AfPak: Will the New U.S. Strategy Succeed?

Writers describe the tribal region along the borders between Afghanistan and Pakistan as al-Qaeda Central. President Obama’s strategy for rooting out international terrorism aligns with this view. The Obama administration is presently mulling over its exit from Iraq, and shifting its focus to Afghanistan and Pakistan. In addition to announcing an initial surge of 17,000 US troops, a request for 70,000 more is likely to be entertained in the coming months. South Asian analysts view the surge as a reinforcement of realpolitik embedded in the Bush Doctrine; however, President Obama’s grand strategy acknowledges the importance of development and diplomacy in dealing with the two South Asian states, both mired in intense political and economic instability. Development can transform a conflict environment. Diplomacy is equally critical and should be the benchmark of U.S. military and development intervention in the region.

President Obama calls his strategy AfPak. He believes that the problem of terrorism flows from one country to the other, and that the solution lies in stabilizing both states. Stability is indeed key to addressing terrorism. In the conflict resolution lexicon, stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan would be understood as a “positive peace” whereby the cessation of direct physical violence is accompanied by transformation in structural and cultural sources of conflict. Strengthening governance structures and building the capacity of grassroots communities would be integral to the establishment of “positive peace” in the region.

AfPak has been welcomed by various quarters for incorporating a develoment approach with military security. Conflict analysts would concur that the denial of basic human needs often lies at the roots of an intractable conflict. In this light, AfPak proffers a sound formula. Troop deployment to enforce peace in the region shall be supplemented by development and reconstruction in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal districts: infrastructure would be built and jobs would be created, local industries and livelihood shall be revived, and access to education and health care shall be ensured. Socioeconomic and political uplift of local communities would prevent recruitment in al-Qaeda’s rank and file Al-Qaeda would no longer find sanctuary among the presently alienated indigenous communities. Could this work? Yes. And no.

While President Obama presents a relatively sound prescription for peace in the region, there are gaps in his intervention plan. The President may find it a challenge to mobilize resources required to build peace in Afghanistan. Practically, this would mean rebuilding a whole country. Similarly, Pakistan’s border regions would require high levels of sustained funding. Assuming that President Obama is able to muster support on the scale of the Marshall Plan from the EU and the G-20, could AfPak succeed? Unlikely.

There are lacunae in AfPak that hinder its success. The plan must engage primary stakeholders in planning, decision-making, and implementation. Close communication, coordination, and cooperation between government officials are essential ingredients missing from U.S. intervention in the region.

Conflict resolution theory brings into sharp focus the need for intervention coordination. In this case, intervention coordination would entail confidence-building measures between governments to address the deficit of trust. US military strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan are not generally planned in collaboration, and are often protested by governments in the two states. This contributes to conflict escalation as state sovereignty and legitimacy are undermined. Collateral damage and internal and external displacement generate resentment for the United States and sympathy for al-Qaeda. The relationship between the Afghan and Pakistan governments is also marked by mutual suspicion. For effective intervention coordination, all sides would need to work together in sharing information, situational analysis, and planning and implementing military operations. Ultimately, the engagement of US-led NATO troops in the region should be phased out and replaced by U.N. peacekeepers with the right mandate.

AfPak must also consider the importance of empowering and re-integrating all ethnic groups in Afghanistan, including the Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and others. Working closely with moderate Taliban factions can mitigate the terrorist threat significantly. Initiating a dialogue with radical Taliban elements could be explored through bridge-builders similar to international goodwill ambassadors. Reconciliation and power-sharing should underpin the development of democratic institutions. Shura (consultation) by tribal councils, an indigenous dispute resolution mechanism, offers opportunities for participatory development processes. Integrating tribal communities in Pakistan with the mainstream is equally important. In order for AfPak to succeed, close coordination and collaboration with the local civil society is imperative. Networking with NGOs (non-governmental organizations) and INGDOs (international non-governmental development organizations) would be helpful in this regard.

Promoting linkages between the Afghan and Pakistan governments and the NGOs and INGDOs, to plan and implement development projects, is a role the US could play effectively. Supporting partnerships between CBOs (community-based organizations), NGOs, and government organizations would make the plan more cost-effective, facilitate participatory approaches, and increase the sustainability of development initiatives. AfPak should also consider international trade opportunities for Afghanistan and Pakistan as a means of generating revenue for development. This would be a viable substitute for development aid. Lifting US trade barriers and advocating regional trade agreements can boost local industries and create jobs. Economic cooperation with India, Russia, Iran, Central Asian Republics, and China would pave the way for better regional integration and would ultimately benefit all actors. Trade with Pakistan and Afghanistan would build economic stakes in the stability of the two states across the region. NGOs from neighboring states could also be involved in development projects in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, providing an added incentive to cooperate in building a peaceful environment.

AfPak’s emphasis on development strategies is commendable; however, the greater challenge lies in the realization that development must come from within. In the final analysis, Washington’s success will be gauged by a shift in South Asian narratives, whereby the U.S. is positioned as a mediator, a benefactor, and a harbinger of peace.