Next Up in Somalia’s Fragile Transition: Bridge Political Divides

On Feb. 9, Somalia’s parliament finally endorsed a Cabinet, 66 members strong, after Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke had failed in two previous attempts in January 2015 to present a list that could appease all of the country’s fractious clan leaders and political players. Sharmarke is President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s third premier since taking office in September 2012—a product of consistent bickering between Somalia's top leaders over their respective powers and responsibilities.

With only two years left in the government’s mandate, expectations are high that it can work with all stakeholders in Somalia and complete an ambitious post-conflict transition plan known as Vision 2016. Developed by the international community and the Somali government in order to keep Somalia on track and avoid the delays that transitional governments had previously encountered in making political progress, the plan includes finalizing and forming the boundaries of Somalia’s various autonomous regions, known as Federal Member States; revising and organizing a referendum on a provisional constitution; and holding national elections in 2016. Whether Somalia can complete these goals rests significantly upon its ability to improve cooperation across the board on key political challenges and close security gaps across the country.

Lack of political cooperation in Somalia continues to hamper opportunities to capitalize on gains made against the militant group al-Shabab in the past two years. Beating back al-Shabab has opened up space for long overdue political reforms, especially a contentious federalism process to divide power between the federal government in Mogadishu and emerging regional administrations. But that has also raised the political stakes in an already divided country.

The president, prime minister, regional administrations and various other political actors are all seeking to maximize their power and influence, often using outside support from Kenya, Ethiopia and among Arab Gulf countries—notably the United Arab Emirates and Oman—to boost their respective positions. This has made it exceedingly difficult to reach consensus on key issues and craft a “Somali solution” to problems as they arise.

Puntland and other regional administrations, for example, recognize the federal government as legitimate, but coordination with Mogadishu has been hampered by allegations that the federal government has failed to tackle corruption, share national resources fairly and consult outside the president’s inner circle on important political issues.

There are also serious tensions at the subnational level. Puntland and the emerging Interim Central State Administration, consisting of the Mudug and Galgaduud regions, are engaged in a serious dispute over their border. While a 1993 peace agreement during Somalia’s civil war partitioned the administration of the region largely along clan lines, there are conflicting views about whether the provisional constitution allows any region to be split now between two administrations. In addition, the Interim Jubba Administration is still at loggerheads with political leaders in Gedo region and some clan communities over the inclusivity of its administration and the behavior of its security forces in the southern port city of Kismayo.

In order to resolve these disputes, there have been several ad hoc reconciliation talks organized by different parties, including the federal government, clan elders and the international community. However, the solutions have not been workable due to the exclusion of key parties or a lack of enforcement mechanisms for any agreement. More important, even if political stakeholders can agree on a political pathway forward, the tenuous security situation in Mogadishu and elsewhere will play a huge part in whether Somali leaders can carry out their aspirations on the ground.

Al-Shabab may have lost control of key cities such as Kismayo and Barawe, but the group has used its presence or control along the country’s main roads to inhibit travel and often block aid from reaching government-controlled areas. And it can still stage high-profile, deadly operations, evidenced by its Feb. 20 attack on a hotel in Mogadishu that killed 25 people.

Improved security will also be necessary for successful national elections planned in 2016. Registering voters and setting up polling stations will be difficult if travel between major cities remains unsafe or if guerrilla attacks continue in urban areas. The legitimacy of elections will also be in doubt if large cross-sections of the population cannot vote because they live in areas still controlled by al-Shabab, like the entirety of Middle Jubba region.

Many armed groups opposed to al-Shabab, meanwhile, remain outside the federal government’s authority, too. That has pushed the federal government into signing security agreements with Puntland and Jubba, along with the Sufi militia Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a, aimed at integrating the country’s disparate forces into the national army. But success is a long way off. Recent fighting between national forces and the Sufi militia in Galgaduud region, among other flashpoints, show how unsuccessful integration has been to date. The inability of Somalia’s various armed groups to coordinate their fight with both the army and the more than 22,000 troops under command of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has stalled efforts against al-Shabab in recent months.

Beyond those security challenges, much of Somalia’s political progress will hinge upon how it addresses a looming political crisis in 2016 when the mandate of the current government ends. If the provisional constitution holds, Somalis will be able to elect members of the lower house and the yet to be formed upper house of parliament, both of which will then elect a president. Yet it is unlikely that political leaders will be able to agree and implement electoral procedures such as electoral laws and voter registration by then. Many observers expect that the government’s mandate may be extended—as it was multiple times for previous transitional administrations—to buy time for a more credible transfer of power.

Unless stakeholders in Puntland, Jubba and other areas of the country are properly engaged on options for 2016, key actors outside Mogadishu who are central to the federalism process’ success could refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of a central government with an expired or extended mandate. That could put the entire political transition’s legitimacy in jeopardy. To forestall such a disaster, the international community must continue to encourage Somali stakeholders to reach a political consensus and implement its terms effectively. The nomination this week of a U.S. ambassador to Somalia for the first time since the early 1990s is a positive sign. But if these issue aren't addressed, Somalia risks descending once again into crisis.

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Cleophus Tres Thomas III is a political and security analyst who runs the blog Somalia Newsroom. He is a doctoral candidate at George Mason University’s School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution.