A conceptual model of worldview conflict is developed and applied to the negotiation transcripts from the 1993 standoff between the Branch Davidian sect and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Through categorization, analogical thinking, and storytelling, human beings negotiate shared symbolic realities that are enacted in their social institutions. Worldview conflicts occur when people who do not share a symbolic reality and, consequently, grant authority to competing social institutions must nevertheless cooperate to accomplish specific tasks.
The emergent discipline of conflict analysis and resolution has typically tried to set aside worldview differences between conflicting parties. Those who would act as third party intervenors in conflict are urged to help the parties focus on their underlying needs or interests and not their worldview differences. However, needs- or interest-based processes fail to address conflicts where the parties do not share a similar worldview. Such parties cannot even cooperatively name their conflict, the first step toward resolving any dispute.
The author describes five areas of worldview differences that may, in various combinations, create conflicts. People may experience worldview conflicts over: what is real or true, how one knows about what is real or true, what is valuable or important, how the world is organized, or the proper way to act in relation to reality. The model is illustrated with examples of conflict from various levels of social organization--interpersonal, intergroup, and international.
The model is tested against the negotiation transcripts from the Waco standoff. The FBI claims the Waco negotiations failed because the hostage rescue team (HRT) undercut the negotiation process, the FBI command structure was flawed, and the Branch Davidians were irrational. The author demonstrates that the negotiations in Waco were not simply disrupted by the actions of others. The FBI negotiators were not trained to recognize or work with worldview conflicts. Hence, they were poorly equipped to negotiate with members of an apocalyptic community. The FBI and the Branch Davidians, never cooperatively framed their conflict and, hence, could not design a process for resolving their standoff peacefully. The study concludes with lessons for improving the crisis negotiation practices employed by police.