A Field Whose Time Has Come

During the early 1980s, S-CAR’s founding director, Dr. Bryant Wedge, MD, often commented that ours was a field whose time had come. I have revisited that proposition several times since, each time wondering how Bryant – a prescient observer of the human condition and of the times – would interpret certain developments (e.g., the end of the Cold War) in light of this sentiment. Consequently, when I read the op-ed article by Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani on, "Time to Engage: Iran's New Approach to the World," published in The Washington Post on 20 September 2013, I wondered, putting myself in Bryant’s shoes, what, if anything, the op-ed might say about where the field of conflict analysis and resolution is, at least in the thinking of the recently elected president of a country that Israel and the U.S. have threatened to go to war against to prevent from further developing its nuclear energy program.

 President Rouhani’s message begins with his "pledge to engage in constructive interaction with the world."  This theme reflects a core component of conflict resolution, i.e., that effective problemsolving depends on developing a collaborative working relationship with others, including those with whom we might have been, or still are in conflict. An early proponent of this view, Morton Deutsch (1973), framed it as a cooperative approach to conflict resolution, often with constructive outcomes, which is a vast improvement on the more commonly used competitive approaches, often associated with destructive outcomes. This divide in conflict handling reflects a larger philosophical overlay -- the tension between two major paradigms in international relations -- that plays a significant role in Rouhani’s narrative.

 In explaining the reason underlying his pledge, therefore, President Rouhani argues: "The world has changed. International Relations is no longer a zero-sum game but a multi-dimensional arena where cooperation and competition often occur simultaneously." Accordingly, "World leaders are expected to turn threats into opportunities." President Rouhani then initiates the process of making his main case, which is that policymakers – especially those concerned about Iran’s nuclear energy program – must undergo a paradigm shift from the traditional security paradigm that encourages competitive, zero-sum thinking and behavior, toward a more appropriate comprehensive security paradigm which recognizes the utility of cooperative, “win-win” approaches to “integrative agreements” (see Pruitt,1987).  Paradigm-shifting implies a need to reframe one’s perceptions of “the other” and the narratives that each constructs to reflect those transformed definitions of the situation.

Building on the paradigm-shift thesis, President Rouani argues that, "The international community faces many challenges in this new world -- terrorism, extremism, foreign military interference, drug trafficking, cyber-crime and cultural encroachment -- all within a framework that has emphasized hard power and the use of brute force." Here, he suggests that a disconnect exists between the traditional security paradigm and what I call the "Global Problematique" – the system of complex, interconnected global problems that no one country or international organization can deal with adequately on its own, but only by collaborating with others (see Sandole 2010, and Muzafer Sherif [1967] on “superordinate goals”).  

President Rouhani’s comment that, "We must pay attention to the complexities of the issues at hand to solve them" (emphasis added) reinforces his emphasis on the need for a shift in paradigms and corresponding reframing of issues in order to advance the goal of "constructive engagement." Further, his argument that, "In a world where global politics is no longer a zero-sum game, it is -- or should be -- counterintuitive to pursue one's interests without considering the interests of others," implies that a corollary of constructive engagement is that “national interest” is now “global interest” and, contrariwise, global interest is national interest.

Rouhani’s claim that constructive engagement "doesn't mean relinquishing one's rights [but] engaging with one's counterparts on the basis of equal footing and mutual respect, to achieve shared concerns and achieve shared objectives” (emphasis added), restates one of the basic tenets of our field; namely, that one does not have to forgo one’s objectives, but only reconsider the utility of the anticipated use of violence to achieve them. Rouhani’s argument here also converges with Basic Human Needs (BHNs) Theory, particularly as advanced by John Burton (1997).

For Rouhani, win-win outcomes are not just favorable but also achievable in a world in which mutual respect is valued. A zero-sum, competitive, Cold War mentality leads to everyone's loss -- a perpetual, escalating “security dilemma” where all actors are worse off than they were before their last round of action-reaction decisionmaking. Hence, Rouhani's comment that, given  American “unilateralism” and, correspondingly, adherence to the traditional security paradigm, "Security is pursued at the [zero-sum] expense of the insecurity [sic] of others, with disastrous consequences."

Rouhani reiterates his position that America’s adherence to the traditional security paradigm (as expressed in its unilateralism) is incompatible with effective problemsolving at the global level: "The unilateral approach, which glorifies brute force and breeds violence, is clearly incapable of solving issues we all face, such as terrorism and extremism. I say all because nobody is immune to extremist-fueled violence, even though it might rage thousands of miles away. Americans woke up to this reality 12 years ago." Here, Rouhani again makes implicit reference to the "Global Problematique," which Americans are still not addressing adequately even 12 years after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. On that fateful day, 19 young men completely undermined the validity of the core proposition of the traditional security paradigm articulated in 416 BC by Athenian negotiators during the Melian Debate recorded by Thucydides in Book V of his The Peloponnesian War: "The strong do what they can and the weak bear what they must!" (1951, p. 331). (This counterintuitive rejection of the traditional security paradigm is a major feature of Malcolm Gladwell’s [2013] new book, David and Goliath: Underdogs, Misfits, and the Art of Battling Giants.)

In contrast to the traditional security paradigm, which "glorifies brute force and breeds violence," the “constructive engagement” approach to dealing with complex global issues --reflecting an alternative, positive-sum security paradigm -- will be more effective because it "seeks to resolve these issues by addressing their underlying causes” (emphasis added).  For Rouhani that means that, “We must pay attention to the issue of identity as a key driver of tension in, and beyond, the Middle East" (emphasis added) (see Korostelina, 2007). Rouhani goes on to mention “identity” a number of times, suggesting that he is not only “savvy” about the language of conflict resolution, but, given the emphasis implied by his repeated use of the term,  he may actually mean what he says. In other words, there is a difference between merely uttering a few conflict resolution buzzwords and actually believing in the value of “constructive engagement,” whether one uses the buzzwords or not.

Indeed, Rouhani comes down strongly on the need to deal with the deep-rooted, underlying causes and conditions of violent conflict, one of which is identity -- a basic human need in John Burton’s (1997) typology of needs. Failure to do so may contribute to an observed trend in the incidence of conflicts worldwide: "growing numbers of conflict recurrences in the recent past serve as one of the most significant contributors to ... conflict trends. Year to year, many conflicts do subside, but other conflicts that had been dormant reignite. That has been the pattern over the past ten years ...." (emphasis added) (Hewitt, 2012, p. 25).  One reason for conflict recurrence appears to be that, "the internationally brokered settlement or containment of many armed conflicts since the early 1990s did not deal effectively with root causes" (emphasis added) (Hewitt, et al., 2010, pp. 3, 4).

Rouhani develops further his argument that identity is a central concept in global affairs, violation of which may account for a number of the brutal conflicts of recent times. Hence, “At their core, the vicious battles in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria are over the nature of those countries’ identities and their consequent roles in our region and the world." Rouhani then moves from the general to the specific by connecting his proposition on the link between a violated sense of identity and violent conflict – basically a restatement of Burton’s (1997) BHNs theory – to Iran’s relations with the U.S. and Israel: "The centrality of identity extends to the case of our peaceful nuclear energy program. To us [this] is about who Iranians are as a nation, our demands for dignity and respect and our consequent place in the world. Without comprehending the role of identity, many issues we all face will remain unresolved" (emphasis added).  The clear subtext here is that, if American, Israeli, and other political leaders do not understand the emotional connection between Iran’s nuclear energy program and their sense of who they are, then the Iranian-Western conflict is likely to escalate, in large part because of an enhanced “frustration-aggression” dynamic (see Dollard, et al., 1939). Indeed, if Rouhani’s initiative is perceived by Iran’s Supreme Leader and others not to have been “respected” and reciprocated, then escalation in the Iranian-Western conflict is very likely.

In addition to reaching out to Washington to deal constructively with his country’s contentious nuclear energy program, Rouhani makes a bold offer "to help facilitate dialogue between the Syrian government and the opposition" (as suggested in my recent letter to the Financial Times [Sandole, 2013]). His objective would be for Iran "to engage with neighbors and other nations to identify and secure win-win solutions."

President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry have started to engage President Rouhani on his various claims and offers. And so they should, as against the background of what we think we know in our field, Rouhani’s op-ed in The Washington Post seems to be much more than the "charm offensive" that some critics have alleged. As he comments: "This [constructive engagement] approach can be useful for efforts to prevent cold conflicts from turning hot. But to move beyond impasses, whether in relation to Syria, my country's nuclear program or its relations with the United States, we need to aim higher. Rather than focusing on how to prevent things from getting worse, we need to think -- and talk -- about how to make things better." We need, in other words, to “reframe” our respective narratives of the other and of our common problems which require solution.

Surely, we can do that!  We have the capacity and the wisdom, to help prevent the Middle East from spinning further out of control by dealing resolutely with two of its interrelated problems which President Rouhani has pledged to help resolve: Iran’s nuclear energy program and the vicious civil war in neighboring Syria. As with other complex issues, however, this is easier said than done. One resilient challenge is that both Iran and the U.S., not to mention Israel, are gripped by “enemy images” of the other (see Volkan, 1988, 1985). President Rouhani has decided to confront this obstacle to “constructive engagement.” The least we – the U.S., Israel, and others -- can do is to reciprocate the courtesy and do the same. As S-CAR’s founder, Dr. Bryant Wedge has also said, “Nothing ever happens unless you take a chance!”

Let’s take the chance!

References

Burton, John W. (1997). Violence Explained. Manchester (England): Manchester University Press and New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Deutsch, Morton (1973). The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes. New Haven (CT) and London: Yale University Press.

Dollard, J., L.W. Doob, N.E. Miller, O.H. Mowrer, and R.R. Sears (1939), Frustration and Aggression, Yale University Press, New Haven.

Gladwell, Malcolm (2013). David and Goliath: Underdogs, Misfits, and the Art of Battling Giants. Boston: Little, Brown.

Hewitt, J. Joseph, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted Robert Gurr (2012). Peace and Conflict 2012. Boulder (CO) and London:  Paradigm Publishers.

Hewitt, J. Joseph (2012). “Trends in Global Conflict, 1946-2009.” In Peace and Conflict 2012, J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted Robert Gurr (eds.). Boulder (CO): Paradigm Publishers.

Hewitt, J.  Joseph, Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Ted Robert Gurr (2010).  Peace and Conflict 2010.  Boulder (Colorado):  Paradigm  Publishers. 

Korostelina, Karina V. (2007). Social Identity and Conflict: Structures, Dynamics, and Implications. New York:  Palgrave Macmillan.

Pruitt, Dean G. (1987). “Creative Approaches to Negotiation.” In Conflict Management and Problem Solving: Interpersonal to International Applications, Dennis J.D. Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste (eds). London: Frances Pinter and New York: New York University Press.

Rouhani, Hassan (2013). "Time to Engage: Iran's New Approach to the World." The Washington Post, 20 September 2013, p. A21.

Sandole, Dennis J.D. (2013). “Look to Iran for a Solution.” Letter to the Editor, Financial Times, 10 September, p. 6.

Sandole, Dennis J.D. (2010). Peacebuilding: Preventing Violent Conflict in a Complex World (Series on War and Conflict in the Modern World). Cambridge (UK) and Malden (MA):  Polity Press.

Sherif, Muzafer (1967). Group Conflict and Cooperation: Their Social Psychology. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Thucydides (1951). The Peloponnesian War (Unabridged Crawley translation). New York: Modern Library (Random House).

Volkan, Vamik D (1988), The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: From Clinical Practice to International Relationships, Jason Aronson, Northvale (NJ) and London.

Volkan, Vamik D (1985). “The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: A Developmental Approach,” Political Psychology, vol. 6, no. 2, June, pp. 219-245.

#Picture by Flickr user Madhu Babu Pandi