subject of prenegotiation is only one of many facets of the conflict resolution field in which the United States Institute of Peace has been quite active. We have made a number of grants, both for research and for the practical application of these principles, to organizations in this country and abroad.

That brings me to the United States Institute of Peace and to the evolution of its role in American society. Many of you probably know as much as I do about the history of our Institute. When the United States Institute of Peace Act finally became law in 1984, it was the end of a long road for nearly 60,000 patriotic, dedicated Americans. For more than a decade, a citizen lobby, organized as the National Peace Academy Campaign, under Bryant Wedge's inspired leadership and that of others like Jim Laue, had urged Congress to establish a National Peace Academy. Leading the way, Senators Jennings Randolph, Spark Matsunaga, and Mark Hatfield; congressmen like Dan Glickman; and many others fought hard for their goal and finally succeeded in overcoming the inertia of a legislative system that could not conceive at the height of the Cold War that something called a "Peace Academy" could be anything the American people should support. The weight of public opinion and these dedicated lobbyists for peace eventually prevailed. It had seemed like a remote possibility only three years earlier in 1981 when the Matsunaga Commission was established and initiated a year of public hearings on the proposal. To move from the Commission's recommendation to final adoption of our legislation in 1984 required not only tenacious lobbying by Peace Academy Campaign members but also skillful legislative tactics.

Many of you probably remember that after hearings were repeatedly held on the bill, still, somehow, the bill couldn't be brought to the Senate floor because of the opposition of certain conservative senators. Finally one day, Senator Hatfield passed the word to the majority leader, Senator Howard Baker, that "either you bring up the Peace Academy Bill or I'm going to attach it as an amendment to the Defense Authorization Act," then the business before the Senate. Baker protested that "this is not germane," but fortunately the Senate doesn't have a rule of germaneness. After a good deal more legislative jockeying, Senator Hatfield did indeed attach the bill to that Defense Authorization Act, thus making it essentially unvetoable. Eventually amended in conference to change the name from "Academy" to "Institute," the bill became law. The Reagan administration was not wildly enthusiastic about this outcome. Once the bill had been signed, it then took a year of maneuvering by friends in Congress to prevent it from being amended and effectively gutted by the State Department, the Office of Management and Budget, and the White House itself. But, eventually, the first board of directors was appointed and confirmed, and the board held its first meeting in February 1986.

As I have said to some people in this audience on other occasions, at that point it became apparent that a certain "disconnect" had occurred between the reality of what had been created and the dreams of those



who had fought so long for its creation. President Reagan appointed a board as close to his own conservative views as possible, and the people like Jim Laue, who should have been on that board, were not appointed. But, fortunately, he did appoint John Norton Moore as chairman. Under his extraordinary leadership, a board filled initially with many skeptics about the institution they were now empowered to direct was transformed over the course of the next three years into a strong, supportive body of men and women, thoroughly committed to the broad purposes of the United States Institute of Peace Act. If any one person deserves credit for the fact that the Institute is today very much a going concern, having surmounted the dangers of those early years, it is John Norton Moore, who served as our chairman until he resigned last spring.

The Institute is now in its seventh year of operations. Initially concentrating on financing high-quality research, we have now developed a broad range of other programs to reflect our full congressional mandate. This summer, for example, we will enter for the first time into the direct training area by launching our first high school teacher training institute here in Washington for teachers who have already been involved with us through our national Peace Essay Contest. The Institute has now developed a novel, state-of-the-art library program. It has launched special initiatives dealing with the ongoing Middle East crisis, with the need to promote the rule of law and democratic governance in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, and with the role of religion both in exacerbating international conflicts and in helping to resolve them. As one looks over the current list of Institute projects that are funded either through grants or through fellowships, or in which Institute staff members are involved directly through our own research and studies program, the breadth of subject matter is truly astounding. Our projects range far beyond conflict resolution theory as narrowly defined, though we have made numerous grants in that segment of our mandate. But we've run the gamut, a gamut that encompasses human rights and humanitarian issues; pacifism and peace movements; arms control; international law and arbitration; conflict resolution, both traditional and innovative; conflict management; negotiation training and negotiation techniques; domestic governance and rule of law; origins of conflict and violence—a range of subject matter explained only by the fact that the whole world is in our purview. We examine all aspects of international conflict: what produces it, and how it can be contained and, hopefully, eventually resolved on every continent.

We have now published seven books through our new Institute of Peace Press, the most recent a small book by a renowned political scientist Alexander George, who is one of our Distinguished Fellows this year. Titled *Forceful Persuasion*, it analyzes the process of what George calls

“coercive diplomacy,” a strategy to persuade an opponent peacefully to undo an aggressive act, and examines historical case studies of such actions. The book we published just previously could not have been more different. David Little's monograph on the *Ukraine, the Legacy of Intolerance* examines the role of clerical struggles in the Ukraine, the interaction of those struggles with Ukrainian history, present and future, and the prospects for peaceful resolution of such conflicts in the Ukraine's future.

Many of you know that one of the earliest Institute efforts was to “map the peace field”—to try to look at all various approaches toward peacemaking. From that project we published *Approaches to Peace, an Intellectual Map*, which, while not exhaustive, has clearly made an important academic contribution and has been adopted by a number of peace-studies programs in universities around the country.

When I begin to speak about the Institute, I am apt to go on too long about the rich variety of our programs, so I had better not continue with this litany. Let me just say, however, that as we have now completed our first six years of operations, we have demonstrated the capability to make a genuine intellectual contribution to the United States government's peacemaking efforts, without overstepping our mandate to be objective, to stay out of the policy process, and to avoid in any way impinging on the responsibilities of the State Department or other agencies of the United States government. We serve the public, and we are responsible to Congress. Though we are independent of the executive branch, we take seriously as part of our mission the need to help both Congress and the executive branch agencies understand better how peace can be achieved, what lessons one can draw from the successes and failures of the past, and what are our policy choices for peacemaking in this new post-Cold War age.

In the largest sense, we are an educational institution. Our educational targets are many: our own government, foreign governments, our public, our schools, and, to some degree, ourselves and yourselves. We are an important part of the new, creative network of institutions that has sprung up during the 1980s and that is seeking to bring conflict resolution and peacemaking into the center ring of American priorities. Let me mention some other examples of our work. A year ago we sponsored a conference on Ethnic Conflict Resolution Under the Rule of Law. For that we brought nearly 60 East European leaders to Washington for three days and exposed them to a wide variety of experts, both American and foreign, on democratic government, on electoral systems, on mediation, and on conflict resolution techniques. The conference helped them

establish their own informal network, which then resulted in a follow-up conference in Europe, which they organized themselves. We have made several grants to train negotiators and mediators in some of the new post-Soviet republics. We want to see to what extent these Western techniques are applicable to those age-old disputes of a tribal and ethnic nature that are currently plaguing that region. Our program on religion, ethics, and human rights, which I earlier described, directed by David Little, is examining religion as a source of intolerance and conflict as well as a potential source of conflict resolution. Dr. Little and an expert working group are investigating seven country case studies. We have already published their conclusions about Ukraine. Sri Lanka, Sudan-Nigeria, Lebanon, Tibet, and Israel are yet to come. These are only a few examples of our Institute's direct involvement in the conflict resolution field.

The challenge for our work, and also for your work, is to make theory truly relevant in practice. That is the challenge that I want to leave with you tonight. All of this good work I have been describing is going on here and in many other institutions, but down there in the State Department, and in the White House, they are not paying any attention. Historically, all of us—the peace movement, the conflict resolution community, and the fine citizens who helped create the United States Institute of Peace—have tended to say: “We need to change public attitudes toward peace and war; then our government will respond.” I would like to suggest that you and we modify that approach. I believe we must concentrate our efforts more on the players, not only on the crowd. To do that—to influence the players, the people involved in negotiating on behalf of our country—we all need to find better ways to demonstrate that the theories are effective guides to action; that beyond mere good will and some examples of what conflict resolution techniques can do to resolve labor disputes or domestic disputes, our ideas can help avoid international conflict; that our theories can be applied to the bloody world of conflict that the policymakers and the diplomats confront.

I have to say, in all candor, that up to this point it is not being demonstrated. It is not demonstrated by organizing a few “interactive workshops” that bring Palestinians and Israelis together year after year but that do not demonstrably affect the attitudes of their leaders. It is not being demonstrated to be more than just a good thing to do. We need to find ways to test our theories against the tough, international issues that the policy community and the traditional diplomats must wrestle with.

Our Institute is going to try to do that this summer. In mid-July the United States Institute of Peace will host a three-day conference here in Washington, titled “Dialogues on Conflict Resolution: Bridging Theory

and Practice.” I hope many of you will take part, either as participants or in the audience. We are going to gather some of the best theorists and practitioners of conflict-resolution techniques, put them together with international-relations and area specialists and with veteran diplomats to examine five current, difficult international conflict cases. The cases will be Kashmir, Mozambique, Peru, Yugoslavia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. In plenary sessions and in smaller workshops, we will provide an opportunity for practitioners, area experts, and traditional negotiators to listen to the theorists and then join with them to try to apply the theories to these cases. I believe this kind of effort should be done over and over again. It needs to be done with the theoreticians, but, more importantly, it needs to be done with people who are unfamiliar with the theory but who have the power to act. Perhaps by working together in this way we can truly advance the conflict resolution field.

The United States Institute of Peace has one foot in government and one foot in the world of scholarship. We have total freedom to do what we think can advance the cause of peace, so long as we do not interfere with the official responsibilities of the executive branch. We can work with institutions like yours and with many others to try to build this bridge between theory and practice, build it toward the center of the Department of State. Unless your theories can achieve a bridgehead within governments, all the creative simulations and workshops and second-track diplomacy will have minimal impact in the face of the imperative of the traditional diplomatic state system. I am talking here about a revolution, but this is a revolution that must start near the top if it is to succeed. Join with us in your next decade. Accept this as your challenge to translate theory into practice on the tough international agenda that lies before us. We will be with you. Let us do it together.