Proximity Talks Should be Maximized
Ph.D. Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University
MA, Journalism with Specialization in Political Science , Charles University
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U.S. Vice President Joe Biden visit to the region came to encourage a new round of indirect talks, or “proximity talks” between Israel and the Palestinians. Israel’s announcement to built 1600 new homes in East Jerusalem during Biden’s visit came as a blow to the U.S. efforts to advance the talks. The Israeli announcement angered the Palestinians for they agreed to the indirect talks with Israel under a U.S. sponsorship and with a nod from the Arab League.
It is worth noting that the Israelis and the Palestinians, in recent years, had repeatedly failed to reach any agreement through direct negotiations. The latest example came following the Annapolis Conference in 2007. The conference allowed direct talks between the two sides, but it failed because of the Israeli government weakness, and the Palestinian disunity.
Proximity talks are perhaps the most useful tool at this point to advance the peace process forward. Proximity talks are designed to bring the Israelis and the Palestinians closer on core issues, such as borders, status of Jerusalem and refugees. It will also level the playing field between the two parties. In this proximity talks, the U.S. acts as the third party to empower the weaker party and help the stronger party to come to terms with the proposed agreement. The problem with this method of conducting negotiation, is that the U.S. is unlikely to be impartial when it comes to the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Vice President Biden’s latest statement in Israel that the U.S. and Israel are “inseparable” stands against the principle of an impartial third-party.
According to Gershon Baskin, head of the Israel-Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI), U.S. Middle East envoy George Mitchell will act as the mediator in these talks by framing and carrying the messages between the parties and create a “single-text draft” agreement between the parties. Baskin believes that this method is “actually very positive. Israelis and Palestinians often misunderstand each other. They speak in code and have a full range of sensitivities that escape the awareness and understanding of the other side.”
For the Palestinians, the indirect talks would allow them the opportunity to clearly communicate their vision of a peace deal without feeling intimidated by the stronger party, Israel. Thus, Senator Mitchell’s experience as a seasoned negotiator will come in handy in this complex conflict. This will also help the Palestinians and the Israelis move beyond their un-compromizable issues.
Mitchell, however, should refrain from making the goal of the proximity talks to start direct negotiations. Instead, Washington should seize the momentum to reach a comprehensive plan based on an agreement reached during these talks. Nonetheless, if Mitchell’s goal was to start direct talks four months latter, then the process would be a step-backward from whatever the two parties would achieve during the proximity talks. The negotiation would again fall in the trap of powerless Palestinians and powerful Israelis equation. Instead of attempting to reach a compromise, the two sides would engage in another cycle of dictating their demands, and as a result the negotiations will break down again.
The Palestinians believe that the U.S. is the only viable party that can mediate between them and the Israelis. However, the success of Mitchell’s task depends on how much support U.S. President Barack Obama will throw behind him. Skeptics in the region cite U.S. domestic issues and the upcoming congressional elections as a diversion from peace-making. For President Obama, who started his presidency by appointing Mitchell and immediately engage both Arabs and the Israelis in an effort to restart negations, is a proof that this administration is determined to move the peace process to a fruitful end.
*Rawhi Afaghani is a writer and a Middle East analyst based in Washington, DC.
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