Faculty Research

In considering the very limited contact between North Korea and the West since the end of the Korean war, the negotiation on Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programs in 1994 offers a unique opportunity to analyze North Korean negotiation strategies. Though the agreements failed to be implemented, the outcome of the negotiation prevented another major military confrontation in the Korean peninsula a decade ago. Despite the dramatic nature of the event, few attempts have been made to undertake serious academic research on the negotiation process beyond journalistic accounts.

In approaching North Korean negotiating behavior, we can examine the values, norms and perceptions of the foreign policy elite in understanding their strategies at the negotiation table. Often an uncompromising North Korean bargaining position has proven to be a challenging issue to Western diplomats. Particular bargaining strategies can be explained in terms of negotiation culture. A conceptual understanding of North Korean behavior and motives will contribute to a better management of the current conflict.

Linking Culture to Negotiation Behavior

Culture, broadly defined as a set of shared meanings, is an important factor in understanding the process of negotiation (Cohen, 1991). According to one observation, Westerners tend to make unnecessary offenses in impending agreements by underestimating the foundation of their partners’ attitudes (Plantey, 1982). Culture reflects conceptions of the world, and it can be embodied in symbols. Values are important standards used to evaluate the meanings and significance of events and objects. Thus culture helps people perpetuate knowledge and communicate with others. Professional and organizational norms can also prescribe proper approaches to resolving differences. In this sense, the negotiating culture “is a blend of civilizational, ethnic, national and professional experiences magnified by the individual's cultural background” (Kremenyuk, 1993: 48).

According to Fisher, culture impinges on negotiation in several ways. It conditions one’s perception of reality, blocks out information inconsistent with culturally grounded assumptions, projects meaning onto the other party’s words and actions, and interprets others’ motives (Fisher, 1988). Studies on negotiation culture have examined negotiators’ behavior in various settings, including international business deals. Early research on the impact of culture on diplomatic relations focused on the role of incompatible languages and nonverbal communication in negotiations between the US and Japan (Kunihiro, 1972), cross cultural differences in a whole range of historical US-Japanese negotiations (Destler, et al. 1976), the interaction between Soviet and Japanese negotiating tendencies in a study of fisheries talks (Kimura, 1980), and a Swedish perspective on intercultural problems in aid negotiations with Tanzania (Elgstrom, 1990). Comparative studies have also been conducted on American, French, Japanese, and Mexican assumptions about the nature of the negotiating encounter, the importance of form, hospitality, and protocol, the choice of delegates, decision making style, methods of persuasion, and linguistic conventions (Fisher, 1988).

The choice of bargaining strategies, including presentation of positions, composition of proposals, exchange of concessions, and preparedness for compromise acquire certain cultural characteristics (Brett, et. al., 1998). Most research in the field generates the observation that while some negotiating cultures are complementary, actual negotiations can be hindered by linguistic, behavioral, and tactical dissonance (Anand, 1981). Different governing principles of organizations across hierarchical and horizontal cultures may explain manipulative or cooperative approaches to changing environments. For instance, some argue that since the Japanese are skeptical of the value of elaborate ploys and stratagems, they believe that it is sufficient enough to convey the justice of their position as accurately as possible.

Some researchers stress the significance of a professional negotiation culture which has a transnational nature (Sunshine, 1990). Negotiators embrace certain values, basic beliefs, norms and customs which fit in a standardized analytical approach. Such professional culture may be traced back to training processes where diplomats are exposed to standard theories and practice. Though the commonalities are tempered by sectoral, institutional, and national cultures, negotiators tend to develop habits, assumptions, and selective perceptions oriented toward certain problem solving approaches.

While the existing literature offers some conceptual understanding, a comprehensive survey finds that research on culture in negotiation was developed in isolation from the mainstream field, and still remains a poorly defined area (Gelfand, 1996: 24). Most work is largely descriptive, and there is no systematic way of explaining differences in tactics with cultural variables. Various types of simulations and bargaining experiments identify differences in the adoption of such negotiation tactics as interruption and reciprocation across cultures (Adler, et al., 1992). However, many laboratory experiments have been done on an ad hoc basis. They produced no cumulative theory of cultural characteristics which can be generalized. Overall, consensus does not seem to exist on which cultural factors are more important in understanding different negotiation strategies.

Given that the broad generalization of the concept of negotiation culture has a limited capacity in explaining specific patterns of behavior, it would be helpful if we put an emphasis on how negotiators’ perception and norms interpreted from their belief systems affect negotiation strategies. Norms and values of political elites serve as important variables to understand negotiation strategies of authoritarian countries like North Korea whose public have little impact on policy making. Behavior can be understood in terms of the interaction between specific situations and subjective cultural elements such as values, norms, and attitudes. In this context, negotiation culture helps explain how negotiators’ goals and cognition affect tactics and outcomes.

North Korean Negotiation Culture and Strategies

In considering the typical patterns of their diplomatic responses to major crises, we can identify Pyongyang’s negotiation strategies. The leadership’s perception of power in international relations influences the rationale behind the selection of ends and means. Rather than applying general categories of cultural patterns broadly defined along such lines as being individualistic and collectivist (Gelfand, 1996), this research will focus on belief systems and professional values which affect perceptions of North Korean negotiators. By avoiding an over-generalized conceptualization of culture, this approach can offer a North Korean negotiation model which can be useful in interpreting specific situations.

An understanding of North Korean culture can be, in part, based on a conceptual construct derived from “Juche” ideology. Juche ideology has served as the governing principle of the country over the last several decades. It emphasizes self-reliance and anti-imperialism while reflecting on the egalitarian ideas of communism. The ideology has been used to explain their struggles against US intervention in the Korean war as well as the brutal Japanese occupation before and during World War II (Hunter, 1999). In the midst of the collapse of their traditional ally system, it still has a dominant impact on many aspects of North Korean society and offers the guiding principles for top political elites to give meaning to external events (Jeong, 1999). In fact, their refusal to accept such conditions as reconciliation with South Korea for US economic aid, in the midst of famine, reflects their long standing self-reliance principle which emphasizes resistance to foreign pressure.

The behavior of North Korean policy makers can also be explained in terms of their professional norms. Given the lack of public input into government policies, the top leadership has the final authority on major issues. Therefore, it is important to focus on the elements of North Korean negotiation culture which may influence the perceptions of foreign policy making elites. At the same time, institutional norms and interests cannot be ignored in the highly bureaucratic policy making process of North Korea. In contrast with the military and communist party ideologues opposing conciliatory postures toward the West, foreign ministry officials and economic bureaucrats tend to support less confrontational approaches.

According to some informal accounts, North Korean diplomats are believed to be well trained and have sophisticated manners and communication skills. Their style is often contrasted with the rigid image of the regime ruled by the communist party. Many North Korean foreign policy experts have concentrated on specific issues and countries for a number of years. Some of them, as trusted advisors, serve as a window on the outside world for the top leader. Given their training in analytical skills, they seem to have a less difficult time in reformulating their perceptions with changes in the international environment.

Negotiation over the North Korean Nuclear Programs

During the 1994 negotiation on the nuclear weapons programs, Pyongyang adopted both contentious and cooperative strategies in response to evolving conflict situations. The threats from the US government to impose economic sanctions were followed by the North Korean counter threat to escalate the crisis into a major war in the peninsula. Former US President Carter’s visit to North Korea and his respect for the North Korean top leader offered face saving ways for Pyongyang to go back to the negotiation table. The North Korean negotiation position was, to a considerable degree, softened by the US agreement to delay negotiation sessions during the mourning period for their leader Kim Il Sung as well as other sensitive reactions by the US government, including President Clinton’s condolence message to Pyongyang.

The significance of self-righteousness, national self-image, and honor in North Korean negotiation culture can explain their resistance to mere pressure that is not accompanied by concessionary measures. Compared with other countries in power imbalance situations, Pyongyang seems to be more resilient to pressures from the other side, and be more willing to use confrontational strategies in crisis bargaining situations. The threat from a dominant power is likely to reinforce enemy images of their negotiation partners.

Difficulties in reaching an early settlement can be attributed to the North Korean refusal to negotiate from positions of weakness. In this situation, the hardening of their bargaining positions appears to be a strategic choice. On the other hand, proposals containing reciprocal concessions may more easily convince the leadership to switch to problem solving strategies. Self-respect and secure feelings are important to North Korean elites who face a hostile international environment. Face saving measures, therefore, are imperative especially in a crisis situation. In considering their expertise and knowledge, North Korean foreign policy elites are believed to be more interested in pragmatic approaches than dogmatic ideological positions. Their willingness to agree to freezing the nuclear programs in return for the US promise to build light water reactors reflects their sense of fairness, need for compromise, and ability to develop creative options.

References

Adler, N. J., et al. (1992), “Strategy Implementation: A Comparison of Face-to- Face Negotiations in the People’s Republic of China and the United States,” Strategic Management Journal. Vol. 13. pp. 449-466.
Anand, R. P. ed. (1981). Cultural Factors in International Relations. New Delhi: Abinhav.

Brett, J. et al. (1998). “Culture and Joint Gains in Negotiation,” Negotiation Journal, Vol. 14, No. 1.
Cohen, R. (1991) Negotiating Across Cultures: Communication Obstacles in International Diplomacy.
Cumings, Bruce (1981). The Origins of the Korean War. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Destler, I. M., et al. (1976). Managing an Alliance: The Politics of US-Japanese Relations. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.

Elgstrom, O. (1992), Foreign Aid Negotiation: The Swedish-Tanzanian Aid Dialogue. Aldershot, UK: Avebury.

Fisher, G. (1988). Mindsets. Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press. Gelfand, M. (1996). “The Influence of Culture on Negotiation: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Framework,” Unpublished paper.

Hunter, H. (1999). Kim Il-Song’s North Korea. Westport: Praeger.

Jeong, H. (1999). “Analysis of Conflict between South and North Korea,” Issues and Perspectives, George Mason University, September.

Kihl, Young and P. Hayes (1997). Peace and Security in Northeast Asia. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.

Kimura, H. (1980). “Soviet and Japanese Negotiating Behavior: the Spring 1977 Fisheries Talks,” Orbis, Vol. 24. pp. 43-67.

Kremenyuk, V. A. (1993). “A Pluralistic Viewpoint,” in Olivier, F. and J. Rubin. Culture and Negotiation. London: Sage, pp. 47-56.

Kunihiro, M. (1972), “US-Japan Communications,” in H. Rosovsky, ed. Discord in the Pacific: Challenges to the Japanese-American Alliance. Washington, D.C.: Columbia. pp. 155-172.

Lee, S. (1994). The Nuclear Question and US Policy on the Korean Peninsula. Seoul: Hangil Publishing Co.
Mazarr, M. J. (1995) North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Paige, G. (1968). The Korean Decision. New York: The Free Press.
Plantey, A. (1982). “A Cultural Approach to International Negotiation,” International Social Science Journal. Vol. 93, pp. 535-543.

Sigal, L. (1998). Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Smith, H. (1996). North Korea in the New World Order. London: Macmillan Press.

Sunshine, R. (1990). Negotiating for International Development: A Practioner’s Handbook. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.